

**The Syntax,
Semantics and
Pragmatics of
Spanish Mood**

Henk Haverkate

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The Syntax, Semantics and Pragmatics of Spanish Mood

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Introduction

The present book on mood in Spanish is a revised, extended and updated version of a study originally written in Dutch (Haverkate, 1989). Its fundamental purpose is to provide a consistent description and explanation of the syntax, the semantics and the pragmatics of the modal system of contemporary Peninsular Spanish.

At the level of syntactic analysis, modal variation will be examined in both subordinate and non-subordinate clauses. As to the latter, a comparative study will be conducted into the use of the imperative, the indicative and the subjunctive mood. Modal variation in dependent clauses will be investigated within the framework of the distinction between noun clauses, adverbial clauses and adjective clauses.

The semantic focus of attention will be the central role of the truthfunctional categories of *realis*, *potentialis* and *irrealis* as parameters relevant to mood selection. Special attention will be paid to the different ways in which these parameters interact with the types of information conveyed by the proposition of embedded clauses. In relation to this, a new classification of complement-taking predicates will be proposed, the basic criterion being the cognitive structure of the input-output mechanism underlying intentional human behavior.

At the level of pragmatic analysis, in conclusion, mood selection will be studied from a variety of perspectives. Thus, specific research will be conducted within the framework of speech act theory, the theory of Gricean maxims, presupposition, relevance, and politeness.

This book has been especially written for researchers and advanced-level students of Spanish linguistics.

Modal categories of the Spanish verb

Levels of analysis

Research into the modal categories of the Spanish verb, the so-called *modos verbales* or *modos del verbo*, can be carried out at five different levels of analysis, viz., (I) the *phonetic* level, (II) the *morphological* level, (III) the *syntactic* level, (IV) the *semantic level*, and (V) the *pragmatic* level.

(I) In the *phonetic* output of the *modos verbales*, supra-segmental features play a major role by virtue of the fact that modal differences are often accompanied by differences in pitch and/or sentence stress. Thus, a clear prosodic contrast is likely to be produced and perceived between the assertion *Cierra la puerta Juan* ('Juan closes the door') and the order ¡*Cierra la puerta, Juan!* ('Juan, close the door!'), which are morpho-syntactically distinguished by the use of the indicative and the imperative mood, respectively. It is not only indicative and imperative sentences but subjunctive sentences which may be marked for a special intonation contour. This applies in particular to the exclamatory output of optative speech acts such as ¡*Viva el presidente!* ('Long live the president!') and ¡*Muera la reina!* ('Away with the queen!'). In this book, we will be concerned only incidentally with the study of prosodic patterns.

(II) From a *morphological* point of view, the modal paradigms of Spanish are comparable to those of tense, aspect, gender, number, and case. Each of these categories is defined by one or more sets of minimal morphological oppositions. Gender and number are formally expressed by the contrast between masculine vs. feminine and singular vs. plural, respectively. Case inflection is restricted to personal and reflexive pronouns.

Tense, aspect and mood, which are compressed into the ending of the verb, determine the paradigmatic system of Spanish conjugation. Traditionally, Spanish grammars distinguish three *modos verbales*: *imperativo*, *indicativo* and *subjuntivo*, each of which is characterized by idiosyncratic formal contrasts.

The imperative shows a kind of hybrid inflection, since it is only the second persons singular and plural of the affirmative paradigm which can be consid-

ered authentic imperative forms; the remaining endings, including the entire negative paradigm, are identical with the corresponding forms of the present subjunctive. In synchronic analysis, this formal equivalence should be regarded as a case of homonymy, due to the fact that the imperative and the subjunctive mood perform quite different roles, both syntactically and pragmatically. Compare, for instance, the contrast between: *¡Venga usted aquí!* ('Come here!') and *No me gusta que venga usted aquí* ('I do not like you to come here'), where identity of modal form is totally unrelated to identity of function.

Lastly note that, from a typological point of view, Spanish does not belong to the class of languages in which the second person singular of the imperative corresponds with the root of the verb. In Spanish, this situation is the exception to the rule, as demonstrated by the fact that imperative forms such as *ten* ('hold'), *sal* ('leave') and *ven* ('come') represent inflectional irregularities.

(III) With respect to *syntactic* description, our point of departure will be the dichotomy between subordinate and non-subordinate clauses. Within this frame of reference, the three *modos verbales* show striking differences as far as their distributional potential is concerned; that is to say, the occurrence of the imperative is exclusively restricted to non-subordinate clauses. The use of the indicative is not subject to this constraint; it equally appears in both subordinate and non-subordinate clauses. As predicted by the etymology of the term, the main working area of the subjunctive (< Lat. *subiungere*: 'submit') is the subordinate clause.

In this book, research into the syntax of the *modos verbales* in subordinate clauses will be carried out in accordance with their distribution in noun clauses, adjective clauses and adverbial clauses.

(IV) A representative description of the *semantics* of Spanish mood requires a variety of criteria to be applied. To start with, in both subordinate and non-subordinate clauses, the truthfunctional categories of *realis*, *potentialis* and *irrealis* play a major part in interpreting the variation of the indicative and the subjunctive.

Furthermore, in non-subordinate clauses, the use of the imperative, the indicative and the subjunctive correlates with predicate selection. Thus, for instance, the imperative mood is typically selected by action predicates. The starting point for the semantic analysis of mood in subordinate clauses is the afore-mentioned tripartite of noun clauses, adjective clauses and adverbial clauses. More precisely, mood selection in noun clauses is dependent to a large extent on the lexical class-membership of the embedding predicate. Compare,

e.g., the following classification of verbs that are claimed to bring about the use of the subjunctive in the embedded clause: *verbos de duda o desconocimiento* ('verbs of doubt or ignorance'), *verbos de temor y emoción* ('verbs of fear and emotion') and *verbos de posibilidad* ('verbs of possibility') (Real Academia Española 1981: 456–457).

Modal variation in adverbial clauses is basically determined by the meaning of the subordinating conjunction. The semantic analysis of *para que* ('in order that'), *sin que* ('without') and *a condición de que* ('on the condition that'), for instance, explains why these conjunctions govern the subjunctive mood.

The modal pattern of adjective clauses, lastly, must be accounted for in terms of the referential properties of the antecedent. Here, we will be concerned in particular with the distinctive features *specific*, *non-specific* and *non-existing*.

(V) *Pragmatic* research into the *modos verbales* should primarily focus on the illocutionary functions of the imperative, the indicative and the subjunctive. Within this frame of reference, we find that, in most cases, speakers make use of the imperative to make a request or to issue an order. Further note that the indicative is the mood typically associated with the expression of assertives, while the subjunctive is generally used in sentences uttered to make a wish or to express a desire. Other pragmatic factors bear on the modal interpretation of subordinate clauses. The appearance of the subjunctive, for instance, may be triggered by certain kinds of presupposition, a low degree of relevance and manipulation of the information conveyed.

Functions of the modal categories of the Spanish verb

From a functional perspective, the first point to be noticed is that the indicative and the subjunctive perform two entirely different tasks, whereas the imperative performs only one. Taking up again the distinction between subordinate and non-subordinate clauses, we find that in the latter the *modos verbales* contribute in an essential way to the expression of illocutionary functions. Specifically, the modal inflection of the verb is indicative, to a large extent, of the type of speech act performed by the speaker of the sentence. Although, in the course of time, several proposals have been put forward to establish a taxonomy of speech acts, it is generally acknowledged that the classification set up by Searle (1976) has not been surpassed so far.¹ Two of the five classes of speech acts distinguished by Searle are relevant to the present context: *assertives* and *directives*. Assertive speech acts serve the purpose of convincing the hearer that the speaker commits him/herself to the truth of the proposition expressed. The purpose of directive speech acts is to influence the intentional behavior of the hearer in such a way that the latter carries out the action specified by the proposition.² Characteristic members of the class of directives are requests, orders and entreaties.

One of the criteria underlying Searle's classification is the so-called *direction of fit*, which bears on the relation between the words uttered and the world referred to. In some cases, the utterance of the words serves to describe a state of affairs; in others, it serves to create one. This difference has been formulated in the following way:

Some illocutions have as part of their illocutionary point to get the words (more strictly — their propositional content —) to match the world, others to get the world to match the words. Assertions are in the former category, promises and requests are in the latter (Searle 1976: 3).

In regard to assertions, therefore, the words should match the world, which means that the direction of fit is *words to world*. For directives, on the contrary, the opposite is true. At the moment the request, order or entreaty is

uttered, the state of affairs the speaker wishes to ensure does not exist, which is self-evident because of the fact that it would constitute a form of irrational behavior to ask a person, for instance, to shut a window that is already closed. In other words, the directive speaker attempts to get the hearer to modify the world in accordance with the words uttered, as a result of which the direction of fit is *world to words*.

In non-subordinate clauses, the indicative is the mood typically characterizing assertive sentences. This is also suggested by the term *indicativo*, derived from Lat. *indicare*: ‘indicate’. In the same way, the imperative is the prototypical mood of directive sentences. We could say, therefore, that, in assertive sentences, the indicative fulfills a world-describing function, while, in directive sentences, the imperative fulfills a world-changing function.

How about the subjunctive? As observed earlier, the occurrence of this mood is mainly restricted to subordinate clauses. Nevertheless, it formally characterizes a type of speech act not explicitly mentioned by Searle, but dealt with by traditional Spanish grammar under the heading *oraciones optativas*. This term refers to sentences expressing wishes or desires that cannot be fulfilled by human agents. Typical cases in point are exclamations such as *¡Muera el general!* (‘Away with the general!’), *¡Viva el presidente!* (‘Long live the president!’).

In subordinate clauses, which cannot be assigned an autonomous illocutionary function, the use of the imperative is excluded. This equally applies to noun clauses, adverbial clauses, and adjective clauses. As to the appearance of the indicative and the subjunctive mood, certain pragmatic factors, such as presupposition and relevance, may determine their interpretation, but it is primarily semantic criteria which account for their distribution. Most research has been devoted to noun clauses in order to examine the influence of the matrix predicate on the modal output of the embedded clause. However, as may be shown by the difference between *Creo que lo he visto* (‘I believe that I have seen it’) and *No creo que lo haya visto* (‘I do not believe that I have seen it’), other factors may be involved as well. That is, in these sentences, it is not only the selection of the matrix predicate *creo* but its occurrence in an affirmative or negative clause which causes the embedded verb to be marked for the indicative or the subjunctive mood, respectively.

When describing modal distribution in noun clauses, grammars do not usually limit themselves to simply setting up three lists of matrix predicates, according to whether these trigger the use of the indicative, the subjunctive, or, alternatively, one or the other mood. Instead, several proposals have been made for classifying the lexical meaning of matrix predicates, which, as point-

ed out above, is considered to be the basic parameter involved in the analysis of modal variation.

Up till now, however, these proposals have not resulted in a well-defined framework that exhaustively specifies the members of the class of clause-embedding predicates. In Chapter 5, a new taxonomy of these predicates will be propounded, its defining characteristic being the set of cognitive categories that determine the structure of the input-output mechanism underlying intentional human behavior.

The modal structure of non-subordinate clauses

In non-subordinate clauses, the imperative and the subjunctive — more precisely, the optative subjunctive — on the one hand, and the indicative, on the other, fulfill different types of illocutionary functions. The use of the imperative and the optative subjunctive reflects the performance of speech acts defined by the world-to-words direction of fit, that is, speech acts that serve the purpose of bringing about a state of affairs not existing at coding time. As pointed out in Chapter 1, the imperative is the mood associated with the expression of directives, the optative subjunctive with the expression of wishes or desires. The indicative is generally considered to be the mood characterizing the expression of assertives. Nevertheless, it should not be overlooked that it may also be involved in the representation of other illocutionary functions. Compare, e.g., the emphatic directive meaning of the present and the future indicative in: *¡Te vas al mercado y me compras dos kilos de plátanos!* ('You go to the market and buy me two kilos of bananas!') and *¡Te callarás ahora mismo!* ('You shall shut up right now!'). In Section 3.2.2 indicative sentences expressing other types of speech acts will be discussed. For the moment, we may conclude that, due to its extensive illocutionary potential, the indicative mood is to be qualified as neutral or unmarked in contrast to the imperative and the subjunctive.

The next sections will focus on the syntax, the semantics and the pragmatics of the *modos verbales*. This investigation comprises two phases: firstly, attention will be paid to the syntactic and semantic structure of imperative, indicative and subjunctive sentences; secondly, the pragmatic function of each of these moods will be examined in accordance with the typology of speech acts discussed in the previous chapter. In chronological order, then, we will be concerned with the analysis of directives, assertives and optatives.

3.1 Imperative sentences

3.1.1 Syntactic and semantic structure

Imperative sentences are distinguished from indicative and subjunctive ones by four syntactic characteristics:

(I) The imperative mood is inflected for second-person reference in two different ways, according to the affirmative or negative structure of the sentence. This may be shown by the following pair of sentences:

- (1) a. ¡Devuélvele el dinero mañana!
(‘Return the money to him tomorrow!’)
- b. ¡No le devuelvas el dinero mañana!
(‘Do not return the money to him tomorrow!’)

By way of comparison, this distinction does not apply to indicative and subjunctive sentences:

- (2) a. Estás aquí mañana
(‘You are here tomorrow’)
- b. No estás aquí mañana
(‘You are not here tomorrow’)
- (3) a. Tal vez estéis aquí mañana
(‘Perhaps you are here tomorrow’)
- b. Tal vez no estéis aquí mañana
(‘Perhaps you are not here tomorrow’)

Examples (2) and (3) make it clear that, in contrast to imperative sentences, the expression of affirmation and negation does not influence modal inflection in indicative and subjunctive sentences.

(II) In affirmative imperative sentences, certain clitic constructions present phonetic and orthographic peculiarities, which need to be described by means of one general and two specific rules. The formulation of the former runs as follows: in a sequence consisting of the first-person plural morpheme, the third person clitic *se* and another third-person clitic, the final *s* of the verb ending and the initial *s* of *se* are reduced to one single sibilant. Compare: **pidámosselo* → *pidámoselo* (‘let us ask it to him’). The specific rules apply to two unique endings of the verb *ir*: **vámosnos* → *vámonos* (‘let’s go’) and **íos* → *idos* (‘go away’ — 2nd pers. pl).

(III) A second rule bearing on the syntax of clitics may be inferred from examples (1a) and (1b). Unlike what happens in negative sentences, in affirmative ones — compare (1a) — the unstressed pronoun directly follows the imperative ending of the verb, as a result of which suffix formation takes place. Note that the affirmative imperative is the only paradigm of the Spanish verb that is marked for this type of cliticization.³

(IV) As compared to the subject of indicative and subjunctive sentences, the imperative subject presents two idiosyncratic properties. First, it cannot but express second-person reference, which, for obvious reasons, is a universal constraint on the output of imperative conjugation. Note that this also applies to first-person plural imperatives, such as *vámonos*, which include reference to both the speaker and the addressee(s). Second, imperative sentences usually lack a pronominal subject. From a communicative point of view, this phenomenon is related to the above constraint on referential potential, since, after having correctly interpreted the imperative meaning of the sentence, the hearer identifies him/herself as the person who is supposed to carry out the action specified by the proposition. For this reason, the agent need not be explicitly referred to by pronoun selection. In other words:

In the case of imperatives [...] it is even the general rule that the Agent is left unspecified, no doubt because it is evident from the illocutionary act of “ordering” itself that the addressee is the intended Agent of the predication (Dik 1989: 74).

Although subjectless sentences in Spanish represent a common phenomenon on account of the pro-drop character of the language, there is a fundamental distinction between imperative and non-imperative subject deletion. In contrast to imperative sentences, in non-imperative ones it is not seldom the case that the implicit subject is retrievable only by means of specific background information, so that, without relevant knowledge of the context or situation of utterance, it may be impossible for the hearer to identify the referent of the subject. Compare, for instance, a sentence like *Le escribía una carta de despedida* (‘I / he / she / you wrote a valedictory letter to her’), where *yo, él, ella* and *usted* are the potential fillers of the subject slot. The subject of *¡Escribale una carta de despedida!* (‘Write her a valedictory letter!’), on the contrary, is identifiable without particular contextual or situational information.

In non pro-drop languages, in conclusion, only imperative sentences may lack an overt subject. As pointed out earlier, this phenomenon is a linguistic universal, or to put it more strictly, subjectless imperative sentences occur in

all languages of the world, regardless of the syntactic behavior of the subject in non-imperative ones.

It is to be noticed that subject deletion in imperative sentences may also be explained from an interactional point of view. This explanation rests on the assumption that uttering a request, order or entreaty represents a face-threatening act, a concept developed by Brown and Levinson (1987) to account for the fact that the performance of a directive speech act potentially threatens the hearer's freedom to act. Not making explicit the imperative subject, then, mitigates the force of the directive, since the hearer is not overtly identified as the person who is supposed to do the act described for the benefit of the speaker.

The next question to be raised is: in what kind of situations do speakers select an imperative subject? First of all, they do so when making conventional use of the personal pronoun *usted*, which, in both imperative and non-imperative sentences, expresses different types of social deixis. The basic parameters involved in the selection of *usted* are the categories of *power* and *solidarity* (Brown and Gilman, 1960). Power relations are typically based on age, sex and socio-economic position, and normally lead to the use of *usted* when the addressee is the powerful interactant. *Usted* is also the prototypical pronoun of address in interactions where no power or solidarity relation holds between speaker and hearer. Illustrative examples are encounters between strangers in a train, an elevator, or a waiting-room.

In addition to expressing social distance by the use of the pronoun *usted*, there are two more reasons for the speaker to make explicit the imperative subject: emphasizing directive force and expressing contrastive reference. Directive reinforcement produces the perlocutionary effect of an order. In an example such as:

- (4) ¡Ven aquí tú!
(‘Come here, you!’)

the use of the second-person pronoun stresses the wish of the speaker to impose his/her will or authority on the hearer. What we are dealing with here in particular, is communication situations where the addressee has not complied with a previously uttered request or order. In light of this, (4) can be considered a reinforced follow-up of *Ven aquí*.

Contrastive reference typifies imperative sentences describing the assignment of different tasks to the members of a set of addressees, who, in order to avoid ambiguity, are overtly referred to by second-person pronouns. Compare, e.g.:

- (5) Buscad vosotros en esta habitación y llama tú a la policía
(‘You search this room and you call the police’)

Finally note that emphasizing directive force and making contrastive reference are not language-specific factors involved in the generation of imperative subjects; they equally apply to pro-drop and non pro-drop languages.

As for the semantic analysis of imperative sentences, my focus of attention will be the constraints on predicate selection. This selection is strictly determined by the illocutionary function of imperatives, which was defined above in the following way: the primary goal of the imperative speaker is to control the intentional behavior of the addressee in such a way that the latter, for the benefit of the speaker, performs a certain act, or, in the case of a prohibitive speaker, refrains from performing a certain act. It follows that verbs denoting an action or activity are the prototypical members of the class of imperative predicates.

Within a general linguistic frame of reference, such as the one established by Dik (1980), a distinction can be made between four types of predicates, according to whether they describe the states of affairs we perceive in the world in terms of one of the following categories:

- (I) action (II) process (III) position (IV) state⁴

There are two distinctive features underlying this typology: the feature *control* and the feature *dynamic*. The former applies to predicates denoting states of affairs that can only be controlled or brought about by human agents. The feature *dynamic* applies to states of affairs consisting in “a recurrent pattern of changes all through the duration of the state of affairs, or in a change from some initial state of affairs into some different final state of affairs” (Dik 1989:91). Now, combining the positive and negative values of both features enables us to exhaustively specify the set of predicates of a language in terms of the four categories mentioned above. Let us consider some examples from Spanish:

Diagram 1

- | | | |
|--|-------------|--|
| (I) [+ <i>control</i>]
[+ <i>dynamic</i>] | → action: | <i>leer, caminar, asesinar</i> |
| (II) [- <i>control</i>]
[+ <i>dynamic</i>] | → process: | <i>crecer, anochecer, derrumbarse</i> |
| (III) [+ <i>control</i>]
[- <i>dynamic</i>] | → position: | <i>mantenerse en pie, quedarse con los brazos cruzados, permanecer</i> |
| (IV) [- <i>control</i>]
[- <i>dynamic</i>] | → state: | <i>saber, ser inherente, estar enterado</i> ⁵ |

leer ('to read')
caminar ('to walk')
asesinar ('to murder')
crecer ('to grow')
anocheecer ('to fall (night)')
derrumbarse ('to collapse')
mantenerse en pie ('to keep one's foothold')
quedarse con los brazos cruzados ('to keep sitting with folded arms')
permanecer ('to stay')
saber ('to know')
ser inherente ('to be inherent')
estar enterado ('to be informed')

From this survey it is clear that it is only action and position verbs that may be inflected for imperative mood. For purposes of illustration, consider:

- (6) Léeme este artículo, por favor. (*action*)
('Read me this article, please')
- (7) *No crezca usted tanto (*process*)
('Do not grow so much')
- (8) Quédate en casa (*position*)
('Stay home')
- (9) *Sepa usted latín (*state*)
('Know Latin')

The relationship between action and position predicates is further shown by the fact that both are compatible with adverbs or adverbials specifying the way in which the subject of the sentence controls the state of affairs indicated. Thus, we find both:

- (10) Carmen leía el periódico con interés
('Carmen read the newspaper with interest')

and

- (11) Carmen se quedaba en casa tranquilamente
('Carmen quietly stayed at home')

A similar kind of relationship concerns the appearance of benefactive constituents in action and position sentences:

- (12) Todo lo que hacemos lo hacemos por el sindicato
('Everything we do we do for the trade-union')
- (13) Teresa permanecía en su pueblo natal por su padre
('Teresa stayed in her native village for the sake of her father')

Finally, action and position predicates share the characteristic that they may occur in complement clauses inherently expressing a controllable state of affairs. This may be seen from the following pair of sentences, where the matrix predicate *persuadir* ('to persuade') imposes the above condition on the content of the complement clause:

- (14) Su padre la persuadió de que asesinara al vecino
(‘Her father persuaded her to murder the neighbor’)
- (15) Su padre la persuadió de que permaneciera en su pueblo natal
(‘Her father persuaded her to stay in her native village’)

The foregoing tests produce negative results when applied to process and state predicates, which, as we have observed before, are not inflected for the imperative mood. Compare, e.g., the ungrammaticality of:

- (16) *Anohecía con interés
(‘The night was falling with interest’)
- (17) *Anohecía por su padre
(‘The night was falling for the sake of her father’)
- (18) *Su padre la persuadió de que anoheciera⁶
(‘Her father persuaded her to cause the night to fall’)

Up till now, we have been examining imperative sentences with verbal predicates. This is no surprise, as it is particularly this type of predicate to which the feature *control* applies. Sporadically, however, we also find adjectives filling the predicate slot of imperative sentences, as shown, for instance, by:

- (19) Sé bueno
(‘Be good’)
- (20) No seas estúpido
(‘Do not be stupid’)

Bueno and *estúpido* are typical state predicates, and, for that reason, they are negatively defined with respect to the features *control* and *dynamic*. As illustrated by (19) and (20), however, they can fulfill the function of imperative predicate, in which case they do not denote an act, but the result of an act or a sequence of acts not specified by the lexical meaning of the adjective. As to (19), for example, the hearer is supposed to infer from the context or situation of utterance what form of behavior he ought to exhibit in order to be considered a decent person. In case (20), he ought to avoid behaving like an unintelligent person.

To conclude the semantic analysis of imperative sentences, there follows a

discussion of four constraints the speaker may impose on the performance of the act by the hearer. These constraints concern the manner, the time, the place and the conditions involved in the performance of the act. The manner constraint can be illustrated by the difference between:

- (21) Traduzcan ustedes este texto
(‘Translate this text’)

and

- (22) Traduzcan ustedes este texto por escrito
(‘Translate this text in writing’)

Obviously, in the latter but not in the former situation, the way the act must be done is restricted in a special way by the content of the manner adverbial.

The use of temporal adverbials enables the speaker to indicate that the act must be done at a certain moment or during a certain period of time:

- (23) Vuelva usted a las dos de la tarde
(‘Come back at two o’clock in the afternoon’)

- (24) Espérala hasta las diez y media
(‘Wait for her until ten thirty’)

As is self-evident, locative constraints bear on the place where the act must be done:

- (25) Lavad el coche delante del garaje
(‘Wash the car in front of the garage’)

Conditional restrictions, lastly, specify the circumstances under which the request, order or entreaty must be complied with:

- (26) Si empieza a llover, cierra las ventanas
(‘If it starts raining, close the windows’)

3.1.2 Pragmatic function

Unlike English, where the imperative mood is primarily associated with issuing an order, the Spanish imperative is commonly used to make a request. Although, as we will see below, imperative sentences may express a wide variety of illocutionary functions, our central focus of interest will be the analysis of requests and orders, that is, the prototypical members of the class of direc-

tive speech acts. The distinction between requests and orders can be appropriately described in terms of pragmatic markedness, the former category being the unmarked, the latter the marked member of the opposition. This is equivalent to stating that, under normal circumstances, speakers make use of a request; they have recourse to an order when they have particular reasons for not making a request. Thus, for instance, orders can have a ceremonial status inherent in certain hierarchically ordered institutions such as the army. What we find in these cases, is that orders or commands have a codified form which excludes modification by individual speakers. Compare, e.g., performative imperatives like *¡Rompan filas!* ('Break ranks!') and *¡Presenten armas!* ('Present arms!'), which cannot be replaced by variants such as **Les ordeno que rompan filas* ('I order you to break ranks') and **Presenten armas, por favor* ('Present arms, please'). Furthermore, orders are typically issued in communication situations where the hearer has disregarded a previous directive speech act of a speaker endowed with power or authority in the corresponding area of behavior.

Requests typify three kinds of social relations between speaker and hearer:

- (I) the speaker has power over the hearer, but does not want to make it explicit
- (II) no power relation holds between speaker and hearer
- (III) the hearer has power over the speaker

Not only in Spanish culture, but in Western cultures in general, making a request is considered a polite form of verbal behavior which basically serves to prevent the interlocutor from losing face. This is most clearly seen in the first interaction pattern mentioned above, where the directive speaker intends to disguise his/her power or authority over the hearer.

After discussing the difference between requests and orders from an interactional point of view, we now come to the analysis of their linguistic form as expressed by the imperative sentence.⁷ The distinctive feature involved is the directive intonation pattern, which, in principle, shows a rising or a falling contour, according to whether a request or an order is uttered. Nevertheless, the difference is not always produced, or, if it is produced, the interpretation may be ambiguous.⁸ As a consequence, the hearer must basically rely on his/her knowledge of the context or situation of utterance in order to correctly interpret the directive force of the imperative sentence. We may get an insight into this process by looking at communication situations characterized by predetermined roles of the interactants, such as those of shopkeeper and customer, and waiter and client. In these routine interactions, imperatives

are conventionally interpreted as requests and not as orders, due to the fact that both speaker and hearer are aware that no power relation holds between them in the area of behavior involved. Consider the following examples:

- (27) Póngame tres kilos de plátanos
(‘Give me three kilos of bananas’)
- (28) Traíganos dos cervezas y un vino tinto
(‘Bring us two beers and one red wine’)

It is further to be noticed that speakers often make use of certain linguistic and paralinguistic strategies to clarify their directive intention. In the latter case, one may think of visual signs such as a wink or a smile, and an angry look or a clenched fist, which support the request and the order interpretation of the imperative, respectively.⁹ Linguistic devices making manifest the type of directive force expressed by the imperative include the use of vocatives, interjections, and tag questions. Examples (29)–(31) illustrate how these categories mitigate or strengthen the force of the directive:

Requests	Orders
(29) Oye, Juan, escúchame (‘Just listen to me, Juan’)	(29) a. ¡Escúchame!, ¿ya? (‘Listen to me, I say!’)
(30) Suéltame, por favor (‘Let me go, please’)	(30) a. ¡Suéltame, imbécil! (‘Let me go, you imbecile!’)
(31) Apaga esa luz. ¿quieres? (‘Put out that light, will you?’)	(31) a. ¡Venga, apaga esa luz! (‘Come on, put that light out!’)

Besides imperative sentences, there are many other sentence types that can be used to express directive meaning. Thus, for example, we may find the following variants of *Dame la llave* (‘Give me the key’), *¿Puedes darme la llave?* (‘Can you give me the key?’), *¿Quieres darme la llave?* (‘Will you give me the key?’), *¿Me das la llave?* (Lit. ‘Do you give me the key?’), *¿Tienes la llave tú?* (‘Do you have the key?’), and *No veo la llave* (‘I do not see the key’).¹⁰

Empirical research by Mulder (1998) has shown that in contemporary Peninsular Spanish imperatives represent the most frequently employed directive category. The statistical analysis of a corpus of about 100,000 words used in a great diversity of communication situations brought to light that the imperative covered 42% of the total number of directive expressions.

In the foregoing discussion, the focus of interest has been on imperative sentences expressing requests and orders, that is, the two illocutionary acts we have qualified as the fundamental subacts of the class of directive speech acts.

It should be taken into consideration, however, that imperative sentences are also employed to perform a wide range of other illocutionary functions. Compare, e.g., the following set of examples:

- (32) Pruebe este jerez si le gusta el tipo seco
(‘Try this sherry if you like the dry type’)
- (33) Ayúdame, por favor
(‘Please, help me’)
- (34) Agítese antes de usar
(‘Shake before use’)
- (35) Esperemos diez minutos más
(‘Let’s wait ten more minutes’)
- (36) Pase y siéntese
(‘Come in and sit down’)
- (37) ¿Podemos entrar? — Entren, entren
(‘May we come in? — Please, enter’)
- (38) Ten cuidado
(‘Be careful’)
- (39) ¡No te acerques, que te pego!
(‘Do not come up to me, I shall hit you’)
- (40) Reciba mi más sincera enhorabuena
(‘Receive my most sincere congratulations’)

When specifying the illocutionary point of these imperatives, we get, in chronological order, advice (32), an entreaty (33), a direction for use (34), a proposal (35), an invitation (36), a permission (37), a warning (38), a challenge (39), and congratulations (40).

Finally note that the direction of fit of the foregoing imperatives is *world to words*, independently of the illocutionary function they perform.

3.2 Indicative sentences

3.2.1 Syntactic and semantic structure

A comparison between the paradigmatic systems of the indicative and imperative mood reveals striking quantitative and qualitative differences. While the imperative consists of two paradigms only, the *imperativo afirmativo* and the

imperativo negativo, the indicative is made up of nine paradigms: *presente*, *futuro*, *condicional*, *pretérito indefinido*, *pretérito imperfecto*, *presente perfecto*, *pluscuamperfecto*, *futuro perfecto*, and *condicional perfecto*. In contrast to their imperative counterparts, the indicative paradigms are distinguished by a set of semantic parameters bearing on the categories of tense, aspect and truth value. The diversity of temporal and aspectual information conveyed by the indicative mood is strictly related to its primary assertive function. That is to say, speakers telling a story, submitting a report, or, in general, making a comment feel the need to situate the states of affairs described in the present, the past or the future. If a past tense is selected, they may further specify the information from a perfective or an imperfective point of view by making use of the *indefinido* or the *imperfecto*, respectively. In relation to this, remember that the imperative does not express particular temporal or aspectual information, which is a natural consequence of the fact that this mood is characterized by the *world-to-words* direction of fit. The category of truth value, lastly, plays a role in certain uses of the *futuro* and the *condicional*.

Some characteristic syntactic properties of indicative sentences have already been discussed from a comparative perspective in the section on imperatives, where the focus of attention was on: (I) affirmation vs. negation, (II) the position of clitic pronouns, and (III) subject deletion. For the sake of convenience, I repeat the major conclusions:

(I) In indicative sentences, the difference between affirmation and negation is not marked by modal inflection, as was shown by the identical verb endings of (2a) *Estás aquí mañana* and (2b) *No estás aquí mañana*.

(II) In indicative sentences, clitic pronouns typically fill the slot immediately preceding the finite verb, as illustrated by an example such as:

- (41) Te devolveré el texto dentro de una semana
(‘I shall return the text to you within a week’)

In footnote 3, it was pointed out that, as far as clitic placement is concerned, periphrastic constructions admit free variation, as a result of which the unstressed pronoun may precede the finite verb, or follow the non-finite one.

(III) In indicative sentences, subject deletion must be regarded as a consequence of the pro-drop character of the language, which is equivalent to stating that the appearance of overt subjects is triggered by specific contextual or situational factors. More precisely, in those cases where the speaker presupposes that the addressee has no access to relevant background information,

making explicit the subject ensures the correct identification of the referent. It is clear from this that subject deletion is blocked when contrastive or emphatic reference is involved. Compare, for instance:

- (42) A estos señores les gustan los deportes; él juega al tenis
y ella monta a caballo
(‘This couple is sport-loving; he plays tennis
and she rides on horseback’)

The semantic analysis of imperative predicates brought to light that, due to the directive force of the sentences in which they appear, no other verbs can be selected than those that are positively marked for the feature *control*. Obviously, this constraint does not apply to indicative sentences, which are pre-eminently uttered to make a statement. This means that assertive speakers may comment on an unlimited variety of states of affairs, so that they are not restricted to the selection of *action* and *position* predicates, but may also make use of *process* and *state* predicates.

In Chapter 2, the illocutionary point of assertives was defined in terms of the intention of the speaker to convince the hearer that he/she commits him/herself to the truth of the proposition expressed. In the context of the present section, this definition needs to be refined, since, as we know by experience, assertions don’t always have an absolute truth value. That is to say, speakers may make assumptions or raise doubts concerning the factuality of the states of affairs they report on. In Spanish, these types of propositional attitudes can be expressed by dubitative adverbs or adverbials such as *posiblemente* (‘possibly’), *a lo mejor* (‘maybe’), *con toda probabilidad* (‘in all probability’), as well as by means of embedded clauses subordinated to matrix predicates such as (*yo*) *creo que...* (‘I believe that...’), *es posible que...* (‘it is possible that...’), and *no parece probable que...* (‘it does not seem likely that...’). Moreover, the speaker may have recourse to certain indicative paradigms, basically the *futuro* and the *condicional*, to indicate that he/she is not sure that the state of affairs reported on represents an actual fact. As for the use of the *futuro*, the Real Academia observes:

Con el futuro de probabilidad expresamos suposición, conjetura o vacilación referidas al presente: *Serán las ocho* (supongo que *son*); *Estará enfadado* (supongo que *está*)...” (1981: 471).

(‘ With the future of probability we express assumptions, conjectures and hesitations with respect to the present: *It will be eight o’clock* (I suppose it is); *He will be angry* (‘I suppose he is’)...’)

Note that instead of *futuro de probabilidad* still other terms are in use: *futuro hipotético*, *futuro supositivo*, and *futuro epistémico*.

It goes without saying that assumptions may bear both on present and past states of affairs, and that is what explains the occurrence of the *condicional de probabilidad* as the past counterpart of the *futuro de probabilidad*. Compare, for instance:

- (43) Serían las doce cuando rompimos las filas los de mi batallón
(‘It will have been twelve o’clock when the soldiers of my battalion broke ranks’)
- (44) El párroco era alto y muy hermoso. Tendría unos cincuenta años, el pelo blanco y grandes ojos pardos
(‘The priest was tall and handsome. He will have been fifty years old; he had white hair and big grey eyes’)

Note that in hypothetical assertions such as (43) and (44) the *futuro perfecto* may also be employed as an alternative to the *condicional*. Thus, the following sentences express the same information as (43) and (44), respectively:

- (43) a. Habrán sido las doce cuando rompimos las filas los de mi batallón
- (44) a. El párroco era alto y muy hermoso. Habrá tenido unos cincuenta años, el pelo blanco, y grandes ojos pardos

Furthermore, the conditional plays a fundamental part in the expression of a particular type of hypothetical assertions, namely, hearsay. This use of the conditional marks the polyphonic origin of the information, enabling the speaker to avoid assuming the responsibility for the truth of the statement quoted. Therefore, one could properly speak of the use of the *condicional de posibilidad*. For illustration purposes, consider:

- (45) Según rumores no confirmados, habría estallado una nueva guerra civil en Nigeria
(‘According to unconfirmed rumors, a new civil war has broken out in Nigeria’)

The following observation shows that the polyphonic use of the conditional is not a language-particular phenomenon of Spanish:

Con más evidencia, pero también de forma más esquemática, aparece el *conditionnel* como metáfora temporal en el estilo periodístico. Georges y Robert le Bidois lo llaman *conditionnel “des dires”*; Paul Imbs, *conditionnel “de l’information hypothétique”*. Tiene el valor expresivo del *dicitur*: *le ministre préparerait une conférence de*

presse—‘parece que el ministro prepara una declaración.’ En todo caso, el hablante no se hace responsable de la exactitud de la noticia (Weinrich 1968: 144–145).

(‘There is more evidence, though in a more schematic form, for the appearance of the *conditionnel* as a temporal metaphor in journalistic prose. George and Robert le Bidier call it *conditionnel* “*des dires*”, Paul Imbs *conditionnel* “*de l’information hypothétique*”. It has the expressive value of the *dicatur*: *le ministre préparerait une conférence de presse* (‘the minister would prepare a declaration’). Anyhow, the speaker does not assume the responsibility for the exactness of the information’)

The most discussed function of the conditional, in conclusion, concerns its appearance in assertions on counterfactual states of affairs. In grammar books, this category of speech acts is usually illustrated by means of examples such as *Si ahora hiciera sol, iríamos a la playa* (‘If the sun were shining, now we would go to the beach’). It should be pointed out, however, that there is more involved in the use of the counterfactual conditional than what is suggested by this type of *irrealis* sentences. The Real Academia, for instance, examines sentences such as *Me gustaría verlo otra vez* (‘I would like to see it again’) and *Desearía hablar con usted* (‘I would like to talk to you’), characterizing them in the following way:

El condicional se emplea también como expresión de *cortesía* cuando anunciamos una pregunta o un ruego, o manifestamos una volición (1981: 474). (‘The conditional is also used as an expression of politeness when we are announcing a question or a request, or expressing a desire’)

Consider also:

El condicional de cortesía se encuentra en los idiomas más diversos. Por eso puede traducirse sin temor: *J’aimerais savoir...*; *Me gustaría saber...*; *Gostaria de saber...*; *I would like to know...*; *Ich würde (möchte) gerne wissen...* (Weinrich 1968: 146).

(‘The conditional of politeness occurs in a wide variety of languages. Therefore, it can be safely translated: *J’aimerais savoir...*; *Me gustaría saber...*; *Gostaria de saber...*; *I would like to know...*; *Ich würde (möchte) gerne wissen...*’)

It is implied by these statements that the expression of politeness by means of the conditional should be accounted for in a special, non-systemic way.

Compare: “... se emplea *también* (emphasis added)...” and “el condicional de cortesía”. In actual fact, however, we are dealing with references to unreal states of affairs, and this is precisely what brings about the polite interpretation of the examples under discussion. More strictly, it is the counterfactual meaning of the conditional which may be manipulated by the speaker to suggest that it depends on the ability and the willingness of the addressee whether or not the unreal state of affairs referred to is going to be transformed into a real one.

From an interactional point of view, finally, it is to be noticed that the so-called *condicional de cortesía* typically functions as a negative politeness strategy.

In regard to the different ways indicative sentences report on real and non-real states of affairs, we arrive at the conclusion that the situations we have been discussing in this section can be represented in terms of different points on a *realis–irrealis* scale. Let us consider the following set of examples:

- (46) Mis padres están de vacaciones
(‘My parents are on vacation’)
- (47) El vecino de enfrente estará en casa; todas las luces están encendidas
(‘The neighbor over the way will be at home; all the lights are on’)
- (48) Según las últimas noticias las tropas enemigas estarían a punto de retirarse
(‘According to the latest news, the enemy troops would be on the point of retreating’)
- (49) Si el portero no hubiera jugado tan bien, habríamos perdido el partido
(‘If the goalkeeper had not played so well, we would have lost the match’)

The following comments on (46)–(49) are in order. In (46), the *presente de indicativo* is selected to express a factual state of affairs.¹¹ The speaker of (47) uses the *futuro de indicativo* to refer to a probable state of affairs. Note that a reason is adduced in order to support the plausibility of the assumption.¹² The speaker of (48) has recourse to the use of the *condicional* to avoid committing him/herself to the truth of the reported statement. What this sentence expresses, therefore, is a possible state of affairs. The *condicional perfecto* of (49), lastly, has the specific function of indicating an unreal state of affairs situated in the past.

The foregoing interpretations enable us to specify the points of the *realis–irrealis* scale by means of the following parameters:

- (I) *real* - cfr. (46)
- (II) *probable* - cfr. (47)
- (III) *possible* - cfr. (48)
- (IV) *unreal* - cfr. (49)

The impact of these truthfunctional categories should not be underestimated, since human organization of reality rests to an important extent on the way the factuality, the potentiality or the non-factuality of the states of affairs that are in our focus of interest is perceived and reported on. Suffice it to say that not a few dialogues and discussions of both formal and informal nature concentrate on the different degrees of truthfulness and reliability of the information provided. Chafe formulates this point of view in the following way: ‘I

hope to have shown... that the realis — irrealis dimension has a consistent functional basis in people's judgments concerning the degree to which their ideas accord with what they believe to be objective reality" (1995: 364).

Finally, I wish to elaborate on points (2) and (3) of the afore-mentioned scale. Concerning the difference between the *futuro de probabilidad* and the *condicional de posibilidad*, we have seen that the former indicates a state of affairs which the speaker, on account of his/her experience or specific background information, supposes to correspond with factual reality. We may now add to this that the degree of uncertainty inherent in a supposition is functionally expressed by the *futuro*, which, from a cognitive point of view, refers to a temporal space where non-factual or non-experienced states of affairs can be located, while factual or experienced ones cannot. As for the quotative use of the *condicional de posibilidad*, we find that the speaker refrains from judging the factuality of the state of affairs transmitted. His/her non-commitment to truth is functionally reflected by the use of the *condicional*, which, in contrast to the *futuro*, does not directly, but indirectly refer to the future, the point of reference not being retrievable from the moment of speaking, but from a non-specified moment in the past.

In the final part of this section, we will concentrate our attention on the set of adverbs and adverbials which, by virtue of their lexical meaning, fulfill the purpose of modifying the assertive force of indicative sentences. Relevant cases in point are: *indudablemente* ('undoubtedly'), *de seguro* ('surely') and *con certeza* ('with certainty'), which are commonly used by speakers to enhance the truthfulness of their statements. As follows from examples such as *Isabel lo hará indudablemente* ('Isabel will do it undoubtedly'), *De seguro viene hoy* ('He will surely come today'), and *Lo sabe con certeza* ('He knows it with certainty'), we are concerned here with an adverbial category that is compatible only with indicative mood. As a consequence, the following imperative and subjunctive sentences are ungrammatical: **Isabel, hazlo indudablemente* ('Isabel, do it undoubtedly'), **De seguro venga hoy* ('He might surely come today'), and **Sépallo con certeza* ('Know it with certainty').

Curiously enough, Spanish grammars never mention these modal constraints, whereas they do pay attention to indicative and subjunctive selection in sentences containing the adverbs *tal vez* ('maybe'), *quizá* ('perhaps') and *ojalá* ('I wish it would'). Speaking in general terms, one can say that the use of the indicative mood has never been a central object of interest. The Real Academia (1981: 454–459), for example, devotes six pages to the discussion of the indicative and the subjunctive mood, reserving not more than half a page for the indicative.

3.2.2 Pragmatic function

In the foregoing section, it was emphasized that indicative sentences are pre-eminently uttered to make assertions. As we will see below, however, the use of the indicative is not exclusively restricted to the expression of this particular illocutionary function.

From a typological point of view, it is customary to associate indicative mood with *declarative* sentences. Together with *interrogative* and *imperative* sentences, these make up a threefold classification characteristic not only of Spanish, but, as is generally assumed, of all languages in the world.¹³ The illocutionary function of the afore-mentioned sentence types is usually specified in the following way: declarative sentences express assertions, interrogative ones questions and imperative ones requests or orders. Formally, this classification lacks a homogeneous basis, since declarative and imperative sentences are marked for a specific mood, whereas interrogative ones are not. Consequently, there is no such thing as ‘interrogative mood’, which means that, as far as Spanish is concerned, interrogative sentences share the indicative mood with declarative ones.¹⁴ On the other hand, interrogative sentences are characterized by a set of idiosyncratic properties: word order, intonation contour, and the appearance of interrogative pronouns and adverbs. Now, a possible explanation for the non-existence of an autonomous interrogative mood is that questions form part of a particular sequence of speech acts; more strictly, the interrogative speaker intends to elicit the performance of a certain verbal act from the hearer, namely, giving an answer to the question.¹⁵ Further note that the hearer giving a relevant answer makes an assertion, and, as just observed above, it is this class of speech acts whose prototypical output is a declarative sentence. From the fact, then, that both declarative and interrogative sentences select indicative mood, we may conclude that the modal output of the latter formally anticipates the answer it is supposed to elicit, thus providing a homogeneous structural base for both members of the adjacency pair.¹⁶

In the foregoing, it has been put forward that assertive speech acts constitute the core of question-answer sequences. Extending the analysis, we may add to this that in most types of verbal interaction assertives play a crucial part. It does not come as a surprise, therefore, that the class of assertives includes a wide variety of members. Thus, in a study devoted to English, not less than sixty-three verbs were distinguished, each denoting a particular kind of assertive speech act. Some representative examples are: *acknowledge, add, affirm, agree, argue, claim, comment, conclude, confirm, declare, deny, disagree,*

dispute, inform, mention, observe, point out, remark, report (Fraser 1975: 190). Although no relevant research has been carried out into Spanish, we may safely assume that a similar classification is applicable to this language too.

The remarkable differentiation of assertives is not the only factor that accounts for the high frequency of declarative sentences. This is also due to the fact that the indicative mood is involved in the expression of other illocutionary functions, whose fundamental properties will be examined below.

In Chapter 2, we have seen that the pragmatic analysis of Spanish mood is basically orientated towards assertives and directives. In the context of the present discussion, two more classes of speech acts must be distinguished: *commissives* and *expressives*.¹⁷ Within the framework of Searle's taxonomy, these classes can be defined as follows. A speaker performing a commissive speech act commits him/herself, primarily for the benefit of the addressee, to do the act expressed by the proposition. Characteristic examples, such as *promise, guarantee, commit oneself*, demonstrate that commissives are the mirror image of directives. In the performance of the former, the speaker assumes the role of the acting person; in the performance of the latter, it is the hearer who is supposed to take on that role. The modal output of commissives is determined by the use of the present or future indicative. Compare, for instance: *Lo hago ahora mismo* ('I do it right now'), *Te daré el dinero dentro de dos días* ('I shall give you the money within two days'), *No se lo diré a papá* ('I shall not tell it to daddy'). Lastly note that the responsible agent, that is, the commissive speaker, is referred to by the filler of the subject slot.

Expressive speech acts typify interactions in which the speaker expresses a psychological state brought about by an event causally involving the hearer. Some illustrative cases in point are: *thank, congratulate, welcome*. Although certain expressives may be formulated by means of an imperative — compare, *Reciba mi más sentido pésame* ('Accept my deepest sympathies') and *Sé bienvenido* ('Be welcome') — the indicative is the mood prototypically used in expressive sentences. Thus, for instance, we find the following indicative counterparts of the above examples: *Le expreso mi más sentido pésame* ('I express my deepest sympathy with you') and *Te doy la bienvenida* ('I bid you welcome'). Other frequently used indicative formulas are: *La felicito sinceramente* ('I offer my sincere congratulations'), *Te lo agradezco mucho* ('I thank you very much') and *Le saludo cordialmente* ('Receive my cordial greetings').

The conclusion from all this is that, unlike what is suggested by the term, declarative sentences, formally defined by the occurrence of the indicative mood, are not only the vehicle of expression of assertive speakers, but also that

of commissive and expressive speakers. And the list is still not complete, since the indicative also characterizes certain types of directive sentences with a strong impositive force. Here, three cases are to be distinguished, according to whether the present tense, the future tense, or the periphrastic gerund is employed:

- (50) ¡Hoy te quedas en casa!
(‘Today you stay home!’)
- (51) ¡Se marchará usted de aquí ahora mismo!
(‘Get out of here immediately!’)
- (52) ¡Ya te estás callando!
(‘Shut up right now!’)

The Real Academia qualifies the indicative form of these impositives in terms of the *presente* and the *futuro de mandato* (1981:465, 470).

The diversity of illocutionary functions we have been examining in this section demonstrates that the traditional term ‘declarative sentence’ is unsatisfactory. A proper alternative would be ‘indicative sentence’ as a force-neutral term exclusively referring to the modal output of the speech act.¹⁸

3.3 Subjunctive sentences

3.3.1 Syntactic and semantic structure

The paradigmatic system of the subjunctive mood differs considerably from that of the indicative, which, as specified in 3.2.1, is composed of nine paradigms. The number of subjunctive paradigms is limited to four: *presente*, *pretérito*, *presente perfecto*, *pluscuamperfecto*. One may object that both the *pretérito* and the *pluscuamperfecto* consist of two paradigms, one ending in *-ra*, the other in *-se*, but, as is well known, no semantic distinction holds between them.¹⁹ In subordinate clauses, their distribution is determined by free variation; in non-subordinate ones, there are no constraints on the use of the *-ra* forms, whereas the *-se* forms only appear in the context of certain adverbial triggers. Therefore, we do find, e.g., *Quisiera pedirle un favor* (‘I would like to ask you a favor’), but not **Quisiese pedirle un favor*.

As compared to the indicative, the subjunctive lacks equivalents of the *futuro* and the *condicional*.²⁰ Furthermore, it does not have special paradigms to express aspectual information; in other words, there are no subjunctive counterparts of the *pretérito indefinido* and the *pretérito imperfecto*. This rela-

tive scarcity of paradigmatic distinctions can be functionally explained by taking into consideration that the appearance of the subjunctive is mainly restricted to the subordinate clause, where, in general, it does not contribute to the semantic interpretation of the sentence. Due to its syntactic distribution, the subjunctive shows a far lower frequency of occurrence than the indicative. A quantitative analysis by Díaz Castañón (1982: 33), applied to a great variety of texts, brought to light that in a corpus containing 4040 verb forms the subjunctive only appeared 382 times.

The syntactic comparison with imperative and indicative sentences — cf. 3.1.1 and 3.2.1—yields the following results. Firstly, the categories of affirmation and negation do not affect the modal inflection of subjunctive sentences. Compare: *Tal vez lo haya visto* ('Maybe he has seen it') and *Tal vez no lo haya visto* ('Maybe he has not seen it'). The subjunctive shares this characteristic with the indicative, so that our final conclusion is that it is only the imperative mood to which a formal distinction between an affirmative and a negative paradigm applies. Secondly, subjunctive sentences are similar to indicative ones in that clitic pronouns typically fill the slot immediately preceding the finite verb. Compare: *¡Dios la perdone!* ('May God forgive her!'), *¡Así te pudras!* ('Be damned to you!'), *Quizá no me conozca* ('Perhaps she does not know me'). In periphrastic constructions, no difference holds between subjunctive and indicative sentences either; clitics are found to precede the finite verb or follow the non-finite one. Finally, subject deletion in subjunctive sentences is triggered by the pro-drop parameter already discussed in connection with indicative sentences. Again, overt realization of the subject reflects the speaker's presupposing that the addressee does not have access to the relevant background information to properly identify the intended referent.

The semantics of subjunctive sentences will be dealt with from two different perspectives: the lexical meaning of the predicate and the *realis–irrealis* scale established in Section 3.2.1. In addition to this, we will make use of a second scale to analyze the occurrence of the subjunctive in optative sentences. Here, the basic parameter will be the distinction between *realizable* and *non-realizable* wishes.

In 3.1.1 and 3.2.1, it was pointed out that constraints on predicate selection are dependent on the illocutionary function of the sentence. Now, subjunctive sentences may be considered equivalent to indicative ones in that they allow all types of states of affairs to be activated: actions, positions, processes, and states. This equally applies to assertive sentences, characterized by the presence of a dubitative adverb, and to optative sentences, which may but

need not be introduced by exclamatory adverbs. The following set of examples illustrates predicate selection in optative sentences: *¡Dios la perdone!* ('May God forgive her!')—(action), *¡Ojalá te tuviera en mis brazos para siempre!* ('If I could only hold you in my arms forever!')—(position), *¡Así te pudras!* ('Be damned to you!')—(process), *¡Viva el presidente!*—('Long live the president')—(state).

In traditional grammar, it is customary to describe the occurrence of both the assertive and the optative subjunctive as dependent upon the adverbial triggers involved in mood selection, namely, the dubitative adverbs *tal vez*, *quizá* and *acaso*, in the former case, and the exclamatory adverbs *quién*, *ojalá* and *así*, in the latter.²¹ Generally, however, no attention is paid to the information subjunctive sentences convey on the specific hypothetical or *irrealis* character of the states of affairs referred to. In what follows below I first turn to the analysis of the optative subjunctive.

From a speech act point of view, optatives are peculiar in the sense that they have a world-changing function, on the one hand, and an expressive function, on the other. It is probably for this reason that Classical Greek distinguished a special optative mood. In Spanish, optatives require the use of the subjunctive because the states of affairs reported on are not real but virtual states of affairs. As to subjunctive variation in optative sentences, we find that it formally reflects the degree to which the wish expressed is considered to be realizable. The following correlations are prototypical: a *possible* change in the world is indicated by the present subjunctive, an *improbable* change by the imperfect subjunctive, and an *impossible* change by either the imperfect or the pluperfect subjunctive. If no optative marker is present, the wish is considered to be realizable, and, as a result, the present subjunctive is used. Compare, e.g.: *Dios le asista* ('May God assist him'), *En paz descanse*, ('May she rest in peace'), *Viva España* ('Long live Spain').

As indicated above, the set of optative markers is composed of *así*, *ojalá* and *quién*. Let us focus attention first on the following *quién* sentences:

- (53) *¡Quién fuera su señoría para no tener que lavar!*
(‘What I would not give to be your honor, so that I would not have to do the washing!’)
- (54) *¡Quién tuviera la dicha — de Adán y Eva — que jamás conocieron — suegro ni suegra!*
(‘If only I had the good fortune of Adam and Eve, who never had parents-in-law’)

Since we cannot conceive of real world situations where changes of identity take place, (53) provides a representative example of an non-realizable wish. In (54), the copla poet thematizes an unrepeatable state of affairs from the remote past. As a consequence, the wish expressed by the imperfect subjunctive cannot be fulfilled. Generalizing these analyses, we arrive at the conclusion that optative *quién* sentences express wishes to be qualified as non-realizable. Syntactically, these sentences are subject to three constraints: (I) the subject expresses third-person singular reference; (II) the use of the present subjunctive is excluded; (III) *quién* is incompatible with the forms of the *se* paradigm; only those of the *ra* paradigm may be selected.

Sentences introduced by *ojalá* and *ojalá que* are not restricted as far as the realizability of the wish is involved. For the sake of convenience, I repeat the relevant form-function correlations: the present subjunctive indicates the possible fulfillment of the wish, the imperfect subjunctive indicates that its fulfillment is improbable or impossible, and the pluperfect subjunctive indicates that the fulfillment is impossible. In actual fact, the use of the latter paradigm implies that the state of affairs described could have taken place in the past, but no longer in the present or the future. Compare:

- (55) ¡Ojalá le hubieses dicho la verdad!
 ('If only you had told him the truth!')

Furthermore, it may be the case that the state of affairs cannot come into existence for factual reasons, as illustrated by:

- (56) ¡Ojalá no existiese La Coruña!
 ('I wish La Coruña did not exist!')

Evidently, in (56) the wish of the speaker cannot come true, because the non-existence of La Coruña would be counterfactual. As we already know, in optative sentences expressing realizable wishes the categories *possible* and *improbable* are formally reflected by the present and the imperfect subjunctive, respectively. In this connection, consider Ridruejo's analysis of *Ojalá cante* and *Ojalá cantara*:

Esta diferencia podría muy bien quedar formulada en los siguientes términos: el alejamiento entre el mundo del deseo y de lo deseado es mayor cuando se emplea *cantase(-ra)* que con *cante...*. Las oraciones optativas con *cante* siempre se utilizan para expresar deseos realizables y deseos, además, cuya realización parece al hablante más probable que si fueran expresados mediante *cantase* (1983: 516).
 ('This difference could be very well described in the following terms: the distance between the world of the desire and that which is desired is greater when *cantase*

(-ra) than when *cante* is used... . Optative sentences with *cante* are always used to express realizable wishes as well as wishes whose realization the speaker assumes to be more probable than those expressed by means of *cantase'*)

Solano-Araya provides the following interpretation of the co-occurrence of *ojalá* and the imperfect subjunctive:

A sentence such as *Ojalá lloviese mañana* ('I wish it would rain tomorrow') is likely to be uttered by a person such as the weatherman, who has some basis for believing that it is very unlikely that it will rain tomorrow; therefore, for me the meaning of *ojalá* + Imperf. Subjunc. is closer to counterfactuality than to anything else (1987: 114).

It may be added to these observations that the present subjunctive literally refers to the period of time including the moment of speaking. Now, one could argue that this temporal overlap metaphorically corresponds to wishes considered to be realizable to a relatively large extent. The imperfect subjunctive, on the other hand, literally refers to the past, that is to say, to a period strictly separated from the period including the moment of speaking. In this case, then, we could say that the temporal distance involved metaphorically corresponds to wishes considered to be realizable to a relatively small extent.

Besides *quién* and *ojalá*, the set of optative markers also contains *así*, which does not introduce sentences expressing a wish, but a curse. Consider the following examples:

- (57) ¡Así te parta un rayo!
(‘I hope lightning will strike you!’)
- (58) ¡Así le diera un cólico esta noche por haberse comido mi ración!
(‘I hope you catch a colic tonight for having eaten my share’)

Due to their specific content, curses may be non-realizable or realizable to a smaller or greater extent, so that each of the optative parameters *possible*, *improbable* and *impossible* may play a part in the interpretation of the future state of affairs desired.

I now turn to the analysis of assertive subjunctive sentences, which are formally determined by the occurrence of dubitative adverbs or adverbials. Taking up again the example *Tal vez lo haya visto* ('Maybe he has seen it'), discussed earlier in this section, we find that this statement makes reference to a state of affairs which, in accordance with the dimensions of the *realis-irrealis* scale, should be qualified as hypothetical or possible. Obviously, this interpretation stems from the lexical meaning of the adverb *tal vez*, which is close-

ly related to that of *quizá* and *acaso*. The syntactic rules applying to the use of these adverbs and the modal output of the sentences containing them are easy to formulate: if *tal vez*, *quizá* and *acaso* precede the finite verb, they are compatible with both the indicative and the subjunctive; if, in contrast, the finite verb precedes the adverb, it is only the indicative mood that can be employed:

Es muy importante advertir que cuando todos estos adverbios de duda siguen al verbo, ése se emplea siempre en indicativo” (Fente et al. 1977: 59).

(‘It is very important to note that the verb is always indicative when these adverbs of doubt follow it’)

Modal variation in sentences where the dubitative adverb precedes the verb has been generally explained in terms of the greater or lesser degree of uncertainty of the speaker concerning the truth value of the statement. Palmer expresses this point of view in the following way: “... the subjunctive is often used to express... doubt, especially with adverbs, in contrast with the indicative which expresses greater confidence: *Tal vez venga mañana*, *Tal vez vendrá mañana*” (1986: 66). Now, instead of the semantic criterion bearing on the degree of uncertainty of the speaker, one could also think of a pragmatic explanation of the modal distribution at issue. This involves the idea that the dubitative speaker does not consider the state of affairs expressed to be hypothetical to a greater or lesser extent but selects the indicative to make explicit his uncertainty in a neutral way. However, by using the subjunctive he/she emphasizes the virtuality of the state of affairs, thus creating a metaphorical space which is intended to prevent a direct confrontation with the interlocutor. In other words, according to the pragmatic interpretation, subjunctive selection serves as a positive politeness strategy in order to make it easier for the hearer to put forward a different or contrastive point of view without threatening the face of the original speaker. We should bear in mind, however, that whatever explanation one prefers, the semantic or the pragmatic one, the average language user does not seem to be always aware of the subtle distinctions involved in mood selection, so that the choice between the indicative or subjunctive may be more or less arbitrary. Some evidence for this may be inferred from the following example, where *quizá* co-occurs with both moods in one and the same discourse unit:

- (59) Quizá todo continuara hasta las cumbres; quizá los tallos rojos, la jara, la maleza... se prolongaban al otro lado, no acababan nunca hasta Madrid (‘Perhaps all would — SUBJ — continue as far as the tops; perhaps the red stems, the stockroses, the undergrowth... would — IND — extend to the other side and never end as far as Madrid’)

In addition to *quizá*, *tal vez* and *acaso*, the class of dubitative adverbs also includes *posiblemente*, ('possibly'), *a lo mejor* ('perhaps') and *probablemente*. ('probably'). As to mood selection, *quizá* and *acaso* are found to co-occur most with the subjunctive (Moreno 1982: 53).²² *Tal vez* and *posiblemente* occupy a neutral position, since they do not show a special preference for either of the two moods. Nevertheless, it should be noticed that in contemporary Spanish *posiblemente* is showing a growing tendency to select the subjunctive, which is true in particular of newspaper style. Compare, e.g., the following statement from a political interview:

- (60) Posiblemente, en un futuro no muy lejano, dedique también sus fuerzas a solucionar los problemas
(‘Possibly, in the near future, he will also devote his strength to solving the problems’)

A lo mejor and *probablemente* express a low degree of uncertainty, which, in regard to the use of the former, is reflected by the fact that it never takes the subjunctive. *Probablemente*, on the other hand, may select the subjunctive, which, as in the case of *posiblemente*, is typical of newspaper style:²³

- (61) Nótese que en ambos casos se está preguntando por algo distinto. Probablemente no esté tampoco nada claro qué es lo que son, en realidad, Cataluña o el País Vasco o Galicia o Andalucía o Castilla, etcétera
(‘Note that in both cases we are dealing with a different question. Probably, it is — SUBJ — not clear at all what are, in reality, Cataluña or el País Vasco or Galicia or Andalucía or Castilla, etc.’)

The following quotation from Manteca Alonso-Cortés(1981: 149) recapitulates one of the major points made in the foregoing discussion:

No parece que puedan agruparse los modos sólo en torno a las nociones semánticas de realidad frente a no realidad, pues hemos visto que el indicativo expresa a veces la irrealidad o inseguridad (tal vez está ocupado). (‘It does not seem possible to define mood only in terms of the semantic opposition between reality and non-reality, because we have seen that the indicative sometimes expresses unreality or uncertainty (perhaps he is busy)’)

Note, however, that it is not the indicative which expresses irreality or uncertainty, but the indicative in strict connection with the dubitative adverb.

3.3.2 Pragmatic function

One of the conclusions of the previous section was that the use of the subjunctive in non-subordinate clauses is relatively infrequent. From a speech act perspective, we may now add to this that low frequency of occurrence is paralleled by limited illocutionary potential. In this relation, remember that the appearance of the subjunctive is restricted to sentences with assertive or optative force. Furthermore, we have seen that, in most cases, the subjunctive does not play an autonomous role, but is syntactically dependent on adverbs or adverbials. This applies first of all to assertive sentences, where the subjunctive is triggered by the use of dubitative adverbs or adverbials. Consequently, the assertive potential of these sentences is limited to statements on possible states of affairs.

Special attention should be drawn to sentences with dubitative adverbs following the finite verb. In these sentences, as we already know, the indicative and the subjunctive are in complementary distribution; that is, the use of the subjunctive is excluded. It is worthwhile commenting briefly on the pragmatic function of the indicative in this particular position. In the sentences under discussion, the speaker starts making an assertion without reservation concerning its truth value, which explains the use of the indicative. In the second instance, however, he/she expresses an afterthought modifying the truth value by adding a dubitative adverb, as a result of which the utterance is no longer presented as an absolutely true statement. This makes it possible for the hearer to put forward a divergent opinion without bringing about loss of face of the original speaker. In spoken language, the mitigating character of the afterthought normally finds its expression in a pause-intonation contour, which, in written language, is indicated by comma-punctuation. Compare, e.g.:

- (62) Tu marido no tiene, quizá, suficiente talento
(‘Perhaps your husband does not have sufficient talents’)

Let us proceed now to discuss optative sentences. Within a speech act frame of reference, these can be defined as the linguistic output of a particular class of directives. In more specific terms, optative speakers utter the wish that a certain state of affairs, which does not hold at coding time, come into existence in a future world. Therefore, as in the case of requests and orders, the direction of fit is *world to words*. On the other hand, optatives differ from directives in that the state of affairs described is not supposed to be brought about by the hearer. In fact, there is no identifiable agent involved, so that, in principle, it cannot be predicted whether or not the wish of the speaker will

be fulfilled. Predictions can only be made, in a negative sense, with respect to wishes such as (55) and (56), which refer to a past and a counterfactual state of affairs, respectively, that is, states of affairs that cannot undergo changes. Further note that pluperfect optatives may function as indirect speech acts. What happens in this case is that the explicitly formulated wish implicitly evokes a reproach. The following example illustrates this interpretation:

- (63) ¡Ojalá no le hubieses contado lo ocurrido a mamá!
 ('If only you had not told what happened to mum!')

Our next focus of interest is those situations in which the non-subordinate subjunctive serves the purpose of either softening or strenghtening the force of the speech act. In the former case, we are concerned with politeness expressions based on the use of the past subjunctive of certain modal verbs. Some typical cases in point are:

- (64) Pudiéramos sacar la conclusión de que nuestro colega no ha dicho la verdad
 ('We could draw the conclusion that our colleague did not tell the truth')
- (65) ¿Pudiera decirme qué hora es?
 ('Could you tell me what time it is?')
- (66) No debieras venir aquí
 ('You should not come here')
- (67) Quisiera preguntarle por qué tu novio no está aquí
 ('I would like to ask you why your boyfriend is not here')

Concerning the perlocutionary effect of these past subjunctives, we find that they are interpreted as more polite than the corresponding forms of the conditional. This equally applies to assertives and directives. In the particular case of *querer*, ('to want') a relatively low degree of mitigation can be expressed by the use of the imperfect indicative. The following diagram shows the degrees of increasing mitigation involved:

Diagram 2

<i>quería</i>	→	<i>querría</i>	→	<i>quisiera</i>
<i>podría</i>	→	<i>pudiera</i>		
<i>debería</i>	→	<i>debiera</i>		
<i>quería</i> :		imperfect indicative		
<i>querría</i> :		conditional		
<i>quisiera</i> :		imperfect subjunctive		

<i>podría:</i>	conditional
<i>pudiera:</i>	imperfect subjunctive
<i>debería</i>	conditional
<i>debiera:</i>	imperfect subjunctive

It is to be observed, lastly, that the polite use of modal verbs is compatible only with the *ra*-paradigm of the past subjunctive.

From a cognitive point of view, the strategic effect produced by the use of the imperfect subjunctive can be explained in terms of a twofold metaphorical process. Firstly, a polite interpretation is suggested on account of the fact that the subjunctive reflects, in a figurative sense, the distance between the real world existing at coding time and the virtual world referred to by the propositional content of the speech act. Secondly, the preterite tense of the subjunctive expresses a temporal distance between the present, which includes the moment of speaking, and the past, which is the domain of reference expressed by the *ra*-paradigm. Both types of distance, now, create a strategic, two-dimensional space which may be filled by a non-cooperative reaction by the hearer without the speaker losing face.²⁴ Further note that the set of examples under discussion illustrates two kinds of politeness: (65)–(67) express mitigation of directive force in order to protect the negative face of the hearer, (64) expresses mitigation of assertive force in order to protect the positive face of the hearer or that of the person referred to in the complement clause.²⁵

Strengthening the force of the speech act, in conclusion, is brought about by certain syntactic constructions characterized by duplication of the present subjunctive. Semantically, these constructions are marked for concessive meaning. Compare, e.g.:

- (68) Llame quien llame, no le abras la puerta
(‘No matter who rings, do not open the door’)
- (69) Mires adonde mires, verás una discriminación brutal de la mujer
(‘Wherever you look you’ll see a brutal discrimination of women’)

As suggested by (68) and (69), strengthening illocutionary force by means of the present subjunctive is not restricted to a certain class of speech act. The foregoing examples, for instance, represent a directive and an assertive, respectively, while (70) is a typical instance of commissive reinforcement:

- (70) Vuelva o no vuelva el bruto de tu hermano, no te dejaré sola
(‘Whether or not that brute of a brother of yours comes back, I shall not leave you on your own’)

The major conclusion to be drawn from this section is that research into the pragmatics of the subjunctive mood in non-subordinate sentences calls for a distinction between three levels of analysis:

- (I) the occurrence of the subjunctive as triggered by adverbial constituents in assertive and optative sentences
- (II) the occurrence of the subjunctive as an indicator of optative speech acts
- (III) the occurrence of the subjunctive as a device for softening or strengthening illocutionary force

CHAPTER 4

Que-sentences

Although the type of sentences we will be examining in this chapter plays an important part in face-to-face interaction, it has never been a specific object of interest in Spanish grammar. There is even no generally accepted term referring to the category. For present purposes, I prefer to speak of *que*-sentences, a syntactic label identifying the initial element of the constructions under review. Some characteristic instances are: *Que aproveche* ('Enjoy your meal'), *¡Que vengas ahora mismo!* ('You come right now!') and *¡Que te vas a caer!* ('You are going to fall!').

Syntactically, *que*-sentences could be viewed as a hybrid category sharing properties of both subordinate and non-subordinate sentences. More precisely, their subordinate character originates in the appearance of the complementizer *que*; at the same time, however, these sentences play an autonomous syntactic role, since they are not embedded in a matrix clause.

Pragmatically, *que*-sentences perform a variety of illocutionary functions in conversational interaction. Thus, they may be used to express assertions, orders, promises, and wishes. These categories are illustrated, in the order given, by the following set of examples:

- (71) Araceli: Ensimá e la comoda no hay na
Ramos: ¡Ya se lo comió!
Araceli: ¡Padre!
Ramos: ¡Que ya se lo comió! Si yo lo puse a propio intento,
 chiquiya
 (– On top of the chest of drawers there is nothing
 – He has already eaten it up!
 – Father!
 – He has already eaten it up, I say! I put it there on
 purpose, my little girl')
- (72) Don Agustín: Tome usted asiento
Enrique: Gracias, me voy a ir
Don Agustín: ¡Que se siente usted!
 (– Sit down

- Thank you, I'm going to leave
- Sit down, I say')

- (73) ¡Que se lo pagaré todo!
(‘I shall pay you everything!’)
- (74) Que en paz descanse
(‘God rest her soul’)

These examples make it clear that, as far as syntactic structure is concerned, *que*-sentences occupy an intermediate position between subordinate and non-subordinate sentences; that is, on the one hand, they can be embedded in performative matrices specifying the speech act that is being performed. As a consequence, the *que*-sentence is transformed into a complement clause, as may be seen, from the following paraphrases of (71) and (72):

- (71) a. Te digo que se lo comió
(‘I tell you that he has eaten it up’)
- (72) a. Le mando que se siente
(‘I order you to sit down’)

On the other hand, *que*-sentences can be compared to non-subordinate sentences without *que*. Thus, in addition to (71) and (72) we can also get:

- (71) b. Se lo comió
(‘He has eaten it up’)
- (72) b. Siéntese
(‘Sit down’)

Looking at these matters from a perlocutionary perspective, we observe that the sentences with and without *que* do not fulfill equivalent functions, since the former, in contrast to the latter, primarily serve to emphasize the illocutionary point of the speech act. In the particular context of (71) and (72), the reinforcement consists in repeating a previously performed speech act, which, in the opinion of the speaker, has not been appropriately attended to by the hearer. Generally, it is directive speakers who make use of the emphatic force of *que*-sentences in order to impose their will or authority on the addressee. In this connection, compare the following statement:

... no es extraño que lo (i.e., present subjunctive, H. H.) hallamos también en la forma reiterativa del imperativo, de acusado perfil en español. De igual modo que la repetición de la negación absoluta *no* toma la estructura *que no*, a la primera invitación o mandato *cállate* corresponde otra más enfática: *que te calles* (Mansilla García 1972: 21).

(‘... it is not strange that we also find it in the reiterative imperative, which plays a prominent role in Spanish. Likewise, repetition of the absolute negation *no* takes the structure *que no*; the first invitation or order *cállate* (‘shut up’) is followed by a more emphatic one: *que te calles*’)

Indicative *que*-sentences are, by definition, emphatic but not necessarily reiterative. What we find is that the utterance of this type of sentence is often intended to issue a warning. Consider, for instance, an example such as *¡Que te vas a caer!* (‘You are going to fall!’); instead of the periphrastic infinitive, the periphrastic gerund is also used: *¡Que te estás cayendo!*

The last class of *que*-sentences to be examined consists of expressions with optative force. These typically function as politeness formulas used in certain standard communication situations. Due to their conventional use, they lack the emphatic or reiterative strength typifying assertive and directive *que*-sentences. In addition to *Que aproveche* and *Que en paz descanse*, already mentioned earlier, the following instances are characteristic members of this class: *Que descanses* (‘Sleep well’), *Que lo pases bien* (‘Good luck to you’), *Que se divierta* (‘Have a good time’). Again, the optative function of these expressions can be made explicit by performative embedding. Thus, for instance, instead of *Que lo pases bien* one may say: *Te deseo que lo pases bien* (‘I wish you good luck’), although, in normal conversation, preference is given to the non-performative variant. This is also suggested by the following statement:

Las oraciones optativas pueden ir introducidas por *que*. Mentalmente van subordinadas a un verbo que expresa un deseo, el cual se supone implícito en la cláusula, pero sintácticamente mantienen su independencia” (Mansilla García 1972: 20).

(‘Optative sentences may be introduced by *que*. They are mentally subordinated to a verb expressing a wish, which is assumed to be implicitly present in the clause, but syntactically they maintain their independence’)

Moliner offers the following survey of the illocutionary potential of *que*-sentences:

En principio [el uso, H. H.] de oraciones interrogativas o exclamativas sin otra anterior a la que se enlacen, implica un verbo de expresión, de mandato o de deseo: ‘¿Que no estaba en casa? ¡Que no puedo! ¡Que vengas pronto! ¡Que Dios te proteja!’. (Los verbos implícitos pueden ser, por ejemplo, “dices..., te digo, deseo, pido”)... . Se usa en exclamaciones de queja con el verbo en subjuntivo, implicando una oración o una expresión de lamentación antecedente tales como “¡qué triste es!”, “¡qué lástima!” o “¡qué desgraciada casualidad!”: ‘¡Que tenga yo que aguantar este insulto...! ¡Que no pueda decirle lo que merece...! ¡Que haya llegado la noticia justamente en estos momentos...!’ (1998 b:826).

(‘In principle, the use of interrogative or exclamatory sentences which are not linked to preceding ones implies an expressive, directive or optative verb: ‘Was she not at home?’ ‘I cannot do it!’ ‘Come soon!’ ‘God protect you!’ (The implicit verbs may be, for example, “you say..., I tell you, I wish, I request”) It [*que*, H.H] is used in exclamations expressing a complaint with a subjunctive form of the verb, implying a sentence or expression of lamentation such as “isn’t it sad!”, “what a pity!” or “what an unfortunate coincidence!”: “To think that I have put up with this insult...! What a pity that I cannot tell him what he deserves...!” How unfortunate that the news has just come in at this moment!...’)

To conclude this chapter, I wish to draw attention to two fragments of a political play, which are remarkable in the sense that both contain a sequence of *que*-sentences, the first one with assertive, the second one with directive force:

- (75) En la prensa de Madrid hablan de un discurso incendiario de Pablo Iglesias. ¡Que critica a Romanones! ¡Que ha atacado al ejército! ¡Que los soldados pasan hambre y que se deben abandonar aquellas tierras de Africa! ¡Es bárbaro ese hombre!
(‘Newspapers from Madrid make mention of an inflammatory speech by Pablo Iglesias. He is criticizing Romanones! He has attacked the army! He has said that the soldiers are hungry and that those African countries should be abandoned! He is barbaric that man!’)
- (76) ¡Viva el servicio militar! ¡Que los ricos tengan que despedir a sus hijos como a nosotros nos obligan! ¡Que tengan que recibir como nosotros los restos ensangrentados de su prole!
(‘Long live military service! Let the rich say good-bye to their sons just as we are obliged to! Let them receive, just as we do, the bloodstained remains of their offspring!’)

The modal structure of subordinate clauses

In accordance with current research into Spanish mood, I will undertake the analysis of the indicative and the subjunctive in the subordinate clause within the framework of the tripartite distinction between noun clauses, adverbial clauses, and adjective clauses. In the present section I will discuss the syntactic relevance of this classification. In 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 I will be concerned with the semantics and pragmatics of mood selection in the subordinate clause.

As suggested by the term, *noun clauses* perform the same syntactic functions as the noun phrase in the predicate-argument configuration. With respect to the syntactic potential of the predicate, a preliminary distinction must be made between predicates that are compatible with noun clauses and predicates that are not. In the latter category are verbs such as *caminar* ('to walk'), *romper* ('to break') and *morir* ('to die'), and adjectives such as *rojo* ('red'), *inteligente* ('intelligent') and *cuadrado* ('square'). Obviously, for the purposes of the present study it is not this class but the class of noun clause-taking predicates which will be the focus of research. Let us start with a survey of the syntactic functions of noun clauses:

Subject

- (77) Es probable que no te haya visto
(‘It is probable that she has not seen you’)

Direct Object

- (78) Ya te he dicho que no nos gusta salir los domingos
(‘I already told you that we do not like to go out on Sundays’)

Prepositional Object

- (79) Se opuso a que le nombraran presidente
(‘She objected to being elected president’)

Nominal Predicate

- (80) La verdad es que se me olvidó decírtelo
(‘The truth is that I forgot to tell you’)

The two following comments are in order:

(I) In each of the four types of noun clauses, both the indicative and the subjunctive may appear. Their distribution is determined in particular, but not exclusively, by the lexical meaning of the verbal predicate or — in case a nominal predicate is selected — by the subject of the main clause.²⁶

(II) The prototypical complementizer of noun clauses is the conjunction *que*. Indirect interrogative sentences follow a different pattern:

- (81) ¿Sabes si Carmen vuelve hoy?
(‘Do you know if Carmen is coming back today?’)
- (82) No recordó quién vino
(‘He did not remember who came’)

The same applies to sentences reporting direct speech:

- (83) Manolo exclamó furiosamente: “¡No lo haré nunca!”²⁷
(‘Manolo furiously exclaimed: “I shall never do that!”’)

From sentences (77)–(83) it is obvious that the matrix and the embedded clause are syntactically connected in two different ways: with or without conjunction. In the former case, the complementizer role is assumed by *que* or *si*; in the latter, there is no filler of the complementizer slot. This rule also applies to embedded clauses containing non-finite predicates, viz., a gerund or an infinitive. Compare, e.g.:

- (84) La vi nadando en el canal
(‘I saw her swimming in the canal’)
- (85) La vi nadar en el canal
(‘I saw her swim in the canal’)

To sum up, three types of complementation are to be distinguished:

- (I) conjunction complementation; cf. (77)–(81)
- (II) gerund and infinitive complementation; cf. (84)–(85)
- (III) asyndetic complementation; cf. (82)–(83)

Elaborating on this typology, we may further note that gerund complementation takes place on a limited scale; it is restricted to the complement clause of so-called *verbos de percepción sensible*. Infinitive complementation is a more general phenomenon, since it does not only apply to *verbos de percepción sensible* but to a set of verbs including, among others, *querer* (‘to want’), *conseguir*

(‘to achieve’) and *evitar* (‘to avoid’), which may also trigger subjunctive complementation. Consider, for example:

- (86) Quiero irme ahora
 (‘I want to leave now’)
- (87) Quiero que te vayas ahora
 (‘I want you to leave now’)

These examples make it clear that complementizer selection is not an arbitrary phenomenon; it is dependent on the referential connection between the subjects of the main and the embedded clause. Coreference triggers infinitive complementation, non-identical reference requires the subjunctive to be used. In other words:

Todos los verbos que obligatoriamente llevan completiva de infinitivo cuando el sujeto de la subordinada es idéntico al de la principal, toman ‘que + subj.’ cuando el sujeto es diferente (Demonte 1977: 66).

(‘All verbs that obligatorily take an infinitive complement clause when the subject of the subordinate clause is identical to that of the main clause, take ‘que + subj.’ when the subject is different’)

Needless to say, when coreference inherently marks the relation between both subjects, infinitive complementation is obligatory. Verbs such as *negarse* (‘to refuse’), *arrepentirse* (‘to regret’) and *intentar* (‘to try’) are subject to this rule. In view of the central focus of this book, gerund and infinitive complementation will be discussed only incidentally.

I now turn to the analysis of *adverbial clauses*, which differ, both syntactically and semantically, in a fundamental way from noun clauses. As shown by the above discussion, the latter type of clause plays a crucial role in the predicate-argument configuration of the main clause. Adverbial clauses, on the contrary, do not fill argument slots but maintain a peripheral relation with the main predicate of the sentence, since they are functionally equivalent to the category of adverbs. For this reason, they usually occupy the initial or the final position of the sentence.

Pursuing the comparison with noun clauses, we find that a basic distinction must be made between the members of the class of conjunctions introducing the subordinate clause. As shown by examples (77)–(81), *que* and *si* exclusively function as connectors of the main and the embedded clause; lacking a specific lexical content, they don’t play a role in the semantic interpretation of the sentence. The class of conjunctions introducing adverbial clauses, in contrast, consists of many more members than two; furthermore, to each

conjunction a particular type of lexical meaning must be assigned, as may be seen from the following survey:

Time: e.g., *cuando* ('when'), *antes de que* ('before');

Concession: e.g., *aunque* ('although'), *a pesar de que* ('in spite of');

Manner: e.g., *como* ('like'), *según* ('according to');

Purpose: e.g., *para que* ('in order that'), *a fin de que* ('for the purpose of');

Cause: e.g., *porque* ('because'), *ya que* ('since');

Consequence: e.g., *de modo que* ('so that'), *de forma que* ('in such a way that');

Condition: e.g., *si* ('if'), *con tal que* ('on the condition that').

In 5.2, this classification will be our point of departure for the analysis of indicative and subjunctive distribution in adverbial clauses.

The last type of subordinate clause, the *adjective* or *relative clause*, performs a basically different function from that of nominal and adverbial clauses. This is due to the fact that the two latter operate at the level of the sentence, whereas the former operates at the hierarchically lower level of the noun phrase. This syntactic distinction manifests itself in the character of the complementizer. Unlike conjunctions introducing nominal and adverbial clauses, the connecting element of the adjective clause is a pronoun, an adjective, or an adverb. It is customary to distinguish two subclasses of adjective clauses, viz., restrictive and non-restrictive clauses, the corresponding Spanish labels being *oraciones especificativas* and *oraciones explicativas*, respectively. To illustrate the difference between them Gili y Gaya provides the following examples:

Especificativas: – Los alumnos que vivían lejos llegaron tarde a la escuela.
 ('The pupils who lived far away arrived at school late')
 – Comimos la fruta que estaba madura.
 ('We ate the fruit that was ripe')

Explicativas: – Los alumnos, que vivían lejos, llegaron tarde a la escuela.
 – Comimos la fruta, que estaba madura."

His comment runs as follows:

Las especificativas indican que llegaron tarde sólo los alumnos que vivían lejos, y que comimos únicamente la fruta que estaba madura. Las explicativas van separadas de la principal por una pausa (en lo escrito con una coma). Con ellas expresamos que todos los alumnos llegaron tarde, y nos referimos a toda la fruta, explicando de ellos respectivamente la cualidad o circunstancia de que vivían lejos y de que estaba madura (1955:277).

('The restrictive clauses indicate that it was only the pupils who lived far away who arrived late, and that we only ate the fruit that was ripe. The non-restrictive

clauses are separated from the main ones by a pause (by a comma in writing). With these clauses we express that all the pupils arrived late, and we make reference to all the fruit, describing, respectively, the quality or the circumstances that the pupils lived far away and that the fruit was ripe')

In Section 5.3, the classification of *oraciones especificativas* and *oraciones explicativas* will serve as the frame of reference for the analysis of modal distribution in adjective clauses. As we will see, the criteria underlying the selection of the indicative and subjunctive mood originate in the referential properties of the antecedent. More precisely, we will be dealing with the distinctive features 'existing' vs. 'non-existing', and 'specific' vs. 'non-specific'.

5.1 Noun clauses

To account for modal variation in noun clauses, grammars of Spanish generally focus their attention on the lexical meaning of the matrix predicate. This approach seems indeed to be the most appropriate one if we cast a glance, for instance, at the difference between sentences such as *Me parece que el director está presente también* ('It seems to me that the director is present too') and *Me gusta que el director esté presente también* ('I am glad that the director is present too'), where no other factor than the specific meaning of *parecer* and *gustar* is responsible for the modal contrast in the complement clause. Although we will see that other criteria may play a part as well — particularly the affirmative or negative structure of the embedding clause — we will start examining the impact of the lexical meaning of complement-taking predicates. In the literature on the subject, we basically find two kinds of classifications. On the one hand, there are grammarians who are not concerned with spelling out taxonomic procedures, but limit themselves to dividing the predicates into two groups according to whether they trigger the indicative or the subjunctive mood in the subordinate clause. Other grammarians, in contrast, prefer to specify mood selection in terms of the lexical meaning of the main predicate, which, of course, presupposes that a certain classification of these predicates is provided. Needless to say, both approaches differ considerably with respect to descriptive power. Unlike the latter, the former is restricted in so far as it can only meet the criteria for observational adequacy. Let us illustrate the difference involved by means of two concrete examples.

A list of predicates without taxonomic justification is offered by Díaz Castañón:

Las proposiciones que actúan de complemento directo de verbos que expresan mandato, voluntad, ruego, permiso, consejo, encargo, prohibición, temor, sentimiento, emoción, etc. llevan el verbo en subjuntivo” (1982: 35–36).

(‘Propositions which perform the function of the direct object of verbs expressing order, will, request, permission, advice, instruction, prohibition, fear, feeling, emotion, etc. take the subjunctive’)

Evidently, enumerations such as the foregoing lack any basis for systematically characterizing the predicates under review. As a result, it cannot be ascertained what kind of distinctive features are responsible for the modal form of the embedded clause. Furthermore, the indication “etc.” demonstrates that the set is incomplete. Lastly note that Díaz Castañón’s list only includes specimens of verbs governing the subjunctive; no reference is made to indicative-taking predicates.²⁸

The second type of approach takes as its starting point an explicit classification of matrix predicates. Speaking in general terms, however, we must say that the taxonomic proposals put forth until now show both qualitative and quantitative shortcomings. As to the former, it is to be noticed that many classifications are not the product of consistently applied and clearly delimited parameters. For illustration purposes, I wish to discuss a symptomatic case in point, namely, the often quoted classification of Terrell and Hooper (1974). These authors make a distinction between six classes of complement-taking predicates, which bear the following labels: ‘belief’, ‘report’, ‘mental act’, ‘comment’, ‘doubt’, and ‘command’. With respect to the first category, it is to be noticed that Terrell and Hooper do not provide any definition of the class of ‘belief’ predicates. A similar problem bears on the ‘command’ class. One of the sections of the article is entitled ‘imperative’ and is probably intended to offer a characterization of ‘command’ predicates, but the difficulty arising here is that the term ‘command’ refers to a certain class of speech acts, whereas ‘imperative’ — as has been shown in Section 3.1 — is a term referring to a certain type of sentence. Furthermore, the remaining classes are not demarcated in a consistent way, as a result of which some predicates are classified inappropriately. *Negar* (‘to deny’), for example, forms part of the class of ‘doubt’ predicates, which is incorrect in view of the fact that *negar* is a speech act verb. It is the antonym of *afirmar* (‘to affirm’) and should be classified, within Terrell and Hooper’s framework, as a member of the class of ‘report’ predicates. The latter class, in turn, contains an item, the verb *leer* (‘to read’), which does not belong to it, since ‘report’ is defined in terms of transmission of information. In other words, *escribir* (‘to write’) is a member of this class, but *leer* is not.

As for quantitative shortcomings, the problem of incompleteness discussed in connection with Díaz Castañón's list of predicates also affects Terrell and Hooper's classification, as a number of predicates is overlooked or not taken into consideration. This holds true in particular for the entire class of perception verbs, which includes such important items as *ver* ('to see'), *oír* ('to hear') and *sentir* ('to feel'). We come to the conclusion then that Terrell and Hooper's analysis shows two kinds of deficiencies. First, it is not optimal in the sense that it is not carried out with appropriately defined and consistently applied taxonomic criteria. Second, it is not maximal in the sense that it does not exhaustively specify the class of clause embedding predicates.

In order to avoid the problems we have just been discussing, the approach presented in this book is based on the idea that a coherent and self-contained classification of complement-taking predicates is indispensable for adequately describing and explaining the modal output of the noun clause. The framework chosen derives from the assumption that the predicates under discussion share the property of providing information on the set of processes that typify intentional human behavior. In this relation, note that, from a psychological point of view, the human mind can be conceived of as being composed of three modules, i.e., thought, feeling, and will. Functionally, these categories have been described in terms of the cognitive mode, the emotional mode, and the conative mode (Ryle 1970:61).

Within linguistic representation, it is the class of clause embedding predicates which serves the particular purpose of making explicit the lexical output of the categorization under review. More precisely, these predicates can be divided into three major classes, each of which covers one of the modules of the input-output mechanism inherent to intentional behavior.²⁹ In chronological order, then, we first get the class of acquisition of knowledge predicates, which describe categories involved in the processing of perceptual and conceptual information. Some instances of perception verbs have already been mentioned before: *ver*, *oír* and *sentir*. Acquisition of conceptual information is denoted by such verbs as *enterarse* ('to find out'), *leer* ('to read') and *aprender* ('to learn').

The second class is composed of predicates describing the storing and assessing of the input information. The categories involved in the storing of information are denoted by cognitive predicates, which are subdivided into an epistemic, a doxastic, and a dubitative class. Prototypical members of these classes are *saber* ('to know'), *creer* ('to believe') and *dudar* ('to doubt'), respectively. Following the chronological line, we arrive at predicates expressing an

assessment of the stored information. Two kinds of assessment are to be distinguished, according to whether rational or emotional evaluations are described. In the former class are predicates such as *ser lógico* ('to be logical'), *ser usual* ('to be usual') and *ser preciso* ('to be necessary'), in the latter, predicates such as *gustar* ('to like'), *irritar* ('to irritate') and *apreciar* ('to appreciate').

The last class of clause-embedding predicates denotes categories involved in the output of intentional behavior, i.e., causative acts, mental acts and speech acts. Characteristic examples of these classes are: *causar* ('to cause'), *deducir* ('to deduce') and *decir* ('to say'), respectively.

In accordance with the above classification, which is claimed to cover not only the entirety of clause-embedding predicates, but also to offer the possibility of making reliable predictions about the distribution of the indicative and subjunctive mood in the complement clause, the sections of this chapter will be devoted to predicates describing the input, i.e., acquisition of knowledge, predicates describing the storing and assessing of the input, i.e., cognition and evaluation, and predicates describing the output, i.e., causation and action.

Finally note that the components of the input-output system we have just been spelling out may also be interpreted in terms of different propositional attitudes. Consider, for instance, the following statement by Barwise and Perry (1981:79):

If single statements describe situations, then attitude reports must describe situations involving the attitudes, perceptual situations *p* in the case of *sees* and *sees that*, epistemic situations *k* in the case of *knows that*, doxastic situations *b* with *believes that*, and utterances *u* in the case of *says that*.

5.1.1 Acquisition of knowledge predicates

As observed in 5.1, one of the major subclasses of the class of acquisition of knowledge predicates is composed of perception predicates, which perform the function of describing the primary sources of our knowledge about the world in which we live. More strictly, these predicates denote the sensory information which is fed into the cognitive component of the human mind. The function of the perception process may be described in terms of a metaphor: "Perception is our only cognitive window on the world outside us" (Kim 1977: 617).

In Spanish, the prototypical perception predicates selecting complement clauses are: *ver*, *oír*, and *sentir*. The order given here reflects the frequency with which reference is made to the senses involved: sight, hearing, and touch.³⁰

Besides *verbos de percepción sensible*, the class of predicates describing input categories also includes predicates specifying certain conceptual or mental stimuli. One may make a distinction here between internal and external stimuli. In the latter case, the stimuli originate in sources outside the individual perceiving and processing them, that is, sources involving categories of human communication. As to linguistic representation, we may think of predicates such as *enterarse* ('to be informed'), *leer* ('to read') and *aprender* ('to learn'). Internal stimuli are inherent in spontaneous mental processes, which take place without the person affected being able to influence them. They have been characterized as follows:

There seems, further, to be a clear difference between *thoughts* that merely occur within me and those which are within my control. For sometimes when I am day-dreaming, or relaxing and waiting for sleep, thoughts and images just arise within me which I was not seeking, not trying to think, and for which I have no use, even thoughts that annoy me and which I try to dispel (Taylor 1970: 51).

Spanish examples of predicates expressing internal conceptual stimuli are *soñar* ('to dream'), *ocurrírsele a uno* ('to occur to one') and *venir al pensamiento* ('to cross one's mind'). The predicate *percibir* ('to perceive'), finally, fulfills a generic function, since it may be used to describe both sensory and conceptual stimuli:

Percibir... Enterarse de la existencia de una cosa por los sentidos, o por la inteligencia servida por los sentidos..." (Moliner 1998b: 636).
(*Percibir...* Become aware of the existence of something through the senses, or through sensorial intelligence...')

The modal behavior of acquisition of knowledge predicates must be defined in the following way. As they describe perceivable states of affairs in the real world or in a conceivable world, they obligatorily select the indicative mood in the complement clause if the main clause is both assertive and affirmative. Compare the following examples:

Sensory stimulus

- (88) Hemos visto que han instalado nuevos semáforos en el centro de la ciudad³¹
(‘We have seen that new traffic lights have — IND — been installed in the center of the town’)
- (89) De improviso sintieron que alguien entraba en la habitación³²
(‘Unexpectedly, they heard someone entering — IND — the room’)

External conceptual stimulus

- (90) Nuestro colega se enteró de que su mujer había salido con otro
(‘Our colleague found out that his wife had — IND — gone out with someone else’)
- (91) Aquí leo que el Real Madrid va a contratar un nuevo entrenador
(‘Here I read that Real Madrid is — IND — going to contract a new trainer’)

Internal conceptual stimulus

- (92) Soñó que estaba en una casa deshabitada
(‘She dreamed that she was — IND — in an unhabitated house’)
- (93) Se le ocurrió que podía ir a verla
(‘It occurred to him that he could — IND — go and see her’)

The indicative loses its monopoly if the embedding clause is not assertive and affirmative at the same time. To see this more clearly, let us look at the following set of examples:

- (94) Noté }
 Descubrí }
 > que la plataforma se estaba derrumbando
Vi }
Sentí }
(‘I noticed / discovered / saw / heard that the platform was — IND — collapsing’)

In this example, *se estaba derrumbando* cannot be replaced by **se estuviera derrumbando*. However, negative and interrogative embedding clauses may select the subjunctive mood in the embedded one. Compare the following variants of (94):

- (95) {noté }
 {descubrí } {se estaba derrumbando}
No { } que la plataforma
 {vi } {se estuviera derrumbando}
 {sentí }
(‘I did not notice / discover / see / hear that the platform was — IND / SUB — collapsing’)
- (96) {Notaste }
 {Descubriste } {se estaba derrumbando}
¿ { } que la plataforma ?

{Viste	}	{se estuviera derrumbando}
{Sentiste	}	

(‘Did you notice / discover / see / hear that the platform was —
IND / SUB was collapsing?’)

The modal variation shown by (95) and (96) reflects certain differences in the situations described. That is to say, the use of the indicative in (95) presupposes that, at coding time, the speaker, identified by the subject of the matrix clause, regards the proposition expressed by the subordinate clause as a true proposition.³³ This means that at some moment after the moment referred to by the *pretérito indefinido* the speaker realized or was informed that the event he/she did not perceive at reference time did take place in reality. The use of the subjunctive, on the other hand, presupposes that no truth value can be attributed to the embedded proposition. That is, the speaker not only did not perceive whether or not the event described took place at reference time, but is still ignorant about it at coding time. Put more simply: “... the speaker has not experienced the event (although it may have taken place” (Bull 1965: 183).³⁴ Further note that the use of the subjunctive in the subordinate clause may be manipulated to achieve certain perlocutionary purposes:

Los complementos AC [verbos de adquisición de conocimiento, H. H.] que se construyen con subjuntivo pueden emplearse irónicamente (chistosa, sarcásticamente) para insinuar que el hablante piensa, o efectivamente ha notado, que la situación descrita en el complemento no ha tenido lugar. Por ejemplo, si le pido a un pianista que interprete cierta pieza para mí y no lo hace mientras estoy presente, puedo decirle: (28) No noté (oí) que tocara lo que le pedí. En (28) el hablante puede estar suponiendo una afirmación real o imaginaria hecha por el pianista, en el sentido de que tocaría la pieza (Guitart 1990: 324).

(‘Subjunctive complement clauses of acquisition of knowledge verbs can be employed ironically (humorously, sarcastically) to insinuate that the speaker thinks, or has actually noticed that the situation described in the complement clause did not take place. For instance, if I ask a pianist to play a certain piece for me and he does not do it while I am present, I can say to him: (28) ‘I did not notice (hear) that you played what I asked you’. By uttering (28) the speaker may be assuming a real or imaginary affirmation by the pianist with respect to his having played the piece’)

No doubt, Guitart’s example can be interpreted in an ironic sense. In actual fact, what we are concerned with is an indirect speech act with explicit assertive and implicit directive force. Specifically, the speaker is informing the hearer that he/she has not acquired the perceptual experience referred to. The non-literal force is directive since it is implied by the performance of the lit-

eral act that the speaker wants the hearer to comply with the request made in a previous part of the discourse.

I now turn to focus attention on example (96), whose interrogative force causes the subject of the main clause to be marked with second-person reference. The interpretation of the indicative-subjunctive variation in the complement clause parallels that of example (95). The use of the indicative presupposes that the speaker takes it for granted that the event described took place in reality. The purpose of his/her question is to ascertain whether the interlocutor perceived that it took place. Note, incidentally, that a negative formulation of the question would produce a marked perlocutionary variant:

- (96) a. ¿No viste que la plataforma se estaba derrumbando?
(‘Didn’t you see that the platform was — IND — collapsing?’)

In (96a), the use of the negation serves to express the speaker’s surprise at the hearer’s not having perceived the event referred to. As for the use of the subjunctive in (96), there is no presupposition on the part of the speaker concerning the truth value of the embedded proposition. By asking the question he/she merely attempts to find out whether or not the state of affairs expressed did take place.

Let us finally consider the particular situation where the matrix clause is subject to the following constraints: (I) negative structure; (II) present tense; (III) first-person singular subject. Compare the following example:

- (97) No veo que hayas hecho progresos
(‘I do not see that you have — SUB — made progress’)

The speaker of (97) communicates that he/she does not perceive at coding time the state of affairs described by the subordinate clause. In other words, he/she assigns a negative truth value to the embedded proposition, which automatically triggers the use of the subjunctive mood. Under these circumstances, the use of the indicative is excluded, as it would indicate that the hearer did make progress. More precisely,

- (97) a. *No veo que has hecho progresos

is unwellformed because it expresses the contradiction that the speaker does not perceive what he knows to be true.³⁵

Summarizing the results of the foregoing analyses, we come to the conclusion that, depending on the syntactic structure of the matrix clause, the propositional attitude manifested by acquisition of knowledge predicates


basically focuses on two different types of states of affairs: (I) states of affairs characterized by the *realis* parameter, which require the use of the indicative, and (II) states of affairs characterized by the *potentialis* parameter, which require the use of the subjunctive. In the former case, the embedded proposition has a positive truth value, in the latter, an indeterminate truth value.³⁶

Lastly note that the difference between the *realis* and *potentialis* interpretation has also been explained in terms of the degree of relevance of the information conveyed. Thus, Lunn takes Sperber and Wilson's *relevance theory* (1986) as her frame of reference when observing:

... in contemporary Spanish, the mood system is a device through which speakers can evaluate the information value of clauses (1995: 429)... verbs in clauses of relatively high information value are marked with the indicative; verbs in clauses with relatively low information value are marked with subjunctive (1989 b:249).

Applying this statement to the interpretation of (95) and (96), we must assume that the indicative variants correspond to a higher point on the scale of relevance than the subjunctive ones, or, to put it more generally, other things being equal, speakers will prefer to provide truthful and reliable information rather than information with indeterminate or negative truth value.³⁷ As we will see in the remaining chapters of this book, specification of degrees of information value is a powerful pragmatic parameter for analyzing indicative and subjunctive variation in subordinate clauses. We conclude this section with a schematic representation of acquisition of knowledge predicates as they have been dealt with in the preceding pages:

Diagram 3



5.1.2 Cognition and evaluation predicates³⁸

The classification of cognition predicates yields a distinction between three major classes: epistemic predicates, doxastic predicates, and dubitative predicates. To evaluation predicates a twofold subclassification applies: predicates expressing rational evaluations and predicates expressing emotional evaluations.

Semantically, cognition and evaluation predicates are differentiated in the following way: the former bring into focus the truth value of the embedded proposition, while the latter denote an assessment of the state of affairs described by the embedded proposition. It follows that both classes of predicates are linked to each other by virtue of the fact that evaluation presupposes cognition. Consequently, the parameters of asserted and presupposed truth value are essential to an integrated analysis of the predicates under review. A fundamental focus of interest, therefore, will be the two different ways in which the propositional content of the subordinate clause is brought to the attention of the interlocutor; that is, in sentences containing a cognition predicate this information is presented from a foregrounding or focalizing perspective, whereas in sentences containing an evaluation predicate it is presented from a backgrounding or defocalizing perspective.³⁹

The organization of this chapter is as follows. In Sections 5.1.2.1 and 5.1.2.2 an analysis will be conducted into both the meaning and the pragmatic interpretation of cognition and evaluation predicates. It will be shown in particular that the use of these predicates correlates in a systematic way with the distribution of the indicative and the subjunctive mood in the complement clause.

5.1.2.1 *Cognition predicates*

The defining characteristic of cognition predicates is the expression of the attitude the subject of the matrix clause adopts with respect to the truth value of the embedded proposition. In this study, the current philosophical and linguistic point of view is adhered to that the class of cognition predicates can be properly divided into an epistemic, a doxastic, and a dubitative subclass.

The lexical properties of these subclasses can be described in terms of scalar magnitudes representing different degrees of commitment to truth value. Thus, the degree denoted by epistemic predicates is that of certainty, the degree denoted by doxastic predicates is that of belief, and the degree denoted by dubitative predicates is that of doubt. The prototype predicates of these subclasses are *saber* ('to know'), *creer* ('to believe'), and *dudar* ('to doubt'), respectively.

Furthermore, it is an inherent characteristic of these subclasses that, in neg-

ative sentences, their members may be involved in a shift in cognitive meaning, so that, for example, a negative doxastic expression, such as *No creo que venga* ('I do not believe that he will come'), is conceptually equivalent to the affirmative dubitative expression *Dudo de que venga* ('I doubt that he will come'). A similar relationship holds between the negative dubitative expression *No dudo de que viene* ('I do not doubt that he will come') and the affirmative epistemic expression *Estoy seguro de que viene* ('I am sure that he will come').

From a pragmatic point of view, the different classes of cognition predicates can be qualified in the following way: the use of an epistemic predicate reflects the subject's confidence in the truth of the information specified by the subordinate proposition; the use of a doxastic predicate implies the subject's willingness to admit of a challenge being made to the propositional attitude taken; finally, the use of a dubitative predicate implies the subject's interest in being informed about the truth of the state of affairs expressed by the subordinate proposition. It is worthwhile adding to the foregoing that languages may encode these degrees of truthfunctional meaning in different ways. While in Spanish they are formally expressed by the opposition between the indicative and subjunctive mood, in a language such as Japanese the difference between the three types of cognitive predicates can be made explicit by means of a set of specific sentence-final particles (Tsuchihashi 1983).

5.1.2.1.1 *Epistemic predicates*

The type of lexical information denoted by epistemic predicates can be defined as follows: the referent of the grammatical or notional subject of the predicate takes it for granted that the complement proposition expresses a state of affairs that corresponds with factual reality. Since the knowledge of the facts described is stored in the memory of the subject, the propositional content of the complement clause forms part of his/her cognitive experience. From an interactional point of view, propositions subordinated to epistemic predicates may be characterized as:

... propositions which are taken for granted via the force of diverse conventions, as unchallengeable by the hearer and thus requiring no evidentiary justifications by the speaker (Givón 1982: 24).

For purposes of illustration, consider the following example:

- | | | | |
|------|-------------------|---|---------------------------------|
| (98) | Sé | } | |
| | Estoy enterado de | } | que el presidente fue asesinado |
| | Es cierto | } | |

(‘I know / I am informed / it is true that the president was — IND — murdered’)

The use of *sé*, *estoy enterado*, and *es cierto* indicates that the speaker of the sentence considers the proposition *el presidente fue asesinado* to be true, that is, a proposition which expresses a real state of affairs. As the content of this proposition forms part of his factual knowledge, the speaker does not expect the hearer to challenge the truth of the embedded proposition, or to ask for “evidentiary justifications” for that truth. Thus, it would be inappropriate for the hearer to react to the assertion with a *why*-question as a request for information concerning the speaker’s being in the epistemic state expressed. Consider, for instance, the pragmatically awkward formulation of:

- (98) a. *¿Por qué sabes que el presidente fue asesinado?
(‘Why do you know that the president was murdered?’)

However, the occurrence of epistemic predicates is not blocked in negative *por qué* questions:

- (98) b. ¿Por qué no sabes que el presidente fue asesinado?
(‘Why don’t you know that the president was murdered?’)

It has been argued (Haverkate (1979: 114–117) that in cases such as (98b) we are dealing with indirect speech acts characterized by the interaction of an interrogative and an expressive illocutionary point. The interrogative point, which bears upon the justification of a negative state of affairs, is explicitly formulated by means of the *por qué* question. From this question the hearer is supposed to infer the expressive point, which implies the reproach that he/she is not in the epistemic state referred to.

Though informative questions may not focus on epistemic justification, they may focus on the source or origin of the factual knowledge of the subject of the sentence. Thus, an appropriate reaction to (98) might be:

- (98) c. ¿Cómo sabes que el presidente fue asesinado?
(‘How do you know that the president was murdered?’)

Annis (1977: 218) qualifies an informative question such as (98c) as: “...a request for a statement of the *person’s evidential position*, that is, what puts the person in a position to know.”

In spite of the fact that, as a rule, manner adverbs are incompatible with stative verbs, (98c) is perfectly well formed, which leads to the conclusion that *saber* must be attributed here a specific non-stative interpretation. More pre-

cisely, in this example *saber* should be interpreted as: "haberse enterado de cierta cosa" ('having found out something') (Moliner 1998b: 998). This particular sense of the verb focuses on the source of the knowledge acquired. Affirmative *cómo* questions, then, serve to elicit information about that source.⁴⁰

As regards modal distribution, the above examples clearly show that epistemic predicates select the indicative mood in the complement clause, which is in accordance with the general rule of Spanish that asserting positive truth value requires the use of the indicative. It may be added to this that veracity in verbal communication produces the effect of a high degree of informativeness, which is equivalent to saying that making truthful epistemic assertions contributes to the expression of optimal relevance. In relation to this, further note that in not a few discussions and disputes in everyday conversation the factuality or non-factuality of a certain state of affairs is found to be a common object of disagreement. It does not come as a surprise, therefore, that epistemic statements are also made for merely manipulative reasons:

People very often claim to know when they do not, although they are not ignorant of the meaning of *know* or the circumstances in which they use the word. By using the word, even though illegitimately, one can encourage important actions, gain respect and admiration, cause attitudes one regards as desirable and even acquire the confidence one needs to achieve some difficult ends (Butcharov quoted from Lehrer 1974: 136).⁴¹

We now come to the analysis of the negative use of epistemic predicates. The two following examples from Kleiman (1974: 175) will serve as the starting point for the discussion:

- (99) No sabe que le estén esperando
(‘He does not know if they are — SUB — waiting for him’)
- (100) No sabían que los jugadores de baloncesto tuvieran que medir más de 1.80 metros
(‘They did not know if basketball-players had — SUB — to be taller than 1.80 meters’)

The interpretation of these sentences does not pose particular problems; the negative structure of the matrix clause indicates that the subject of the epistemic predicate is not in a position to assess the truth value of the embedded proposition. The same holds true for the speaker of the sentence; it is not known to him/her whether the state of affairs described by *le estén esperando* obtains at coding time nor whether the state of affairs described by *tuvieran*

que medir más de 1.80 metros obtained at reference time. The dubitative interpretation of (99) and (100) is made explicit by Kleiman in the following way:

- (99) a. No sabe que le estén esperando y es muy probable que no haya nadie esperándole
(‘He does not know if they are waiting for him and it is very likely that there is no one waiting for him’)
- (100) a. No sabían que los jugadores de baloncesto tuvieran que medir más de 1.80 metros y no creo que sea verdad
(‘They didn’t know if basketball-players had to be taller than 1.80 meters and I don’t believe it is true’)

Although Kleiman does not mention the point, both sentences also admit the use of the indicative mood in the complement clause. The corresponding interpretation runs parallel with that of the indicative complementation of perception predicates inserted in negative matrix clauses. Thus, if we replace *le estén esperando* by *le están esperando* in (99), the use of the indicative informs us that the speaker knows that there is someone waiting for the person identified by the subject of the matrix clause. In the same way, substitution of *tuvieran que medir más de 1.80 metros* by *tenían que medir más de 1.80 metros* enhances the informativeness of the embedded clause, as the use of the indicative involves the presupposition that the speaker of the sentence knows that in the past period referred to basketball players had to be taller than 1.80 meters. Guitart (1984: 161), who is dealing with the same question as Kleiman, provides a contrastive example in which the subject expresses reference to the speaker:

- (101) a. No sabía que estabas a cargo de eso
(‘I didn’t know that you were — IND — in charge of that (but now I know)
- b. No sabía que estuvieras a cargo de eso
(‘I didn’t know that you were — SUB — in charge of that’ (I doubt that you are or were)

Next, it is worth noting that negative epistemic predicates inflected for first-person singular and present tense block the occurrence of the indicative in the complement clause. Compare, for instance:

- (102) No sé que la secretaria esté (*está) enferma
(‘I do not know if the secretary is — SUB — (*IND) ill’)

To this example a similar interpretation applies as to (97): from the use of *está*

one would draw the conclusion that the speaker of the sentence presupposes that the secretary is ill. This, then, creates a contradiction because the main clause expresses that the speaker doesn't know whether she is ill.

Consider next:

- (103) Antes de conocer a mi esposo, no sabía que no todos los físicos eran aburridos
 ('Before I met my husband, I did not know that not all physicists were — IND — boring')

The use of the indicative in the complement clause of this sentence leads to the interpretation that, after the period specified by *antes de conocer a mi esposo*, the speaker gained an experience that was totally new to her. We may further deduce that, at the moment of speech, the experience described forms part of her epistemic knowledge. It follows that the complement clause excludes variation of mood: it is only the indicative which can be selected.

Finally note that, besides the negative matrix *no saber que*, we also find *no saber si*. Thus, for instance, instead of (102), we could get:

- (102) a. No sé si la secretaria está enferma
 ('I do not know if the secretary is — IND — ill')

Although conceptually equivalent to (102), (102a) shows two differences in syntactic structure, since the embedded clause is introduced by the conjunction *si* and marked for indicative mood. Taking into account the relatively low degree of informativeness of the embedded proposition, it comes as a surprise that modal complementation finds its expression in the use of the indicative. The explanation for this has to be sought in the indirect interrogative status of the complement clause. As pointed out in 3.2.2, the indicative is, probably universally, chosen as the mood typifying interrogative sentences by virtue of the fact that questions are conventionally asked to elicit assertive information. What we observe, then, is that this rule applies not only to direct but also to indirect interrogatives. Note, incidentally, that embedded WH-questions also require the use of the indicative mood. Compare, for instance: *No sé quién viene esta noche* ('I do not know who is — IND — coming tonight'), *No sabíamos cómo lo había hecho* ('We did not know how he had — IND — done it'), *No se sabe dónde ocurrió* ('It is not known where it happened — IND —').

It has been pointed out earlier that *saber* fulfills a prototype role within the field of epistemic predicates. Now, in addition to *saber* ('to know'), there are three more predicates making up the core of the field: *ignorar* ('not

know'), *recordar* ('to remember'), and *olvidar* ('to forget') (Wanders and Luyrink 1991: 46–47). *Ignorar* bears an antonymous relation to *saber* being semantically equivalent to *no saber*. This relation is syntactically reflected by identical form of complementation. Thus, looking again at example (102), we see that it parallels (102b), both as regards form and meaning:

- (102) b. Ignoro que la secretaria esté enferma
(‘I do not know if the secretary is — SUB — ill’)

Remember that referential identity of the speaker of the sentence and the subject of the main clause blocks indicative complementation.

Let us consider next two other examples:

- (104) Don Manuel ignora todavía que ésta no va a ser para él una noche cualquiera
(‘Don Manuel does not know yet that this night will — IND — not be for him just like any other night’)
- (105) Ignoramos si el que nos ha correspondido a nosotros dos os parecerá interesante
(‘We do not know if our share will — IND — be of interest to you’)

The indicative complementation of (104) suggests that in order to correctly interpret this sentence a distinction should be made between its meaning and its presupposition. As to the former, it is predicated of Don Manuel that he is not aware of the special character of the night that awaits him. As to the latter, it is presupposed by the utterance of the sentence that the speaker knows what is going to happen on the night referred to. Note that the adverb *todavía* (‘yet’) alludes to that presupposition. From the embedded clause in (105), however, no specific presupposition on the part of the speaker may be inferred. What this assertion expresses is that the referents of the subject of the main clause, which include the speaker of the sentence, cannot assess the truth value of the embedded proposition.

The foregoing analyses make it clear that the conjunction *si*, also called, for obvious reasons, *si dubitativo*, may introduce the complement clause of both *no saber* and *ignorar*.⁴² Note, however, that *si* complements only express dubitative information, as shown, for example, by (102a) and (105). This means that the truth value of the embedded proposition cannot be ascertained, which is a logical consequence of the indirect interrogative meaning of the *si* clause. To add one more example, if we look at the difference between (101a) and (102b), we observe that *No sabía si estabas a cargo de eso* is truth-

functionally related to the latter and not to the former sentence.

To conclude the comparison between *ignorar* and *saber*, let us focus on the pair *no ignorar* and *saber*. As regards the semantics of *no ignorar*, the inherently negative meaning of the verb is counterbalanced by the explicit negation *no*. From a pragmatic point of view, however, there is no full synonymy with *saber*, since *no ignorar* is not seldom used as an understatement, so that it is more or less equivalent to *saber perfectamente bien*.

I now wish to draw attention to the two remaining core predicates: *recordar* ('remember') and *olvidar* ('forget'), which express reactivation and loss of epistemic knowledge, respectively. Both predicates share the property that, as far as modal complementation is concerned, their occurrence in an affirmative main clause triggers the use of the indicative mood in the complement clause. However, negative main clauses bring about different modal patterns in the embedded ones. Let us start with the analysis of *olvidar*:

- (106) Me olvidé de que Mario nunca cierra la puerta
(‘I forgot that Mario never closes — IND — the door’)
- (107) No olvidan que José es muy poderoso en la firma
(‘They do not forget that José is — IND — a very powerful man in the company’)

These sentences illustrate the rule that the use of *olvidar* obligatorily triggers the indicative mood in the complement clause, which is equivalent to stating that the affirmative or negative structure of the main clause does not produce modal variation. The referent of the subject is not involved in producing variation either, as may be seen from the first-person singular reference of (106) and the third-person plural reference of (107). In the former case, it is the speaker him/herself who communicates that he had lost a certain piece of information from his epistemic memory; in the latter, the speaker presupposes the truth of *José es muy poderoso en la firma*. In this connection, consider the contradiction expressed by:

- (107) a. *No olvidan que José es muy poderoso en la firma, pero yo creo que no tiene la menor influencia
(‘They do not forget that José is a very powerful man in the company, but I believe that he does not have any influence’)

The conclusion from all this is clear: the complement clause of *olvidar* always describes a state of affairs that corresponds with factual reality.⁴³

This conclusion, however, is not applicable to the complement clause of

recordar, which shows a more complicated truthfunctional pattern. Compare the following examples:

- (108) No recuerdo que {haya} venido aquí
 {*ha }
 ('I do not remember that he has — SUB / *IND — come here')
- (109) Marta no recuerda que nos {hayan} invitado
 {han }
 ('Marta does not remember that they have — SUB / IND — invited us')
- (110) Lucía no recuerda que yo {fumo }
 {*fume}
 ('Lucía does not remember that I smoke — IND / *SUB —')

As to the interpretation of (108), it is important to bear in mind that it is the speaker him/herself who does not remember whether a certain event took place. This is the reason that the occurrence of the indicative in the complement clause is excluded. Put differently, the use of *ha venido* would imply a contradiction, because, by using the indicative mood, the speaker indicates that he/she does not remember an event although he is aware that it took place. The contrastive distribution of the subjunctive and indicative mood in (109) can be explained as follows. The use of the subjunctive expresses that Marta does not remember whether or not an invitation has been sent. Concerning the knowledge of the speaker of the sentence, it must be inferred that he/she is not in a position to assess the truth value of the embedded proposition. The interpretation of the indicative mood parallels that of the subjunctive in so far as we are informed about Marta's not remembering whether or not an invitation has been sent. The role of the speaker, however, is a different one, since his/her selection of *han invitado* presupposes the factuality of the state of affairs described by the complement clause. In (110), finally, the referent of the subject of the complement clause plays a decisive part in the interpretation of the sentence. That is, the use of *yo* excludes the appearance of *fume*, because the subjunctive would indicate that the truth value of the embedded proposition cannot be ascertained. This, however, would lead to the strange conclusion that the speaker does not know whether or not he/she is a smoker.

To conclude this section, I wish to focus on a particular subclass of the class of epistemic predicates, namely, the class composed of so-called 'impersonal expressions', such as *ser cierto* ('to be true'), *ser evidente* ('to be evident'), and *estar claro* ('to be clear'). From a formal point of view, the term 'impersonal', which is the product of a long grammatical tradition, is unsatisfactory, since

the corresponding constructions are obligatorily inflected for third-person singular reference. It would be appropriate, therefore, to speak of ‘unipersonal predicates’, the term normally reserved for meteorological predicates such as *lloviznar* (‘to drizzle’), *nevar* (‘to snow’) and *relampaguear* (‘to lighten’).

Unipersonal epistemic predicates are peculiar in the sense that they do not make explicit reference to a particular human participant, although it is implied that the speaker of the sentence is the person committed to the truth of the statement. This may be seen from the unacceptability of an example such as:

- (111) *Es verdad que el Real Madrid ganó el partido, pero yo no lo creo
(‘It is true that Real Madrid won — IND — the match, but I do not believe it’)

This sentence is an illustration of the so-called ‘Moore’s paradox’, which manifests itself when a speaker denies believing an assertion which he/she characterizes as true. Further note that the unipersonal predicates under discussion perform the function of presenting the epistemic knowledge of the speaker in an objective way. By lacking overt reference to a human participant, these expressions obtain the status of a generally accepted truth.⁴⁴ In affirmative sentences, unipersonal epistemic predicates require the complement clause to be marked with indicative mood, which is in accordance with the fact that, just like their non-unipersonal counterparts, they express a high degree of information value by focusing on positive truth value. When negated, unipersonal predicates express negative or indeterminate truth value, as illustrated, e.g., by the meaning of *no es cierto* (‘it is not true’) and *no está claro* (‘it is not clear’), respectively. What happens in these cases is that the *potentialis* and *irrealis* interpretation of the embedded proposition implies a relatively low or low degree of information value, which is formally reflected by the obligatory use of the subjunctive mood. Sporadically, the negative use of unipersonal predicates provides information about a real state of affairs. This situation arises when the speaker directly or indirectly reports a statement made by the hearer or another person. As a result, the embedded clause expresses polyphonic information, which triggers the use of the indicative mood. Compare, for instance:

- (112) No es cierto que estuviste allí, por cuanto no sabes lo que ocurrió
(‘It is not true that you were — IND — there, since you do not know what happened’)

Lastly note that the implicit reference of unipersonal expressions should be clearly distinguished from the referential potential of so-called ‘pseudo-reflex-

ive' constructions, which are typically employed when the speaker is not able to specify the referent of the notional subject of the sentence or wishes to conceal his/her identity for strategical purposes.⁴⁵ In the following epistemic assertion, the reflexive pronoun expresses a generalizing or all-inclusive reference:

- (113) Hoy se sabe que la corteza terrestre está formado por alrededor de doce placas que flotan en el magma...
 ('Nowadays we know that the earth's crust is — IND — made up of about twelve layers which float in the magma...')

The rules applying to modal selection in epistemic complement clauses can be summarized as follows: affirmative matrix clauses require the use of the indicative mood, which is to be considered a formal marker of positive truth value. Negative matrix clauses admit modal variation in the complement clause; the use of the subjunctive indicates that the speaker of the sentence is not in a position to assess the truth value of the embedded proposition. The subjunctive may also mark negative truth value, which holds for the use of certain unipersonal predicates. Finally, negative matrix clauses trigger the use of the indicative when the speaker of the sentence attributes positive truth value to the embedded proposition, while it is predicated of the subject of the matrix clause that he/she does not.

5.1.2.1.2 *Doxastic predicates*

The lexical content of doxastic predicates can be defined in terms of the following propositional attitude: the grammatical or notional subject of the predicate has reasonable grounds for believing that the state of affairs expressed by the embedded proposition corresponds with factual reality. The reasonable grounds underlying the subject's belief are often made explicit by causal clauses, not only in argumentative types of discourse, but in everyday conversation. It follows that propositions subordinated to doxastic predicates may be qualified as:

... propositions that are asserted with relative confidence, are open to challenge by the hearer and thus require, or admit, evidentiary justification (Givón 1982: 24).

Let us take the following example as the starting point for empirical analysis:

- (114) Creo }
 Me parece } que el presidente fue asesinado
 ('I believe / it seems to me that the president was — IND — murdered')

The speaker uttering one of these sentences does not commit him/herself fully to the truth of the embedded proposition, but is supposed to be relatively certain that *el presidente fue asesinado* describes a real state of affairs. As observed earlier, the subject of a doxastic predicate should be able to justify the grounds that underly his/her confidence. Therefore, there is nothing unusual in asking a person who is in a doxastic state to motivate his belief. The following reaction to (114), for instance, would be perfectly acceptable:

- (114) a. ¿Por qué crees que el presidente fue asesinado?
 ('Why do you believe that the president was murdered?')

This example shows that doxastic assertions differ from epistemic ones in that the latter, as illustrated by (98a), do not elicit requests for justification.

Let us consider next the meaning of negative *por qué* questions. Compare, e.g.:

- (114) b. ¿Por qué no crees que el presidente fue asesinado?
 ('Why don't you believe that the president was murdered?')

From (114b) it is clear that speakers who are in a negative doxastic state are supposed to be able to motivate their lack of confidence in the truth of the proposition expressed. Eliciting this type of information is a basic function of questions such as (114b), which is equivalent to stating that they are not interpreted as indirect speech acts, which was found to be typical of the use of their epistemic counterparts.

Furthermore, we find that, unlike epistemic assertions, doxastic ones cannot serve as a stimulus for asking information on the source of the belief by means of a manner question. This may be seen, for example, from the lack of wellformedness of:

- (114) c. *¿Cómo crees que el presidente fue asesinado?⁴⁶
 ('How do you believe that the president was murdered?')

In what follows, our focus of attention will be the selection of mood in doxastic complement clauses. Though sporadic exceptions do occur, the use of the indicative is the norm preferred by the vast majority of speakers of Peninsular Spanish.⁴⁷ Note, however, that *parecer* is likely to take infinitive complementation when the speaker or writer wishes to refer to a general point of view for which no conclusive evidence has been furnished. Compare, e.g., the following statement from a scientific publication: "... los dos nuevos homínidos parecen pertenecer al grupo de *austrolopithecus*" ('... the two new

hominids seem to belong to the *austrolopithecus* group’).

Taking up again the criterion of asserting positive truth value, which we claimed to be the distinctive feature of mood selection in epistemic predicates, we may explain the appearance of the indicative in doxastic complements by virtue of the confidence the subject of the matrix clause has in the proposition describing a real state of affairs. To elaborate on this point, it is useful to return to the scalar magnitudes set up in Section 5.1.2.1 in order to account for the lexical difference between epistemic, doxastic, and dubitative predicates. What we find, then, is that doxastic predicates, which occupy the middle position on the scale, are not equidistant from the two other points. Since their subjects are attributed a relatively strong certainty regarding the truth of the embedded proposition, doxastic predicates are more similar to epistemic ones than to dubitative ones. Though this analysis offers a plausible explanation for the occurrence of the indicative mood in the complement clause, there is another factor to be taken into consideration. That is, doxastic statements are often made to put forward a standpoint, which necessarily implies the speaker’s being able to provide conclusive evidence for the embedded proposition. Now, since, in most cases, it is the intention of the speaker to convince his/her interlocutor of the validity of his standpoint, presenting it in a doxastic, that is, in a mitigated form, makes it more acceptable to the interlocutor. Thus, instead of saying, for instance:

- (115) Tu amigo no es de fiar
(‘Your friend is not to be trusted’)

the speaker may express the same standpoint by softening its assertive force:

- (115) a. Me parece que tu amigo no es de fiar
(‘It seems to me that your friend is — IND — not to be trusted’)

Evidently, the mitigating character of assertions such as (115a) originates in the speaker’s literally indicating that he does not assume full responsibility for the truth of the embedded proposition. In cases like these, which have been qualified as ‘weak assertions’ (Hooper 1975: 101), it is up to the hearer to infer that the weak assertion expressed functions as a politeness strategy to hedge against the delicate character of the information provided.

Further note that the weak assertive interpretation also obtains when the doxastic predicate appears in sentence-final position. The syntactic process involved, which is indicated by such different labels as ‘complement preposing’, ‘sentence raising’, ‘sentence lifting’, and even ‘slifting’ (Ross 1975: 241), manifests itself in a movement rule that raises the complement clause to the

sentence-initial position. Doxastic predicates occurring in structures to which complement preposing has applied are inflected for indicative mood and first-person singular reference, due to the fact that the belief expressed is the belief of the speaker. The perlocutionary effect produced by complement preposing is an afterthought, as may be shown by the ‘slifted’ variant of (115a):

- (115) b. Tu amigo no es de fiar, me parece
(‘Your friend is not to be trusted, I believe’)

The politeness strategy involved consists of the speaker’s uttering first an assertion without any reservation concerning its truth value, while, in the second instance, this assertion is made dependent on the mitigating force of the doxastic expression. In other words: “The intransitive form of *creer* is functioning as a hedge on the immediately prior clause. It serves to limit the speaker’s responsibility for the truth of the previous statement” (Weber and Bentivoglio 1991: 197).

Assertive mitigation may further be brought about by parenthetical insertion of the doxastic predicate. Thus, we do not only find the afterthought construction:

- (116) Esta señora está vinculada a la mejor burguesía local, creo
(‘This lady is linked to the upper local middle class, I believe’)

but also:

- (116) a. Esta señora está vinculada, creo, a la mejor burguesía local
(‘This lady is linked, I believe, to the upper local middle class’)

Demonte (1977: 89) speaks of the *parentetización del verbo* to indicate the sentence-internal position of the doxastic predicate. Finally note that doxastic manipulation of truth value can be considered the strategic counterpart of the type of epistemic manipulation discussed in note 41.

In the foregoing analyses we have been concerned with the use of *creer* and *parecer*. This choice is motivated by the fact that these verbs perform a prototype function within the field of doxastic predicates. Other, less frequently used items are *opinar* (‘to be of the opinion that’), *pensar* (‘to think’), *suponer* (‘to suppose’), and *sospechar* (‘to suspect’). *Opinar* basically serves to express a standpoint or opinion:

Opinar. Tener cierta opinión sobre algo o alguien: ‘El opina que la situación no es tan grave’... ‘Opino que eres todavía demasiado joven’ (Moliner 1998b: 505).
(‘*Opinar*. To hold a view on something or someone: ‘He holds the view that the situation is not so serious...’ ‘I am of the opinion that you are still too young’)

Unlike *creer*, which focuses on the doxastic state of the subject of the predicate, *opinar* is not employed for mitigating purposes, so that it is not likely to appear in parenthetical or sentence-final position. Due to the relatively high degree of information value of the embedded proposition, the use of the indicative is obligatory. *Pensar* ('to think') denotes a mental act whose semantic characterization requires the distinction of different classes of subacts. Thus, among other specifications, Moliner provides the following ones:

Formar y relacionar ideas... . Dedicar la mente al examen de una cuestión para formar una opinión o tomar una resolución.... Decidir una cosa como consecuencia de haber pensado sobre un asunto (1998b: 629–630).
 ('To form and relate ideas — To devote one's mind to examining a question in order to form an opinion or to make a decision.... To make a decision as a result of having thought about a question')

For our present purposes, it is important to bear in mind that *pensar* may also denote doxastic meaning:

Creer u opinar cierta cosa: 'Yo pienso que no es ahora momento oportuno para eso' (1998b: 630).
 ('To believe or hold a view on something: 'I think this is not the right moment for that')

When used as a synonym of *creer*, *pensar* requires, as is to be expected, the use of the indicative in the complement clause. In contrast to the predicates we have just been examining, *suponer* ('to suppose') and *sospechar* ('to suspect') are compatible with subjunctive complementation. Let us consider the following examples of the use of *suponer*:⁴⁸

- (117) Suponiendo que haya salido a las cinco, antes de las ocho puede estar aquí
 ('Supposing that he left — SUB — at five o'clock, he can be here before eight o'clock')
- (117) a. Supón que haya salido a las cinco; pues antes de las ocho puede estar aquí
 ('Suppose that he left — SUB — at five o'clock; in that case he can be here before eight o'clock')

(117) and (117a) can be contrasted with an example to which indicative complementation applies:

- (118) Supongo que pensará venir, porque, si no, me hubiera avisado
 ('I suppose that he will — IND — intend to come, because, otherwise, he would have told me')

At the level of syntactic structure, the source of the modal difference between these examples is easy to detect: indicative complementation is triggered by the indicative form of the main clause, subjunctive complementation by the imperative form of the main clause, on the one hand, and by the gerund output of the matrix predicate, on the other. As regards semantic interpretation, it is useful to consider the two specifications given by Moliner in the entry of *suponer*. The first one applies to the interpretation of (117) and (117a), the second one to that of (118):

Considerar como existente cierta cosa, circunstancia, etc., que es base o punto de arranque para un razonamiento o consideración;

(‘To consider existent something, a circumstance, etc., which is the ground or starting-point for a reasoning’)

Pensar que ocurre cierta cosa aunque faltan datos para tener la certeza de ella (1998b: 1154).

(‘To think that something occurs although there is no evidence to be sure of it’)

It may be added to this that the subjunctive occurring in sentences (117) and (117a) reflects a relatively low degree of relevance, since the proposition expressed by the embedded clause serves as a presupposition underlying the communicative core of the sentence, i.e., the conclusion drawn in the main clause. In (118), on the other hand, the major focus of attention is the content of the doxastic attitude of the speaker, which is syntactically reflected by the indicative mood of *pensará*.⁴⁹

Let us finally look at modal variation in the complement clause of *sospechar*. When expressing doxastic meaning, defined as:

Creer en la existencia de cierta cosa o circunstancia por alguna apariencia: ‘Sospecho que no están en muy buenas relaciones’ (Moliner 1998b: 1129).

(‘To believe in the existence of something or a circumstance by appearances: ‘I suspect that they do not have a very good relationship’),

sospechar normally takes the indicative mood. Nevertheless, the appearance of the subjunctive should not be considered ungrammatical, as may be seen from the following statement:

Si comparamos dos oraciones gramaticalmente correctas, como *sospecho que ha pasado por aquí*, y *sospecho que haya pasado por aquí*, observaremos que con la primera significamos una inclinación a creer que efectivamente ha pasado, mientras que en la segunda acentuamos nuestra incertidumbre (Gili y Gaya 1955: 121).

(‘When comparing two grammatically wellformed sentences, such as ‘I suspect that he has — IND — passed by’, and ‘I suspect that he has — SUB — passed by’, we

notice that with the first one we express a tendency to believe that he has really passed by, while in the second one we stress our uncertainty')

Castronovo reaches the same conclusion by pointing out that *sospecho* + *Indicativo* is: "... more or less equivalent to *creo* ('I believe'), *pienso* ('I think'), *casi sé* ('I almost know') or *casi estoy seguro* ('I am almost sure')... ", while the speaker using *sospecho* + *Subjuntivo*: "... accentuates his uncertainty and *sospecho* takes on the meaning of something like *no estoy muy seguro*, or *dudo* as in *dudo que haya pasado por aquí*" (1984:231). Note that the comments of both Gili y Gaya and Castronovo lead to the interpretation that, as far as the expression of different degrees of truth value is concerned, a parallel may be drawn between the doxastic predicate *sospechar* and the dubitative adverbs *tal vez*, *quizá* and *acaso*, discussed in 3.3.1. In either case, the use of the subjunctive may be considered to correlate with a lower degree of truthfunctional information than the use of the indicative.

Our next focus of attention will be the negative use of doxastic predicates, which generates a twofold modal pattern in the subordinate clause. Thus, the affirmative sentence:

- (119) Carmen cree que el terrorista mató a su amigo
(‘Carmen believes that the terrorist killed — IND — her friend’)

can be negated in two different ways:

- (120) Carmen no cree que el terrorista mató a su amigo
(‘Carmen does not believe that the terrorist killed — IND — her friend’)

and

- (121) Carmen no cree que el terrorista matara a su amigo
(‘Carmen does not believe that the terrorist killed — SUB — her friend’)

The distinction between (120) and (121) requires an analysis from both a semantic and a pragmatic point of view. (120) communicates that *Carmen* does not believe that the proposition *el terrorista mató a su amigo* is true; at the same time, however, the use of the indicative reflects the presupposition that the speaker of the sentence assigns a positive truth value to that proposition. (121) is semantically equivalent to (120): in this case, too, the speaker reports on the negative belief of *Carmen* with respect to the truth of the embedded proposition. Pragmatically, however, there is a difference: from the use of the subjunctive we must infer that the speaker of the sentence is not in a position to judge whether or not the state of affairs described took place in actual fact. The truth value of the embedded proposition is indeterminate, as

a result of which the sentence has an inherently dubitative meaning. Looking at the difference between indicative and subjunctive complementation from another angle, one could say that in (120) subject-meaning and speaker-meaning come apart, whereas in (121) they coincide.⁵⁰

Finally remember that the presupposition of the speaker concerning the truth value of the embedded proposition also plays a distinctive role in the analysis of acquisition of knowledge and epistemic predicates, as was made clear by our discussion of (96) and (100a), respectively.

Pursuing the comparison with acquisition of knowledge and epistemic predicates, we observe that doxastic predicates also require a specific analysis of negative main clauses whose subject is marked by first-person singular reference. In the literature on the subject, opinions diverge as to the question whether the complement clause of *No creo que...* is compatible with the indicative mood. Klein, e.g., considers the sentence

- (122) No creo que ustedes fueron al cine
(‘I do not believe that you went — IND — to the movies’)

to be ungrammatical: “[This sentence, H. H.] with a first-person subject and an indicative complement, is not possible” (1974: 91). Solano-Araya shares this standpoint, and also provides an explanation:

With verbs of ‘belief’, a sentence with a first person singular in the present does not admit the indicative because there would be a contradiction; in this restricted sense, one should not affirm that which one does not believe. In the past tense, there would be no contradiction, even with a first person subject because there are two states of affairs involved (my beliefs in the past may be different from my beliefs in the present (1987: 29).

The point of view of Klein and Solano-Araya differs from that of Bustos and LLeó. Specifically, in his analysis of the sentence:

- (123) No creo que el belga ganó la carrera
(‘I do not believe that the Belgian won — IND — the race’)

Bustos offers a polyphonous explanation for the use of the indicative, which boils down to the interpretation that the speaker of the sentence considers the assertion *el belga ganó la carrera*, made by another spokesman, possibly the interlocutor, to be false. Bustos (1986: 220) paraphrases this interpretation in the following way:

- (123) a. No puedo creerme que el belga ganó la carrera
(‘I cannot believe that the Belgian won — IND — the race’)

Lleó examines the sentence:

- (124) Yo no creo que Santiago es oportunista
(‘I do not believe that Santiago is — IND — an opportunist’)

and arrives at the same conclusion as Bustos:

[124] could only be uttered in the case that some other speaker has claimed (previously in the discourse) that *Santiago es oportunista*; i.e., it can only be uttered as a reply to somebody else’s belief or “claim to truth” about the complement clause. This means that whenever the subject of the negated assertion coincides with the speaker, the “claim to truth” conveyed by the Indicative cannot be attributed to the speaker, since the negated assertive disallows it, and is attributed to some other (previous in the discourse) speaker, among which the hearer is a possible candidate (1979: 168).

The controversy between Klein and Solano-Araya, on the one hand, and Bustos and Lleó, on the other, induces us to consider the modal problem at issue from both a qualitative and a quantitative point of view. As to the former, it may be assumed that Bustos’ and Lleó’s interpretation of (123) and (124), respectively, is difficult to reject, which is equivalent to stating that the indicative mood conveys polyphonous, that is, factual information. From a quantitative point of view, however, where the focus of attention is on frequency of occurrence, it may be predicted that the indicative manifests itself only sporadically, since, as we will see below, speakers often prefer to make use of the subjunctive to express, for mitigating purposes, their doubt about the truth of the embedded proposition. It might well be the case therefore that there are speakers who, by analogy of this strategy, always employ the subjunctive.

Next I wish to draw attention to the impact of the category of mitigation I have just been referring to. Remember first of all the syntactic flexibility of doxastic sentences as shown by complement preposing and parenthetical insertion. Now, it is not only these permutation rules which apply optionally; the same holds true for the negation occurring in the complement clause. To see this more clearly, consider the following example:

- (125) Creo que ésta es la mejor solución de nuestro problema
(‘I believe that this is — IND — the best solution to our problem’)

The standpoint expressed by this doxastic assertion may be negated in two different ways, as shown by:

- (126) a. Creo que ésta no es la mejor solución de nuestro problema
(‘I believe that this is — IND — not the best solution to our problem’)

- (126) b. No creo que ésta sea la mejor solución de nuestro problema
(‘I do not believe that this is — SUB — the best solution to our problem’)

It is evident that, as far as semantic interpretation is concerned, (126a) and (126b) do not provide synonymous information, due to the fact that in the former case the speaker asserts having a positive belief in the truth of the embedded proposition, whereas in the latter, in which negative raising has applied, the assertion is one of expressing a negative belief concerning that proposition.

As for pragmatic interpretation, it seems to be a plausible assumption that most speakers will prefer (126b) if it is their intention not to impose their opinion on the hearer, even though what they actually wish to put forward is the positive belief expressed by (126a). Therefore, what we are dealing with here is a hedging strategy which consists in presenting a doxastic propositional attitude in the form of a dubitative statement, since, as was observed earlier, *no creo* is conceptually equivalent to *dudo*. Again, we find that conveying doubt or uncertainty about the truth value of the embedded proposition triggers the use of the subjunctive.

From the foregoing it is obvious that Spanish is a language in which the assertive mitigation under discussion is formally expressed in two different ways: by means of negative raising and by means of subjunctive complementation.

Note that the hedging effect produced by negative raising can be explained in terms of syntactic iconicity. That is, in (126a) the stronger force of the assertion is reflected by the fact that the negation fills a slot inside the embedded clause which is under its scope; in (126b), in contrast, the negation has been transported to the matrix clause. Consequently, the spatial distance created in this way can be taken to iconically reflect the weaker force of the assertion. Speaking in terms of verbal politeness, the type of distance involved can be conceived of as an icon of interpersonal distance.

The following political statement represents an interesting variant of the mitigating strategy we are examining:

- (127) Creo, señor Gordon, que la prensa de su país no esté informada correctamente respecto al Dr. Fidel Castro
(‘I believe, Mr. Gordon, that the press of your country is — SUB — not wellinformed with respect to Dr. Fidel Castro’)

Obviously, what the speaker of this sentence has in mind is to pursue a hedging strategy in order to soften the criticism expressed by the embedded propo-

lugar a oraciones de dudosa gramaticalidad (Kempchinsky 1990:434).
 ('Unlike the subjunctive, the indicative can also be used to express the speaker's complete skepticism:

(I) Do you believe that there are — IND — monsters with four heads in the Caribbean?

Here the person asking the question intends to verify the position taken by the speaker. Compare the same question with an adverbial modifier:

(II) Do you just believe that there are — IND — monsters with four heads in the Caribbean?

It is interesting to notice that changing the mood of these two sentences produces sentences of doubtful grammaticality')

In negative interrogative sentences the indicative is also found to perform the function of emphasizing positive truth value. This may be seen, e.g., from the following fragment of a political interview:

- (129) ¿No cree que en el fondo lo que pasa es que no hay más de tres o cuatro ministros con una cierta sensibilidad sindical?
 ('Don't you believe that what actually happens is that there are — IND — not more than three or four ministers with a certain sensitivity to the union movement?')

The negative form of this question fulfills a not unusual persuasive function, which consists in the interviewer's asking whether the interviewee does not hold a certain opinion, implying by his question that the latter should indeed entertain that opinion. The use of the subjunctive would be impossible in this situation, as it would suggest that the speaker cannot ascertain the truth value of the corresponding proposition.

Besides negative interrogative sentences, negative imperative ones may also be used to bring about particular perlocutionary effects. For illustration purposes, consider:

- (130) Pero no creas que duró horas y horas: fue como un relámpago todo ello
 ('But don't think that it lasted — IND — hours and hours; it was just like a flash of lightning')
- (131) No te creas que le solté la coz así, de sopetón
 ('Don't think that I snapped at him all of a sudden')

Both of these negative imperatives express the intention of the speaker to highlight the relevance of the information conveyed by the embedded propo-

sition, which explains the use of the indicative. The reinforcing function of doxastic imperatives can be easily shown by a comparison between (130) and (131) and their non-doxastic, force-neutral counterparts:

- (130) a. No duró horas y horas: fue como un relámpago todo ello
(‘It did not last hours and hours; it was just like a flash of lightning’)
- (131) a. No le solté la coz así, de sopetón
(‘I did not snap at him all of a sudden’)

The following statement explains the use of *no creas* and *no te creas* in more general terms:

Un hablante hace normalmente una suposición sobre la creencia (o aparentes creencias) de su oyente cuando profiere una oración negativa. Específicamente, supone... que el oyente cree o podría creer en la verdad de lo que se niega (Bustos 1986:99).

(‘Normally, a speaker makes a supposition about the belief (or apparent beliefs) of the hearer when he utters a negative sentence. Specifically, he supposes... that the hearer believes or could believe in the truth of what is being negated’)

The results of the analyses conducted in this section lead to the conclusion that one cannot speak, in absolute terms, of modal control exercised by the use of doxastic predicates. Just as what we found in the cases of acquisition of knowledge and epistemic predicates, it is unavoidable to take into account the syntactic configuration in which the predicate is embedded. Thus, a crucial distinction is called for between assertive, interrogative, and imperative sentences, on the one hand, and between affirmative and negative sentences, on the other. Focusing on the latter parameter, which is the most discriminating one of the two, we can formulate the general rule that affirmative assertive main clauses select the indicative mood in the complement one. The pragmatic explanation for this is that the expression of positive truth value reflects the relatively high degree of informativeness inherent in the presentation of a belief, an opinion, or a standpoint. Negative main clauses trigger a more complicated modal pattern in the subordinate clause. The use of the subjunctive indicates the *potentialis* character of the embedded proposition whose truth value cannot be ascertained. The use of the indicative provides two different types of information which have been qualified in terms of speaker meaning and subject meaning. When the speaker is different from the subject, the former presupposes that the embedded proposition describes a real state of affairs. At the same time, it is asserted of the subject of the main clause that he/she is not able to assess the truth value of the proposition. Finally, when the

speaker and the referent of the subject are identical, and the matrix clause is marked by the present tense, the embedded proposition provides polyphorous information which is considered to be untrue. As we have seen from the literature, it is this particular situation which provokes divergent views on the wellformedness of indicative complementation.

5.1.2.1.3 *Dubitative predicates*

Dubitative predicates are basically distinct from epistemic and doxastic ones in that their subjects do not assign an absolutely or relatively positive truth value to the embedded proposition. A dubitative propositional attitude bears upon the fact that the subject is not in a position to ascertain whether or not the state of affairs described corresponds with factual reality. It is for this reason that these propositions may be qualified as:

... propositions that are asserted with doubt as hypothesis and are thus beneath both challenge and evidentiary substantiation (Givón 1982:24).

Note, however, that the dubitative attitude itself may be problematized by means of both affirmative and negative *por qué* questions. *Cómo* questions, on the other hand, are excluded; asking for the way in which one doubts does not elicit sensible information.

Since speakers making a dubitative statement inform their hearers that the subject of the matrix clause is not able to judge whether the embedded proposition is true or false, these statements constitute the counterpart of epistemic ones, which, as we have seen in Section 5.1.2.1.1, bring into focus the positive truth value of the embedded proposition. We may further say that speakers being in a dubitative state must be assigned a stronger belief in the unreality than in the reality of the state of affairs expressed. This interpretation has been formulated by Auchlin (1984:818) in the following way:

... it is generally acknowledged that the expression or assertion of uncertainty is negatively oriented: from “I don’t know whether Paul will come” one cannot discursively conclude: “so we had better set a place for him” but rather, “so there is no reason to set a place for him”.

It is suggested by this observation that the dubitative attitude of the subject arises from his/her being in a negative epistemic or doxastic state. This brings us back to the statement made in Section 5.1.2.1.1 that negative matrices such as *no saber* and *no creer* are conceptually equivalent to the meaning of the non-analytical lexical item *dudar*. The following set of examples illustrates the synonymy involved:

- (132) Dudo }
 No sé } que sea tan rico
 No creo }
 ('I doubt / do not know / do not believe that he is — SUB — so rich')

The modal inflection of *sea*, triggered by the use of *dudo*, *no sé* and *no creo*, has already been discussed in connection with (126b), where it was pointed out that the expression of doubt and uncertainty concerning the truth value of the embedded proposition requires subjunctive complementation. From a pragmatic point of view, we may now add to this that the *potentialis* interpretation of *que sea tan rico* implies the conveyance of a relatively low degree of information value.

Looking next at the expression of doubt from a lexical point of view, we come to the conclusion that *dudar* is the only authentic predicate expressing dubitative meaning. This situation is in clear contrast with what we observed in relation to the two other classes of cognition predicates, both of which consist of a variety of lexical items. Thus, the epistemic class includes items such as *saber*, *estar enterado*, *tener la certeza de*, and *estar convencido de*, the doxastic class, items such as *creer*, *pensar*, *suponer*, and *sospechar*. A possible explanation for the asymmetry in question might be sought in the principle of informativeness; that is to say, since the transmission of optimal information is based on the expression of positive truth value, epistemic and doxastic statements play a more crucial role in communicative interaction than dubitative ones. For that reason, lexical specification satisfies a greater need in the former type of statements than in the latter. Further note that the expression of doubt is more often than not realized from an epistemic or doxastic point of view. This is shown by the relatively high frequency with which analytical predicates such as *no saber que*, *no saber si*, and *no creer que* are employed. Since these expressions have already been discussed in the previous sections, I wish to focus attention below on the use of the predicate *dudar*.

In accordance with the analysis of epistemic and doxastic predicates, we start with the distinction between affirmative and negative matrix clauses. In both cases, the indicative and the subjunctive mood are found to appear in the complement clause.⁵¹ Let us concentrate first on subjunctive complementation:

- (133) Dudo que pueda venir a esa hora
 ('I doubt that she can — SUB — come at that time')
- (133) a. Su hermano duda que pueda venir a esa hora
 ('Her brother doubts that she can — SUB — come at that time')
- (134) Dudo que llegue a tiempo: es poco puntual

(‘I doubt that he will — SUB — get there in time; he is not very punctual’)

- (134) a. Su hermano duda que llegue a tiempo: es poco puntual
 (‘His brother doubts that he will — SUB — get there in time; he is not very punctual’)

In (133) and (134), the speaker, referred to by the dubitative subject, expresses his/her lack of confidence in the truth of the embedded proposition. In (133a) and (134a), this lack of confidence is predicated of *su hermano*, while, at the same time, it is presupposed that the speaker shares the dubitative attitude of the subject. Note that in all of these cases, the *potentialis* interpretation involved is syntactically reflected by the use of the subjunctive.

The analysis of indicative complementation also requires the distinction between subject meaning and speaker meaning. For illustration purposes, consider:

- (135) Mi novia duda que soy millonario
 (‘My girlfriend doubts that I am — IND — a millionaire’)

This sentence expresses the doubt of the subject concerning the truth value of the embedded proposition. However, the use of the indicative mood leads to the interpretation that the speaker of the sentence presupposes the factuality of his being a millionaire. Note that factual presuppositions may also be involved in the expression of information based on hearsay, as illustrated by:

- (136) Dudo que tiene dinero
 (‘I doubt that he has — IND — money’)

In this sentence, the use of the indicative mood in the subordinate clause points to a polyphonic source of the statement *tiene dinero*.

In addition to subordinate clauses introduced by the conjunction *que*, which is optionally preceded by the preposition *de*, two more types of complementation are to be distinguished: *si* + indicative and *si* + infinitive complementation. Compare the following examples:

- (137) Dudo si llegará a tiempo
 (‘I doubt if he will — IND — get there in time’)
- (138) Dudo si me dijo que había escrito o que iba a escribir
 (‘I doubt if she said — IND — to me she had written or that she was going to write’)
- (139) Duda si comprarse ese abrigo
 (‘He doubts whether he should buy that coat’)

Similar to sentences containing *no saber si* matrices, sentences such as (137) and (138) only describe the dubitative attitude the subject of the main clause adopts towards the truth value of the embedded proposition; factual presuppositions are excluded. As may be seen from (139), *si* + infinitive complementation is subject to two constraints: (I) the subjects of the matrix and the subordinate clause must be coreferential; (II) the predicate of the subordinate clause must belong to the class of action predicates. By virtue of these constraints, the sentences under discussion express the doubt of the subject as to whether or not to perform the act specified by the embedded proposition.

I now wish to turn to the analysis of negative matrix clauses. Let us take the following example as our point of departure:

- (140) Tu mujer no duda que lo harás
(‘Your wife does not doubt that you will — IND — do it’)

From the appearance of the indicative in the complement clause it must be inferred that negation of the dubitative predicate generates epistemic meaning. More strictly, it is predicated of the subject of the matrix clause that its referent has conclusive evidence for believing that the content of the embedded proposition will come true. This interpretation is supported by the use of the *futuro de indicativo*, a paradigm that is typically employed to enhance the force of the speech act being performed. In this connection, consider, e.g., the categorical force of an order such as *¡Lo harás ahora mismo!* (‘You shall do it right now!’)

Nevertheless, the negative use of *dudar* does not exclude subjunctive complementation. What we are concerned with in that situation, is a certain presupposition on the part of the speaker, who does not take it for granted that the embedded proposition is a true proposition. Thus, discussing the example:

- (141) No duda que su tío tenga mucho dinero
(‘She does not doubt that her uncle has — SUB — much money’)

Solano-Araya (1987:28) puts forward: ”As the speaker of the sentence I have my reservations”. It goes without saying that if the subject of the matrix clause refers to the speaker, we are no longer dealing with presuppositional information, but with the assertion that the embedded proposition expresses a real state of affairs. Consequently, there is no room left for the use of the subjunctive:

- (141) a. No dudo que su tío tiene mucho dinero
(‘I do not doubt that her uncle has — IND — much money’)

Comparable with the use of *no creas* and *no te creas*—cf. examples (130) and (131) — the negative imperative of *dudar* may also serve as a strategic device for enhancing assertive force. This may be seen from an example such as:

- (142) No dudas que triunfaremos
(‘Don’t doubt that we will — IND — win’)

Note again the reinforcing perlocutionary effect produced by the use of the future indicative.

Finally, dubitative meaning may be expressed by the unipersonal predicate *ser dudoso* (‘to be doubtful’), which, from a lexical point of view, bears a paradigmatic relation to *ser probable*, *ser posible*, *puede (ser) que*, and *ser improbable*. Speakers making use of these objectively modalized expressions indicate that they are not in a position to judge the truth value of the embedded proposition; as a result, this value corresponds to the *potentialis* dimension of the *realis–irrealis* scale. To be precise, these expressions denote different degrees of potentiality. Thus, the members of the ordered set, *ser probable*, *ser posible*, *ser dudoso* and *ser improbable*, show an increasing degree of distance from the dimension of positive truth value.⁵² Since Spanish is a language which lacks modal specifications for these different dimensions of low information value, the subjunctive is used to formally mark them in a uniform way. Under specific conditions infinitive complementation also takes place. There is a difference, for example, between *Es probable/posible acabarlo esta noche* (‘It is probable / possible to finish it tonight’) and *Es probable/posible que lo acabe esta noche* (‘It is probable / possible that he finishes — SUB — it tonight’):

Las dos versiones se diferencian en que el infinitivo transmite la idea de generalidad e inconcreción personal, mientras que con el subjuntivo nos encontramos ante la modalización de un enunciado cuyo sujeto puede estar representado por cualquiera de las seis personas verbales, sin excluir la primera (Igalada Belchí 1987–89: 658)

(‘Both versions differ in that the infinitive expresses an idea of generality and lack of personal precision, whereas the subjunctive expresses the modalization of an utterance whose subject can be represented by any of the six grammatical persons, without excluding the first one’)

Let us recapitulate the major points of this section. We have seen that the number of dubitative predicates is relatively small; in our examples, we have been mainly discussing the meaning and syntactic behavior of the prototypical predicate *dudar*. Furthermore, we found that in not a few cases the dubitative interpretation of the sentence is brought about by the negation of an epistemic or a doxastic predicate, characteristic cases in point being *no saber*

que/si and *no creer que*. Our general conclusion was that the appearance of the subjunctive in the complement clause is a reflection of the fact that the truth or falsehood of the embedded proposition cannot be ascertained, which, from a pragmatic perspective, is equivalent to saying that these propositions are marked by a relatively low degree of information value.

As a starting-point for an all-encompassing survey of the modal behavior of cognition predicates, we could avail ourselves of the following exposition:

El uso del indicativo está asociado con actitudes epistémicas *positivas* del hablante hacia el valor de la verdad de la oración en que figura, mientras que la *neutralidad epistémica*, ligada al uso del subjuntivo, abarca actitudes epistémicas que van desde la inseguridad en el valor veritativo a la sugerencia o implicatura de que tal valor es de falsedad” (Bustos 1986: 252).

(‘The use of the indicative is associated with *positive* epistemic attitudes of the speaker concerning the truth value of the sentence in which it occurs, whereas *epistemic neutrality*, linked to the use of the subjunctive, includes a range of epistemic attitudes: from uncertainty with respect to truth value to the suggestion or implicature of negative truth value’)

The positive epistemic attitudes referred to involve the knowledge that the proposition expressed corresponds to a real state of affairs. Since this knowledge is considered to be based on conclusive evidence, no particular justifications by the speaker are required. Positive epistemic attitudes activate the *realis* domain of the scale of truth value, as a result of which indicative complementation takes place. We have argued that, as far as pragmatic interpretation is concerned, the propositions in question express an optimal degree of information value.

Epistemic meaning can be made explicit in several ways: by the affirmative use of predicates such as *saber* and *estar enterado*, by the negative use of *dudar* and *ignorar*, and by the affirmative use of certain unipersonal constructions, such as *ser cierto* and *ser evidente*.

Bustos’ *neutralidad epistémica* bears on dubitative and hypothetical statements, which express uncertainty as to whether or not the embedded proposition expresses a real state of affairs. On account of their *potentialis* interpretation these statements require the subordinate clause to be marked by subjunctive mood, that is, the mood typifying relatively low degrees of truth-functional information. Dubitative and hypothetical meaning is lexically expressed in three different ways: by the affirmative use of *dudar* and *ignorar*, by objectively modalized constructions such as *ser dudoso*, *ser posible*, and *ser probable*, and by the negative use of epistemic and doxastic predicates, such as *no saber* and *no creer*.

The only class of cognition predicates not represented in Bustos' survey is the class of doxastic predicates. We have characterized these predicates in terms of the relatively firm confidence of the subject in the embedded proposition describing a real state of affairs. Affirmative main clauses require the use of the indicative in the complement clause, which should be considered a reflection of the relatively high degree of information value inherent in the presentation of a belief, an opinion, or a standpoint. As is well-known, doxastic assertions play a major role in both everyday and formal discussions; among the latter, scientific communication represents a relevant case in point. One may agree, therefore, with Jaszcolt's qualification (1998: 2) that belief is "the most prominent representative" of propositional attitudes. In the foregoing we have argued more than once that a correlation holds between modal variation and the conveyance of different degrees of information value, or, more specifically, different degrees of truthfunctional information. We may add to this now that this category has also been defined in terms of the principle of relevance:

For example, the Principle of Relevance invites the prediction — which Sperber and Wilson do not make — that utterances that do not meet the presumption of optimal relevance should be marked for this deviation from the norm. This paper argues that subjunctive morphology serves to make less-than-optimally relevant information in Spanish. The word "optimal" in the Principle of Relevance defines one end of a continuum between maximum relevance and total irrelevance.... Semantically, less-than-optimally relevant information falls between the extremes of relevance and irrelevance (Lunn 1989b: 251)

Our final observation concerns the fact that it is not only modal variation which is indicative of degrees of relevance; in addition, we find a set of adverbs, adverbials, and modal verbs that are involved in the expression of information value. High information value is suggested by the use of, e.g., *sin duda* and *con certeza*, low information value by *quizá* and *posiblemente*.⁵³ In this relation, it is significant that the members of the former pair only appear in indicative sentences, whereas the members of the latter are compatible with the use of the subjunctive.

Finally, with respect to modal verbs, we may compare the following sentences:

- (143) Deben (de) estar en casa; ya son las once
(‘They must be at home; it is already eleven o’clock’)
- (144) a. Concha puede estar enferma; es que no la he visto hoy
(‘Concha may be ill; I haven’t seen her today’)

- b. Puede (ser) que Concha esté enferma; es que no la he visto hoy
(‘It may be the case that Concha is — SUB — ill; I haven’t seen her today’)

These sentences show that, though in both of them the hypothesis expressed is causally supported, the use of *deber* (*de*) suggests a more reliable conclusion than the use of *poder*, so that *deben* (*de*) *estar en casa* should be attributed a higher degree of truthfunctional information than *Concha puede estar enferma* or *Puede (ser) que Concha esté enferma*

5.1.2.2. Evaluation predicates

Evaluation predicates — *predicados valorativos* — denote the different ways in which the state of affairs described by the complement clause may be qualified. Two basic kinds of evaluation need to be distinguished according to whether the qualification rests on rational or emotional grounds. This distinction forms the point of departure for our analysis in the next two sections, which will be devoted to *rational* and *emotional* evaluations.

5.1.2.2.1 Rational evaluations

Rational evaluations fulfill a variety of functions in both everyday and formal interaction. In the latter type of interaction — one may think here, for instance, of argumentative discourse — they usually require evidentiary justification, which basically takes the form of a causal clause, a category that will be dealt with in detail in 5.2.4. In this section we will focus our attention on the distinction between *qualitative*, *quantitative*, and *deontic* judgments. These categories may be exemplified by the following sets of unipersonal predicates:

- (I) qualitative evaluations: *ser extraño* (‘to be strange’), *ser inútil* (‘to be useless’), *ser significativo* (‘to be significant’);
(II) quantitative evaluations: *ser corriente* (‘to be common’), *ser raro* (‘to be rare’), *ser frecuente* (‘to be frequent’);
(III) deontic evaluations: *ser preciso* (‘to be necessary’), *ser imprescindible* (‘to be indispensable’), *ser conveniente* (‘to be convenient’).

Evidently, the major demarcation line runs between qualitative and quantitative evaluations, on the one hand, and deontic ones, on the other. In the former case, we are concerned with value and frequency judgments, which are necessarily founded on real states of affairs. Deontic judgments, in contrast, express desirable states of affairs that do not exist at coding time or reference time.

Let us start with the analysis of qualitative and quantitative evaluations, which, as illustrated by the following examples, generate the same modal output in the subordinate clause:

- (145) Es extraño que no me hayas visto en el bar
(‘It is strange that you have — SUB — not seen me in the bar’)
- (146) Es corriente que en esta época del año llueva un poco cada día
(‘It is normal for this time of year that it rains — SUB — a while every day’)

In both (145) and (146), the embedded proposition is marked for positive truth value. Nevertheless, it is not indicative but subjunctive complementation which takes place. This, of course, presents a remarkable contrast with the patterns of mood selection examined thus far. To account for the discrepancy involved traditional grammars generally put forward that qualifying a state of affairs as strange, important, of frequent occurrence, etc., does not imply an objectively accepted assessment of reality, but an individual interpretation of it. Put another way, qualitative and quantitative judgments do not focus on factual, but on subjectively interpreted states of affairs, and that would explain the use of the subjunctive in the complement clause.⁵⁴ Nowadays, this point of view is no longer adhered to. In order to see why, let us take up again example (145) and compare it with its clefted variant:

- (145) a. Lo extraño es que no me has (hayas) visto en el bar
(‘How strange that you have — IND / SUB — not seen me in the bar’)

Although exceptions do occur, the use of the subjunctive in (145) should be regarded as the standard choice of Peninsular Spanish speakers. As compared to (145a), the syntactic structure of (145) is unmarked, which means that the information provided by the subordinate proposition is not presented as new or unpredictable. More strictly, this information is presupposed by the speaker, and the assertion made serves no other purpose than qualifying the state of affairs involved in terms of the value judgment *es extraño*. The content of the embedded proposition, therefore, is backgrounded or defocalized. Although this situation is radically different from what we saw in regard to acquisition of knowledge and cognition predicates, where the subjunctive is generated by the *potentialis* or *irrealis* interpretation of the embedded proposition, the interesting point is that *potentialis*, *irrealis* and presupposed or defocalized propositions share the property of providing a low or relatively low degree of

information value. In *potentialis* and *irrealis* propositions information value bears on truthfunctionality, in presupposed propositions on relevance. In this connection, consider also:

Low information value is an instantiation of what Sperber and Wilson (1986) term low relevance [...]. In Spanish, propositions that are less than optimally relevant, either because they add nothing to existing information or because they add nothing true to existing information, are marked with Subjunctive (Lunn 1995: 430).

Presuppositions of the type manifested by (145) have been studied for the first time by Kiparsky and Kiparsky, who describe them in terms of the notion of ‘factivity’. Thus, commenting on the sentence “It is odd that it is raining”, they observe:

The speaker presupposes that the embedded clause expresses a true proposition, and makes some assertion about that presupposition [...]. It is important that the following things should be clearly distinguished:

1. Propositions the speaker asserts, directly or indirectly, to be true.
2. Propositions the speaker presupposes to be true. Factivity depends on presupposition and not on assertion.

For instance, when someone says: “It is true that John is ill.” “John turns out to be ill”, he is *asserting* that the proposition ‘John is ill’ is a true proposition, but he is not *presupposing* that it is a true proposition (Kiparsky and Kiparsky 1971: 38- 349).

Let us proceed now with the analysis of (145a), which, as indicated by the parenthetical notation, admits of both indicative and subjunctive complementation. The interpretation of the latter runs parallel with that of (145); the content of the embedded proposition is presupposed to be true, so that it is not brought into focus. As we have seen above, this information is presented as background information already known to the hearer.

The indicative variant of sentence (145a), by contrast, shows a crucial change in perspective, since it fulfills the function of highlighting the content of the complement proposition. This foregrounding strategy may be reinforced in the following way:

- (145) b. Lo extraño del caso es que no me has (hayas) visto en el bar
 (‘The strange thing is that you have — IND / SUB — not seen me in the bar’)

In general, one can say that speakers show a preference for the use of the indicative in sentences such as (145a) and (145b), which does not come as a surprise, as the complement proposition is focused on as a proposition that comments

on a real state of affairs. We also find a strongly marked variant of (145a), which requires the use of the indicative in the complement clause. Compare:

- (145) c. Lo que es extraño es que no me has visto en el bar
 ('What is strange is that you have — IND — not seen me in the bar')

It should be pointed out, in conclusion, that the basic concepts underlying the foregoing analyses can be integrated into a discourse frame of reference:

... foreground information is characterized as information which is more central or salient or important to the development of the discourse theme. Background information is that which elaborates or develops foreground information... the foreground-background distinction is not a simple binary concept, but defines a continuum, permitting an individual proposition to be ranked against others in terms of its importance or centrality to the discourse theme (Tomlin 1985: 89).

The category of deontic predicates differs from that of qualitative and quantitative ones by virtue of the fact that the complement proposition does not describe a real but a future or anticipated state of affairs. More precisely, these predicates express the necessity that a certain change in the world take place. As may be seen from the examples given earlier — *ser preciso*, *ser imprescindible*, *ser conveniente* — predicates expressing deontic statements are typically marked for non-specific reference; nevertheless, it is implied by their use that the speaker assumes the responsibility for the assessment made. As a corollary, it is the speaker who should be able to provide a rational and reasonable justification for the necessity that the change in the world referred to come about. Since deontic statements bear on anticipated states of affairs, the complement proposition is marked for negative truth value, which, from a communicative point of view, correlates with a relatively low degree of informativeness. As is to be expected, this interpretation is syntactically corroborated by the obligatory use of the subjunctive mood. Consider, for example:

- (146) Es necesario que lo hagas cuanto antes
 ('It is necessary that you — SUB — do it as soon as possible')
- (147) Siendo su amigo, era preciso que le ayudara⁵⁵
 ('Since he is your friend, it was necessary that you helped — SUB — him')

Looking at the syntactic and semantic structure of (147), it is easy to see that the occurrence of the preterite subjunctive *ayudara* is not the result of the description of a future state of affairs in the strict sense of the term. What is relevant in this connection, is that reference to the future is made from a

prospective point of view, associated not with coding time but with reference time. Specifically, in (147) the state of affairs denoted by *que le ayudara* is prospectively viewed from the past point of reference expressed by the main clause. This is what explains the use of the preterite subjunctive.

It follows from all this that prospectivity implies unreality. Now, it is important to clearly distinguish that which could be called ‘prospective unreality’ from the type of unreality illustrated by sentences such as (49) *Si el portero no hubiera jugado tan bien, habríamos perdido el partido* and (53) *¡Quién fuera su señoría para no tener que lavar!* In both of the latter cases, we are dealing with counterfactual states of affairs, which can never come true. Sentences such as (146) and (147), on the other hand, describe unreal states of affairs that may possibly or even probably come true. From the perspective of the speaker, they represent anticipated states of affairs. Further note that both kinds of unreality are syntactically differentiated in the following way: anticipation requires the use of the present subjunctive if the main clause is in the present tense, while counterfactuality excludes the use of the present subjunctive; it requires the use of either the pluperfect or the preterite subjunctive, as shown by (49) and (53), respectively. At the level of pragmatic analysis, all this leads to the conclusion that the present subjunctive is the formal marker associating anticipation with a relatively low degree of truthfunctional information, whereas the preterite and the pluperfect subjunctive are the formal markers associating counterfactuality with a minimum degree of truthfunctional information.

Besides subjunctive complementation, infinitive complementation may also take place. The distinctive marker involved bears on difference in referential specificity. As may be inferred from (146) and (147), specific reference to the agent triggers the use of the subjunctive. The infinitive, in contrast, is triggered by non-specific reference, as shown by:

- (148) Es necesario distraerse de cuando en cuando
(‘It is necessary to enjoy yourself from time to time’)

Next, I turn to the analysis of the class of so-called ‘desiderative’ predicates, which share both semantic and syntactic properties with the class of deontic predicates discussed above. Frequently used desiderative predicates are: *querer* (‘to want’), *desear* (‘to wish’), and *preferir* (‘to prefer’). With respect to the meaning of these predicates, consider the following characterization:

Desiderative predicates [...] are characterized by having experiencer subjects expressing a desire that the complement proposition be realized. In this respect,

they can be looked on as being the opposite of predicates of fearing, expressing a positive as opposed to a negative feeling about the ultimate realization of the complement proposition (Noonan 1985: 121).

Desiderative predicates are subject to the rule that the subordinate clause is marked by infinitive complementation if the subjects of the matrix and the subordinate clause are coreferential. When no referential identity between the subjects holds, the use of the subjunctive is obligatory. Compare the following examples:

- (149) Quiero acostarme temprano esta noche
(‘I want to go to bed early tonight’)
- (150) Quiero que te acuestes temprano esta noche
(‘I want you to go — SUB — to bed early tonight’)

From a speech act point of view, desiderative judgments such as (150) must be qualified as indirect directives, since the speaker gives an order to the hearer, but refrains from doing so in a direct manner by not making use, e.g., of an imperative or performative sentence such as:

- (150) a. Acuéstate temprano esta noche
(‘Go to bed early tonight’)
- b. Te digo que te acuestes temprano esta noche
(‘I order you to go — SUB — to bed early tonight’)

In actual fact, the speaker of (150) makes an assertion about his/her being in a particular intentional state, viz., the state underlying the act of issuing the order. One can also say that, in the context under discussion, *quiero* expresses the sincerity condition inherent in the performance of directive speech acts. This condition specifies that the speaker making a request or issuing an order sincerely wishes the hearer to do the act denoted by the embedded proposition. The idiosyncratic character of the sincerity condition may be seen from the unacceptability of the following sentence, which contains an instance of *Moore’s Paradox*:

- (150) c. *Acuéstate temprano esta noche, pero no quiero que lo hagas
(‘Go to bed early tonight, but I do not want you to do — SUB — that’)

Finally, it is worthwhile pointing out that *querer* belongs to the category of negative raising predicates. Remember that this movement rule was discussed earlier in connection with the difference between *creo que no* + Indicative and

no creo que + Subjunctive. In *querer* sentences negative transportation produces the same mitigating effect. Consider, for instance:

- (151) a. Quiero que no le digas la verdad
(‘I want you not to tell — SUB — him the truth’)
b. No quiero que le digas la verdad
(‘I do not want you to tell — SUB — him the truth’)

The speaker of (151a) utters the wish that a certain act not be done, whereas the speaker of (151b) denies wishing that a certain act be done. We may say then that the latter speaker softens the force of his utterance by creating a syntactic distance between the raised negation and the proposition which is under its scope. As a result, the distance between negation and embedded proposition iconically reflects the interpersonal distance between speaker and hearer preventing the latter’s negative face from being directly threatened. Note, in conclusion, that the pragmatic distinction between (151a) and (151b) is not paralleled by variation in mood; in both sentences, the subjunctive characterizes an anticipated state of affairs.

5.1.2.2.2 *Emotional evaluations*

Emotional evaluations express the subjective feelings of the evaluating person concerning an experienced state of affairs. Predicates denoting emotional judgments can be divided into two complementary subclasses according to whether they describe a positive or negative attitude towards the content of the embedded proposition. The former subclass is represented by predicates such as *gustar* (‘to like’), *encantar* (‘to enjoy thoroughly’), and *alegrar* (‘to make happy’). Some examples of the latter subclass are *enojar* (‘to make angry’), *molestar* (‘to bother’), and *dar asco* (‘to disgust’).

In regard to syntactic analysis, four classes of predicates are to be distinguished. First, the class of predicates exemplified by the six items mentioned above, namely, the class consisting of two-place predicates specified by a subject and an indirect object slot. The former slot is filled by the clause describing the source of the emotion, the latter by the experiencer to whom the emotion is attributed.⁵⁶ Second, the class of two-place predicates specified by a subject and a direct object slot. Some examples are *lamentar* (‘to regret’), *apreciar* (‘to appreciate’), and *sentir* (‘to be sorry’). The subject slot of these predicates is filled by the experiencer of the emotion, the direct object slot by the clause describing the source of the emotion. Third, the class of predicates composed of reflexive verbs governing prepositional complements, such as

enfadarse de ('to get angry'), *quejarse de* ('to complain'), and *alegrarse de* ('to be glad'). Finally, a subclass of unipersonal expressions must be distinguished, such as *ser triste* ('to be sad'), *ser lamentable* ('to be lamentable') and *ser gratificante* ('to be gratifying'). From this survey it is obvious that emotional evaluation predicates show a larger variety of syntactic configurations than their rational counterparts, which were examined in the previous section. Let us concentrate next on modal complementation. Both syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic factors are involved in the selection of the infinitive, the subjunctive, or the indicative mood. The infinitive is selected if the experiencer of the matrix predicate and the referent of the subject of the subordinate clause are identical. Consider, e.g.:

(152) Me gusta estar aquí
(‘I like to be here’)

(153) El embajador lamenta haberse retrasado
(‘The ambassador regrets having been late’)

Comparing the referential output of these two sentences, we observe that in (152) the subject of the complement clause is coreferential with the indirect object of the matrix clause, while in (153) it is coreferential with the subject of the matrix clause. If coreference does not apply, the indicative or the subjunctive mood is selected in accordance with the principle that the former reflects foregrounding and the latter backgrounding of the information provided by the embedded proposition. The process of backgrounding may be shown by an example such as:

(154) Le enoja que sus hijos lleguen tarde a casa
(‘It annoys him that his children get — SUB — home late’)

Parallel with the interpretation of (146) *Es corriente en esta época del año que llueva un poco cada día*, which describes a rational evaluation, the use of the subjunctive mood in (154) reflects the presupposition that *sus hijos lleguen tarde a casa* describes a factual state of affairs. In other words, the speaker of the sentence takes it for granted that this information is accessible to the hearer. Now, what is foregrounded in sentence (154) is the information that the father or mother of the children referred to are angry that they come home late. Recapitulating we can say that the use of the emotional predicate does not focalize the propositional content of the subordinate clause but the evaluative judgment on that proposition denoted by the main clause. Since the truth of the embedded proposition is presupposed, we arrive at the conclusion that, as

far as modal output is concerned, the use of the subjunctive corresponds with a low degree of information value. In this connection, consider also: "... utterances with the subjunctive plan the facts that they describe at the bottom of the scale of "relevance" (Lavandera 1983:231). It is implied by this statement that the content of the presupposition forms part of the cognitive domain mutually shared by speaker and hearer. Compare also the following comments on the sentence *Lamento que Juan esté enfermo* ('I regret that Juan is — SUB — ill'):

[...] debemos tener en cuenta que cuando los hablantes usan el subjuntivo de esa manera es porque hay un enunciado disponible en el contexto: en el caso de *Lamento que Juan esté enfermo* alguien tiene que haber dicho, en esa conversación o en otra, o ser un conocimiento o creencia compartidos por los interlocutores aunque no estén explícitos en la conversación, que Juan estaba enfermo, pues de otro modo sería totalmente inapropiado lamentar el hecho de que Juan esté enfermo, que es un comentario sobre tal hecho. De modo que desde un punto de vista pragmático, no veo diferencias en el mecanismo: por medio de los verbos y de otras formas lingüísticas, los hablantes evocan, es decir, citan, tanto segmentos recientemente producidos cuanto otros más remotos, y tanto segmentos efectivamente producidos cuanto segmentos presupuestos (Reyes 1990: 20).

(['... we should take into account that when speakers use the subjunctive in this way they do so because there is an utterance available in the context: in the case of *Lamento que Juan esté enfermo* someone must have have said, in that conversation or in another one — we may also be dealing with a certain piece of information or belief shared by the interlocutors although it is not made explicit in the conversation — that Juan was ill, since, otherwise, it would be totally inappropriate to regret the fact that Juan is ill, which is a comment on that fact. Therefore, from a pragmatic point of view, I do not see differences in the mechanism: by using verbs and other linguistic forms speakers recall, that is, quote both segments recently produced and others which are more remote, and both segments really produced and segments which are presupposed')

As implied by Reyes' discussion, the presupposed information of the example given can be made explicit by the paraphrase *Lamento el hecho de que Juan esté enfermo* ('I regret that fact that Juan is — SUB — ill'), where *el hecho de que* underlines the factualness of the state of affairs in question.

The modal pattern of the subordinate clause may undergo a shift in case the speaker, for specific communicative purposes, wishes to highlight the content of the embedded proposition by means of a cleft construction. What is likely to happen in this situation is that the indicative mood takes over the complementizer role from the subjunctive. For illustration purposes, let us look at the cleft variant of (154):

- (154) a. Lo que le enoja es que sus hijos llegan tarde a casa
 ('What annoys him is that his children get — IND — home late')

We see that the *lo que* sentence marks the distribution of the information in such a way that the emotional predicate does not serve any longer as the core, but as a contextually given background of the assertion. Thus, for instance, (154a) could be interpreted in a quite natural way as a relevant answer to the question *¿Qué le enoja?* ('What makes him angry?') or *¿Qué es lo que le enoja?* ('What is it what makes him angry?'). It is this change in perspective which explains the use of the indicative in the complement clause.

In order to get a better insight into the often subtle pragmatic distinctions between the use of the indicative and the subjunctive mood in evaluating assertions, the following experiment was carried out by Guitart (1984: 165):

... as part of one experiment the subjects were given the context in (17):

- (17) Una cosa que me molestaba de niño era....
 ('Something which bothered me when I was a child...')

and were asked to fill it out with what they would tell a biographer who did not know them personally. In this case the information would be presumably unshared. But speakers tend to respond in the Indicative when the experience was of a more private nature and in the Subjunctive when it was a more universal one, as illustrated in (18) with actual responses:

- (18) a. Una cosa que me molestaba de niño era que me atormentaba estar solo.
 ('Something which bothered me when I was a child was that I found — IND — it terrible to be alone')
- b. Una cosa que me molestaba de niño era que me pegaran.
 ('Something which bothered me when I was a child was that they beat — SUB — me')

To the native ear it sounds odd to use the Subjunctive in (18a) because it assumes a non-existent familiarity of the hearer with speaker's experience.

The essence of Guitart's interpretation of (18a) and (18b) boils down to the assumption that if people were affected by an unpleasant experience when they were young, it will probably be more often the case that they were beaten than that they felt lonely. Given an unhappy youth, the former situation is not uncommon, so that a proposition describing that situation conveys more or less expected information. Its low degree of information value, therefore, may be assumed to account for the preference to use the subjunctive. Feeling lonely, on the other hand, should be considered an experience which, in the context given, is less predictable, as a result of which a proposition describing such

an experience offers a piece of unexpected information, which corresponds to a high point on the scale of information value. In this way it can be explained that the persons participating in the test preferred to use the indicative.

It should be further noticed that, in addition to cleft focus, particular contextual clues, such as the thematic givenness of a certain evaluation, may also contribute to foreground the factual information expressed by the complement clause. Compare, e.g., the discussion of the following examples by Borrego, Asencio and Prieto (1987: 35–36):

- (155) Me preocupa que la Bolsa haya bajado
 (Recojo un hecho ya conocido para dar mi impresión:
 fundamentalmente valoro)
 ('It worries me that the stock exchange has — SUB — fallen')
 ('I am referring to an already known fact to give my impression;
 actually, I am making an evaluation')
- (156) – ¿Qué pasa ? ¿Te preocupa algo?
 – Sí, me preocupa que la Bolsa ha bajado
 (Doy mi reacción ante el hecho, pero a la vez informo de él)
 (' — What's the matter? Is something bothering you? — Yes, it worries
 me that the stock exchange has — IND — fallen')
 ('I am reacting to the fact, but at the same time I am informing about it')

As for the question-answer sequence, we may say that the fact that the speaker uttering *Sí, me preocupa que la Bolsa ha bajado* is worrying about something, forms part of the thematic information provided by the first member of the adjacency pair. What is foregrounded by this speaker is the content of his/her preoccupation. As shown by *ha bajado*, it is this kind of focalizing factual information which triggers the use of the indicative mood.

Our last example is a fragment of a letter written by a Spanish linguist:

- (157) Se ve que no se puede vivir aprisa y la verdad es que tuve un trimestre primero este curso imposible. Gracias a Dios que ha pasado
 ('It is obvious that one cannot live in a hurry; actually I had an impossible first term during this course. Thank God it has — IND — come to an end')

If the writer had used *haya pasado* instead of *ha pasado*, she would have placed this information at the bottom of the scale of relevance. From the context, however, it is clear that *ha pasado* highlights the content of the emotional evaluation, and that is what explains the use of the indicative mood.

The next phenomenon to be examined is modal variation in the subordi-

nate clause of reflexive predicates. Our point of departure is the following set of examples taken from Ridruejo (1999: 3232):

- (158) a. Me quejo de que no me hagan caso
(‘I am complaining that they do — SUB — not pay attention to me’)
- b. Se lamenta de que no le hagan caso
(‘He deplores that they do — SUB — not pay attention to him’)
- c. Me quejo de que no me hacen caso
(‘I am complaining that they do — IND — not pay attention to me’)
- d. Se lamenta de que no le hacen caso
(‘He deplores that they do — IND — not pay attention to him’)

According to Ridruejo, the relation between the main and the subordinate clause can be viewed from two different angles. As suggested by the appearance of the subjunctive in the (a) and (b) sentence, the content of the embedded proposition is presupposed to be true; it is this content which gives rise to the negative attitude expressed by the embedding predicate. This information, therefore, is foregrounded. In the (c) and (d) sentence, by contrast, the use of the indicative in the subordinate clause specifically draws the attention of the hearer to that which is expressed by the embedded proposition. More strictly, foregrounding of this information establishes a causal link between the main and the subordinate clause, which can be roughly paraphrased in terms of *Me quejo porque no me hacen caso* (‘I am complaining because they do not pay attention to me’) and *Se lamenta porque no le hacen caso* (‘He grumbles because they do not pay attention to him’).

In what follows below, I will discuss four judgment predicates — *comprender* (‘to understand’), *esperar* (‘to hope’), *confiar* (‘to trust’), *temer(se)* (‘to be afraid’) — which are peculiar in the sense that modal distribution in the complement clause correlates with different aspects of polysemous meaning. Consider, to begin with, the following examples of *comprender*:

- (159) No te excites, por favor, reflexiona, ¿no comprendes que es absurdo?
(‘Please, don’t get so agitated; reflect on it, don’t you understand that it is — IND — absurd?’)
- (160) Miguel no comprendía, por ejemplo, que no sintieran curiosidad por conocer las poblaciones que visitaban
(‘Miguel did not understand, for instance, that they were — SUB — not curious to get to know the villages they visited’)

The modal difference between (159) and (160) brings to light a difference in thematic perspective. In (159), the proposition *es absurdo* is focalized for discursive purposes, since the question is intended to elicit an explicit answer from the hearer. Again, we see that the indicative mood marks the foregrounding perspective. The speaker of sentence (160), by contrast, defocalizes the content of the embedded proposition, as reflected by the use of the subjunctive. What is foregrounded in this case is *Miguel's* lack of comprehension. Unlike (159) and (160), the two following examples are neither interrogative nor negative:

- (161) Comprendo perfectamente que ésta es la mejor solución
(‘I perfectly understand that this is — IND — the best solution’)
- (162) Comprendo perfectamente que con este tiempo no quiera venir
(‘I perfectly understand that he will — SUB — not come in this weather’)

In (161), the embedded proposition expresses the core of the information provided. The speaker emphasizes an inevitable conclusion, which could also be communicated by omitting the matrix clause *comprendo perfectamente*. Sentence (162) reflects the opposite perspective, the focus of attention being the evaluative attitude the speaker adopts towards a presupposed state of affairs. In this case, of course, it would be impossible to omit the matrix clause restricting the information to **con este tiempo no quiera venir*.

As suggested by Wanders and Luyerink (1991:60), the above analyses lead to the conclusion that the predicate *comprender* should be considered a polysemous lexical item denoting, according to whether the indicative or the subjunctive is selected, a rational or an emotional evaluation, respectively. Rational evaluations are further differentiated from emotional ones in that they are compatible with the discursive particle *ya*. This explains the contrast between the grammaticalness of *Ya comprendo que necesitas tiempo* (‘I realize that you need — IND — time’) and the ungrammaticalness of **Ya comprendo que necesites tiempo* (‘I realize that you need — SUB — time’) (Bosque 1990:47). Finally note that sentences such as (160) and (162) strongly suggest that the emotional attitude described by *comprender* should be qualified in terms of empathy.

Modal variation in the complement clause of *esperar* and *confiar* is, just as we have seen in the case of *comprender*, indicative of polysemy. Subjunctive complementation is characteristic of propositions denoting an amalgamation of desiderative and predictive meaning. For illustration purposes, compare:

- (163) Espero que mi ruego no le cause excesivas molestias
(‘I hope that my request does — SUB — not cause you too much trouble’)

- (164) El presidente confía en que Cuba alcance la democracia
(‘The president is confident that Cuba will — SUB — achieve democracy’)

In both of these sentences, the complement clause takes the subjunctive mood because of the *irrealis* character of the embedded proposition. This proposition describes a desirable and, at the same time, anticipated state of affairs; as a consequence, it is typified by a low degree of information value. The analysis proposed also applies to sentences where the matrix predicate expresses reference to a moment or period in the past from a prospective point of view. Consider, for instance:

- (165) El estaba esperando que le recibiera el ministro
(‘He was waiting for the minister to receive — SUB — him’)

If indicative complementation takes place, the use of the future tense or the conditional is obligatory. Although the desiderative element of meaning cannot be considered to be entirely cancelled, the semantic focus is on the expression of a prediction or expectation. Compare, e.g.:

- (166) Espero que vendrá puntualmente
(‘I expect that he will — IND — arrive punctually’)
- (167) Confío en que la cuerda resistirá
(‘I am confident that the rope will — IND — be strong enough’)

Note that the future tense of the verb, which has a more categorical predictive force than the present, expresses the relatively high confidence of the speaker that the state of affairs described will come true. The following observation bears on the predictive meaning of *esperar*, but could equally apply to *confiar*:

Con indicativo futuro, el componente volitivo de *esperar* pasa a un segundo plano y este verbo se comporta de manera próxima a un predicado creador de universos, eso sí, con el rasgo añadido de “expectativa”. En tales condiciones no es difícil parafrasear el verbo *esperar* con indicativo mediante un verbo creador de mundos: “{espero / imagino / supongo} que vendrá” (Ridruejo 1999: 3229).
(‘With the future indicative, the volitive component of *esperar* plays a secondary part and this verb is very similar to predicates that create universes, that is, it has the additional feature of “expectation”. In these circumstances it is not difficult to paraphrase the verb *esperar* with indicative by means of a world-creating verb: “{I expect / imagine / suppose} that he will come” ’)

As suggested by this analysis and the two foregoing examples, the use of the future tense of the indicative seems to be obligatory. Nevertheless, Bustos (1986: 199) examines an example with the present tense: *No todos confían en*

que eres el mejor ('Not everyone is confident that you are — IND — the best'). He compares it with: *Todos confían en que seas el mejor* ('Everyone is confident that you are — SUB — the best') and explains the difference as follows:

Lo que distingue el empleo del modo indicativo del subjuntivo... es que mientras en el caso del indicativo el hablante se compromete con la verdad de la oración complemento, cuando utiliza el subjuntivo se mantiene neutral, no se pronuncia ni en su favor ni en su contra.

('What distinguishes the use of the indicative from the subjunctive mood... is that in the case of the indicative the speaker commits himself to the truth of the complement sentence, while when he uses the subjunctive he expresses himself neutrally, neither affirming nor denying it')

To conclude the discussion of *esperar* and *confiar* I wish to point out that the desiderative use of both predicates admits negative raising. Thus, taking up again (163), we can compare this sentence with its raised variant:

- (163) a. No espero que mi ruego le cause excesivas molestias
(‘I do not hope that my request causes — SUB — you too much trouble’)

Unlike the difference we observed between (151a) *Quiero que no le digas la verdad* and (151b) *No quiero que le digas la verdad*, (163) and (163a) do not seem to produce different perlocutionary effects, which is probably due to the fact that both the raised and the non-raised variant express a high degree of politeness.

The last polysemous item to be examined is the predicate *temer(se)* ('to be afraid'). This predicate may but need not select a complement clause as the filler of the direct object slot. If it does, its lexical meaning can be specified as follows:

Pensar que ocurre, ha ocurrido o va a ocurrir algo malo, aunque no se sabe:
'Temo que lo ha perdido. Si temes que no te lo devuelva, no se lo prestes'
(Moliner 1998b: 1200).

('To think that something bad is happening, has happened or is going to happen, although this is not definite: 'I'm afraid that he has — IND — lost it. If you are afraid that he will — SUB — not give it back to you, don't lend it to him'')

It follows that the subject of *temer(se)* is attributed both an emotional and a dubitative attitude towards the content of the embedded proposition. Let us consider another example:

- (168) Me temo además, que sus gestos de buena voluntad hacia la opinión pública no encuentren apoyo en el resto del Gobierno
(‘Moreover I’m afraid that his gestures of goodwill toward public opinion are — SUB — not supported by the rest of the Government’)

Obviously, the state of affairs described by the *que* clause is not a real, but a hypothetical one. Although the speaker of the sentence adopts a negative propositional attitude, the subjunctive mood in the subordinate clause is not triggered by his/her expressing an emotional evaluation, as that would require reference not to a hypothetical state of affairs, but to a state of affairs presupposed to be real. In other words, it is the *potentialis* interpretation of the embedded proposition which explains the use of the subjunctive. Note that an *irrealis* interpretation may also be at stake. This situation is illustrated by Moliner's second example: *Si temes que no te lo devuelva, no se lo prestes*.

With respect to lexical interpretation, it is to be noticed (Fish 1963) that an antonymous relation holds between *temer(se)* and *esperar* in the sense that the use of *esperar* presupposes that its subject regards the state of affairs expressed by the embedded proposition as favorable, whereas the subject of *temer(se)* regards it as unfavorable.

Let us turn next to indicative complementation. As may be seen from:

- (169) Me temo que has llegado tarde
(‘I’m afraid that you have — IND — arrived late’)

the marker involved in the selection of the indicative mood is the positive truth value attributed to the embedded proposition. Since a hypothetical interpretation is excluded in this case, Moliner's definition: “Pensar que ocurre, ha ocurrido o va a ocurrir algo malo, aunque no se sabe” does not apply any longer. Specifically, the emotional state attributed to the subject of the main clause must be interpreted in terms of a conversational implicature.⁵⁷ In other words, what is involved is the development of a politeness strategy enabling the speaker to mitigate the force of a face-threatening speech act. Thus, for instance, (169) can be perfectly uttered to make an indirect approach.⁵⁸

Three specific observations about the mitigating function of *temer(se)* are in order. Firstly, the polite use of the verb is restricted to the first-person singular form of the present tense, which is a natural consequence of the fact that it is the speaker who is responsible for softening the force of the speech act. Secondly, when the verb is used for politeness purposes, the reflexive form is preferred. Finally, the strategic impact of the sentences in question can be demonstrated by deletion of the main clause. Thus, for instance, after being reduced to a single clause, i.e., *has llegado tarde*, sentence (169) conveys the face-threatening message in a straightforward way. Needless to say, this deletion is impossible in (168), because **sus gestos de buena voluntad hacia la opinión pública no encuentren apoyo en el resto del Gobierno* is not only an

ungrammatical sentence of Spanish, but does not express an alternative statement conceptually equivalent to the original one.

The results of the analyses carried out in Sections 5.1.2.1 and 5.1.2.2 enable us to formulate some general conclusions with respect to modal distribution in the subordinate clauses of Spanish cognition and evaluation predicates. Remember that the conceptual framework underlying these analyses derives from the intrinsic relationship between both types of predicates. This relationship stems from the fact that making an evaluation presupposes cognition, which, in more specific terms, is equivalent to asserting that the person to whom the evaluation is attributed — syntactically, the subject, the indirect object, or a non-specified argument — is presupposed to be in a particular epistemic state. The concept of truth value, therefore, is essential to an adequate description of both cognition and evaluation predicates. The difference between them depends on the perspective from which the truth value of the embedded proposition is brought to the attention of the interlocutor. Cognition predicates foreground or focalize its truth value, while evaluation predicates background or defocalize it.

The modal distinction between cognition and evaluation predicates can be recapitulated as follows. In sentences containing an evaluation predicate, backgrounding of the content of the embedded proposition requires the use of the subjunctive, whereas foregrounding of the content, which is triggered by specific syntactic or contextual factors, requires the use of the indicative. As for the expression of cognitive meaning, epistemic and doxastic predicates select the indicative mood, since they focus attention on different degrees of positive truth value. Dubitative predicates select the subjunctive mood in their complement clauses when neither the subject nor the speaker is able to judge whether the embedded proposition is true or false. The indicative is used when the speaker presupposes this proposition to be true.

The following scheme may serve as an overview of the categories under review:


Diagram 4

positive truth value	→	<i>indicative</i>
negative } }		
indeterminate}	truth value	→ <i>subjunctive</i>
factual information	→	+/- foregrounded
+ foregrounded	→	<i>indicative</i>
- foregrounded	→	<i>subjunctive</i> ⁵⁹

As to pragmatic interpretation, it follows from this scheme that there is one basic mechanism involved in the distribution of Spanish mood: the use of the indicative correlates with a high or a relatively high degree of information value, while the use of the subjunctive correlates with a low or a relatively low degree of information value.

Finally, the classification of cognition and evaluation predicates established in this chapter can be represented by means of the following diagram:

Diagram 5



5.1.3 Action predicates

Action predicates describe the different output categories of intentional human behavior. At the level of syntactic structure, a preliminary distinction is called for between predicates that do not take complement clauses, such as *viajar* ('to travel'), *bailar* ('to dance'), *salir* ('to leave'), and predicates that do take complement clauses, such as *impedir* ('to prevent'), *pensar* ('to think'), *informar* ('to inform'). Evidently, the focus of attention of this study will be on the latter category, which may be further characterized in terms of a threefold semantic

classification, which yields the following subclasses: causative acts, mental acts, and speech acts. The distinction between these acts will constitute our framework for doing research into modal variation in the complement clause.

5.1.3.1 *Causative acts*

Causative acts can be defined in terms of: "... the notion of causality, according to which agents are seen as the causes of the situations which, by their actions, they bring into existence" (Lyons 1977:490). As to syntactic configuration, causative predicates must be divided into two subclasses, according to whether or not they allow clausal complementation to take place. Predicates positively marked with respect to this feature are, e.g., *causar* ('to cause'), *lograr* ('to succeed'), and *provocar* ('to provoke'). The use of these predicates serves to focus attention on the particular effect brought about by the causative agent. Compare, for instance:

- (170) He logrado de él que tome la medicina
(‘I succeeded in getting him to take — SUB — the medicine’)

In this sentence, the matrix predicate refers to the performance of a certain causative act, the result of which is specified by the complement clause. In more general terms, we can also say that causative predicates are defined by an inherently perfective aspect, which bears on the completion of the causative process. Thus, for example, predicates such as *causar*, *lograr*, and *provocar* denote a positive cause-effect relation by virtue of the fact that a certain state of affairs not existing before the causative act was done, comes into existence because of that act. In addition to this type of predicates, there are others denoting a negative cause-effect relation. In this category, for instance, are *impedir* ('to prevent'), *evitar* ('to avoid'), and *prevenir* ('to prevent'). Let us consider a concrete example:

- (171) Mi madre impidió que riñera con mi hermanita
(‘My mother prevented me from quarrelling — SUB — with my little sister’)

In (171), the causative process expressed by *impidió* develops as follows: the mother of the speaker causes a certain state of affairs — *reñir(yo) con mi hermanita*—which did not take place at reference time, i.e., the moment referred to by *impidió*, not to come into existence after that moment. The use of the subjunctive in (170) and (171) must be explained by the *irrealis* character of the embedded proposition. The relevant parameter is ‘anticipation’, which

means that the unreality of (*él*) *tome la medicina* and (*yo*) *riñera con mi hermanita* is considered from a prospective point of view, since both propositions describe future states of affairs from the vantage points referred to by *he logrado* and *impidió*.

Syntactically, causative predicates run parallel with desiderative ones in that they select either the subjunctive or the infinitive in the subordinate clause. In either case, the use of the indicative is excluded. As we already know, the subjunctive and the infinitive are in complementary distribution, the distinctive marker being the referential output of the subjects of the main and the subordinate clause. If the referents are not identical, as in the case of (170) and (171), the use of the subjunctive is obligatory.⁶⁰ Coreference of the subjects, however, triggers infinitive complementation. Consider, for instance:

- (172) Este secretario logra despachar la correspondencia de los dos jefes
(‘This secretary manages to take care of the correspondence of both bosses’)
- (173) Durante su convalecencia evitó beber alcohol para no recaer
(‘During her convalescence she avoided drinking alcohol in order to prevent a relapse’)

Note that causative and desiderative predicates are not only syntactically, but also semantically related. This is due to the fact that the use of both types of predicates creates a temporal relation between the main and the subordinate clause that is to be defined in terms of prospectivity; thus, as was already pointed out in the discussion of (170) and (171), the reference time of the main clause serves as a vantage point from which the state of affairs of the subordinate clause is orientated towards the future. Therefore, both causative and desiderative situations include an element of anticipation.

Most causative verbs belong to the class of two-place predicates, which generate a structural link between the argument expressing the cause and the argument expressing the effect. Nevertheless, there is a small set of three-place predicates, where the place of the third argument is reserved for a human participant passively involved in the causative process. Prototypical cases in point are *forzar* (‘to force’), *obligar* (‘to oblige’), and *compeler* (‘to compel’). Trivalent predicates differ from bivalent ones in that they exclude referential identity between the subjects of the main and the subordinate clause. It comes as a surprise, therefore, that it is not subjunctive but infinitive complementation which takes place in most cases. Compare the following set of examples:

- (174) La oposición forzó al gobierno a definirse públicamente

(‘The opposition forced the government to publicly define a standpoint’)

(175) La policía les obligó a desalojar el local
(‘The police obliged them to vacate the building’)

(176) Le compelieron a abandonar el piso que ocupaba
(‘They compelled him to leave the flat where he lived’)

Subjunctive complementation, lastly, is illustrated by:

(177) Me va usted a obligar que le eche a la calle
(‘You are going to oblige me to throw — SUB — you out of the house’)

Among the members of the class of complement-taking predicates, causative ones occupy a special position because they may allow non-human entities to fill the subject slot. From the analysis of acquisition of knowledge, cognition and evaluation predicates we have seen that these all share the property of expressing meaning from an anthropocentric perspective, that is to say, their meaning is strictly oriented towards the interaction between man and his world.⁶¹ This anthropocentric bias finds its syntactic expression in the fact that complement-taking predicates typically assign the role of subject or indirect object to the human participant responsible for the propositional attitude expressed. This also holds for unipersonal predicates, which, as has been pointed out more than once, include an implicit reference to the speaker of the sentence. The class of causative predicates, by contrast, may also select non-human subjects. Note that we are concerned here with an option only; there are no causative predicates that are incompatible with human subjects. What we do find are predicates that require a human subject; relevant cases in point are *lograr* (‘to succeed’), *compeler* (‘to compel’), and *conseguir* (‘achieve’).

We come to the conclusion, then, that causative predicates split into two subclasses according to whether the change in the world described is brought about by human action or by physical forces operating spontaneously without human control. We may illustrate the latter situation by the following examples:

(178) La lluvia causó que el pueblo se inundara
(‘The rain caused the village to be — SUB — flooded’)

(179) La sal hace que el hierro se oxide
(‘Salt makes iron rust — SUB — ’)

From the obligatory use of the subjunctive it is obvious that causation by non-human forces also requires the resulting effect to be viewed from a prospective point of view.

5.1.3.2 *Mental acts*

Mental-act indicating predicates bring into focus different manifestations of the process of human thinking. These manifestations are basically generated by three types of acts: acts of thinking, which describe the mental process in general or specific terms, acts of making a prediction, and acts of creating a belief world. We will examine these different types of acts in the order given.

(I) Acts of thinking may have a general or a specific meaning. In the former category are predicates such as *pensar* ('to think'), *considerar* ('to consider'), and *tener en cuenta* ('to take into account'). More specialized acts of thinking, in particular the act of reasoning, are denoted by predicates such as: *argumentar* ('to argue'), *inferir* ('to infer'), and *concluir* ('to conclude'). Generally, the subject of these predicates refers to the thinking agent; nevertheless, it may be the case that, depending on predicate selection, the agent cannot be made explicit. This is shown by an example such as:

- (180) De sus palabras se desprende que no está dispuesto a hacer ninguna concesión
(‘From his words it can be gathered that he is — IND — not willing to make any concession’)

The following pairs of sentences manifest a difference between specific and non-specific reference to the agent involved in the process of reasoning:

- (181) Eso demuestra que no tiene mucho dinero
(‘That proves that he does — IND — not have much money’)
- (182) Demostró con pruebas que él no había estado aquel día en el lugar del suceso
(‘He provided evidence that he had — IND — not been on the scene of the incident that day’)
- (183) De tus palabras se infiere que no estarás aquí el domingo
(‘From your words it can be deduced that you wil — IND — not be here next Sunday’)
- (184) Infiero de su carta que espera que vayamos a verle
(‘I deduce from his letter that he hopes — IND — that we are going to see him’)

In (181) and (183), the predicates *demuestra* and *se infiere*, both characterized by the lack of a human subject, indicate the result of reaching a particular conclusion. Similar to what we have seen in the case of unipersonal evaluation predicates, the participant implicitly involved is the speaker of the sentence.

For this reason, we may say that the information provided by (181) and (183) is typically process-oriented. (182) and (183), on the other hand, do not only describe the result of an act of reasoning, but, as reference is made to the human subject of the sentence, they are agent-oriented.

The linguistic output of acts of thinking is a proposition the content of which the thinking agent considers to be true or demonstrably true. As is clear from the set of sentences we have just been examining, the positive truth value involved triggers the use of the indicative mood. It should be further added, however, that the truth of the embedded proposition need not be a universally accepted truth, since the person or persons to whom the thought, hypothesis, inference, etc, is attributed may draw wrong conclusions or make use of invalid arguments. These considerations, however, are not relevant to mood selection: the *realis* interpretation of the embedded proposition is based on the point of view of the subject of the mental act predicate.

Let us examine next what happens when negative matrices are generated. Consider, e.g.:

- (185) De sus palabras no se desprende que esté / está dispuesto a hacer ninguna concesión
(‘From his words it cannot be gathered that he is — SUB / IND — willing to make any concession’)

The difference between subjunctive and indicative complementation is comparable with the one discussed in relation to negative doxastic sentences; compare, again, (120) and (121). As for (185), the modal contrast between *esté* and *está* must be explained by taking into account both the vantage point of the speaker and that of the person referred to by the possessive pronoun *sus*. From the use of the subjunctive it is impossible to infer whether or not the latter is willing to make a concession. The use of the indicative, on the other hand, presupposes that the speaker of the sentence is aware of the willingness of the third person to make a concession, although this information cannot be concluded from *sus palabras*.

Lastly, I wish to focus attention on the polysemous character of the predicate *pensar*. As we already observed in the section on doxastic predicates, *pensar* denotes different kinds of mental acts. In the present context, it is worthwhile looking at the distinction between the two following sentences:

- (186) Hemos pensado que la mejor solución no es ésta
(‘We thought that the best solution is — IND — not this one’)
- (187) Hemos pensado que hables tú primero
(‘We thought that you should — SUB — speak first’)

The first sentence needs no special comment; *la mejor solución no es ésta* represents the output of the act of thinking, which results in the use of the indicative mood. Though the second sentence contains the same predicate in the main clause, it is evident that, in this case, *pensar* does not primarily serve to express the content of a thought. What is brought to the attention of the hearer, is the directive intention of the speaker of the utterance, which finds its conventional expression in the subjunctive mood of the subordinate clause. Our conclusion, then, is that, from a speech act point of view, the act of thinking does not produce a uniform output: the direction of fit of the proposition expressed may have both a *words-to-world* and a *world-to-words* orientation, as illustrated by (186) and (187), respectively.

(II) The second class of mental acts to be distinguished is composed of predicting acts. Spanish predicates describing this type of act are, e.g., *adivinar* ('to guess'), *prever* ('to foresee'), and *pronosticar* ('to predict'). Since making a prediction implies making an assertion on a future, that is, an unreal state of affairs, one would expect these predicates to govern the use of the subjunctive in the subordinate clause. This, however, is not the case; predicting predicates govern the indicative mood. The explanation for this has to be sought in the kind of perspective from which the subject of the matrix clause is viewing the future state of affairs. More precisely, when making a prediction, people usually have reliable evidence for the claim that the state of affairs in question will come into existence. We can say, therefore, that the prediction anticipates, as it were, the transformation of unreality into reality.

There follows a note on agreement of tenses. The use of the present tense in the main clause correlates with the future tense or the *ir a* + infinitive construction in the subordinate one. The following examples illustrate the type of *consecutio temporum* at issue:

- (188) Adivino que éste va a ser un mal año
(‘I guess that this is — IND — going to be a bad year’)
- (189) Preveo que el Congreso desechará el proyecto de ley
(‘I foresee that the Congress will — IND — reject the bill’)
- (190) Si te metes en ese negocio sucio, te pronostico que acabarás mal
(‘If you get involved in that dirty business, I tell you that things will — IND — turn nasty’)

As regards the use of the future tense, remember our discussion of the evaluation predicates *esperar* and *confiar*, in particular examples (166) and (167), where we pointed out that the paradigm is marked for a categorical type of

temporal reference. In light of this, one might argue that in sentences (189) and (190) the use of the future tense suggests that the speaker is able to provide evidentiary justification for the correctness of the prediction.

(III) The last class of mental acts consists of acts described by so-called ‘pretense’ predicates, which, as indicated by the term, do not describe states of affairs taking place in the real world, but in a fictitious or imaginary world. Put differently, pretense predicates provide an introduction to worlds that can be viewed as alternative or belief worlds. As is wellknown, belief worlds are pre-eminently created in the work of literary writers. Nevertheless, they also play an essential part in non-fictional types of communication, such as everyday conversation. Some characteristic instances of pretense predicates in Spanish are *fingir* (‘to pretend’), *imaginar(se)* (‘to imagine’), and *figurar(se)* (‘to imagine’). Since competent speakers of a language are used to experiencing a belief world as an alternative to the real world, they have no trouble conceiving the states of affairs described in the imaginary world as a reality in that world. This explains that, with respect to modal complementation, Spanish pretense predicates trigger the indicative mood in the subordinate clause. In this connection, consider also: “The reason for the indicative in these cases seems to derive from the fact that the pretense predicate establishes an alternative reality and the complement constitutes an assertion within that alternative reality” (Noonan 1985: 116).

Though not pertaining to the class of pretense predicates, *soñar* (‘to dream’), which, as clarified in 5.1.1, denotes an experience deriving from an internal conceptual stimulus, also establishes an introduction to an imaginary world. This world is not intentionally created, but comes into existence spontaneously without control of the dreamer. However, the dreamed world is experienced as a real world, and that explains the use of the indicative mood in the complement clause.

Let us concentrate on the use of the following pretense predicates:

- (191) Finge que está enfermo para no trabajar
(‘He pretends to be — IND — ill so that he does not have to work’)
- (192) Encarna levanta los ojos enrojecidos y mira al vacío: acaso imagina que Mario está donde efectivamente se encuentra
(‘Encarna is raising her reddened eyes and gazing into space: perhaps she imagines Mario is — IND — where he really is’)
- (193) Todo va bien: él no se imagina que lo perseguimos
(‘Everything is fine: he does not imagine we are — IND — pursuing him’)

- (194) Imagínate que no hubiera salido en ese momento
 ('Imagine he had — SUB — not left at that moment')

(191) and (192) confirm the rule established above: the use of the indicative reflects the fact that the embedded proposition describes a real state of affairs in the alternative world created by the use of the pretense predicate. What draws our attention in (193), is that the negative structure of the matrix clause does not trigger the use of the subjunctive mood. The reason for this is that the proposition *lo perseguimos* is not true in the world created by *él no se imagina*, but is presupposed to be true in the real world. In (194), in conclusion, the addressee is invited to create a fictitious world in which a counterfactual state of affairs holds. Evidently, it is the *irrealis* interpretation of this proposition which accounts for the use of the pluperfect subjunctive in the complement clause.

5.1.3.3 *Speech acts*

In Chapters 2 and 3 it was pointed out that four major classes of speech acts are relevant to research into mood selection in Spanish complement clauses, viz., *assertives*, *directives*, *commissives*, and *expressives*. Now, the predicates denoting the members of these classes of speech acts are typically used for the expression of reported speech. As is wellknown, it is customary to distinguish two basic types of reported speech: direct and indirect discourse. Elaborating on this distinction we may say that direct discourse serves as a particular kind of *evidentiality marker*, that is, a linguistic category that has the characteristic function of focusing on the truthfulness of that which is being reported. The following statement provides some detailed information: "Direct quotation, by virtue of its formal features, however, can be considered as a means for restaging a verbal performance, and as such it creates the illusion to witness the scene evoked by the narrative" (Fónagy 1986: 255).

In indirect discourse, on the other hand, evidentiality does not necessarily play a crucial role. This applies in particular to so-called *de re* representations, which produce a double-focus effect by separating the voices of the reported and the reporting speaker. Evidently, in this situation, the reported utterance can only be attributed a low degree of evidentiality.⁶² It should be borne in mind, however, that even in the case of direct discourse evidentiality is not a *conditio sine qua non*, since, especially in narrative discourse, many speakers wish to create the impression that they are truthfully quoting the originally produced speech, while, in actual fact, it is clear that their memory lacks the capacity of exactly recalling all that was literally said. We must conclude, then, that it is the aim of these speakers to enhance the reality value of

the reported utterance by pretending to assign their addressee the role of an eye-witness in the state of affairs represented. Since the rhetorical effect of this strategy does not bear on the modal output of reported speech, we will not take it into consideration in our analyses.

In the next section attention will be focused on the reproduction of assertive speech acts.

5.1.3.3.1 *Assertives*⁶³

We will start the empirical research into the modal distribution in reported assertives with two examples of direct discourse, both of which have been taken from contemporary Spanish novels:

- (195) Su Majestad era partidario de abandonar Marruecos a su suerte —
dijo éste — pero he conseguido disuadirle
(‘His Majesty was in favor of abandoning Morocco to its fate —
this one said — but I managed to dissuade him’)
- (196) Estoy de acuerdo — dijo — El cine y la literatura que no exploran el
corazón humano no me interesan
(‘I agree — he said — Movies and literature that do not explore the
human heart do not interest me’)

These sentences illustrate the prototypical modal pattern of direct discourse, which requires the mood of the original speech act to be copied. As a consequence, the reporting predicate *dijo* does not exert control over mood selection. The second example is peculiar in the sense that the assertive reproduced by *dijo* contains a second instance of assertive direct discourse, introduced by *estoy de acuerdo*. The indicative mood, therefore, manifests itself twice: by means of *estoy* and by means of *interesan*. Note that the rule of mood copying also applies to assertives containing a verb in the subjunctive mood. Compare, for instance:

- (197) Manuela me dijo — Quizá venga mañana
(‘Manuela said to me — Perhaps I will — SUB — come tomorrow’)

At the level of indirect discourse, the same situation holds: the mood of the original assertion is reproduced in the complement clause. Thus, we get the following variants of (195)–(197):

- (195) a. Dijo éste que Su Majestad era partidario de abandonar Marruecos a
su suerte, pero que había conseguido disuadirle
(‘This one said that His Majesty was — IND — in favor of aban-
doning Morocco to its fate, but that he had — IND — managed to
dissuade him’)

- (196) a. Dijo que estaba de acuerdo en que el cine y la literatura que no exploran el corazón humano no le interesaban
(‘He said that he agreed — IND — that movies and literature that do not explore the human heart did — IND — not interest him’)
- (197) a. Manuela me dijo que quizá viniera mañana
(‘Manuela said to me that she would — SUB — perhaps come tomorrow’)

It is clear from these sentences that agreement of mood is not matched by agreement of tense. Specifically, the following shifts are to be noticed: (195) *he conseguido* → (195a) *había conseguido*; (196) *estoy / interesan* → (196a) *estaba / interesaban*; (197) *venga* → (197a) *viniera*.

In Section 3.2.2 attention was drawn to Fraser’s inventory of acts of assertion, which contains a remarkable variety of items indicating particular aspects of assertive interaction. As suggested by (195a) and (196a), the vast majority of these predicates governs the indicative mood in the complement clause. Note, incidentally, that the subjunctive appearing in (197a) is not triggered by *dijo* but by the dubitative adverb *quizá*. Now, an interesting exception to the general rule formulated above is the predicate *admitir* (‘to admit’), which allows modal variation. Let us consider two examples from Bustos (1986: 198, 199):

- (198) Mi madre admite que Juan tiene menos años que mi padre
(‘My mother admits that Juan is — IND — younger than my father’)
- (199) Mi madre admite que Juan tenga menos años que mi padre
(‘My mother admits that Juan is — SUB — younger than my father’)

Bustos’ explanation of the difference between *tiene* and *tenga* is based on the speaker’s point of view concerning the truth value of the embedded proposition. That is to say, the use of the indicative in (198) reflects the presupposition of the speaker that the embedded proposition describes a real state of affairs. The use of the subjunctive in (199), by contrast, should be interpreted in terms of epistemic neutrality. In other words, it reflects the speaker’s uncertainty with respect to the truth value of the embedded proposition. The speaker’s point of view, therefore, can be paraphrased in the following way: *No sé que Juan tenga menos años que mi padre* (‘I do not know if Juan is — SUB — younger than my father’). It is important to add to this interpretation that negation of the matrix predicate does not produce a modification of the speaker’s point of view, so that in:

- (198) a. Mi madre no admite que Juan tiene menos años que mi padre
(‘My mother does not admit that Juan is — IND — younger than my father’)

the same factive presupposition holds as in (198), while

- (199) a. Mi madre no admite que Juan tenga menos años que mi padre
(‘My mother does not admit that Juan is — SUB — younger than my father’)

still implies: *No sé que Juan tenga menos años que mi padre.*

Let us focus next on the performative use of *admitir*. In this connection, it is to be noticed that performative sentences do not necessarily reproduce a speech act performed in a previous discourse. Their essential characteristic is that they are self-reporting because of the fact that the speaker makes a metalinguistic reference to the speech act he/she is performing at the moment of speaking. Consider the following examples:

- (200) Admito que tienes razón. Yo me he equivocado
(‘I admit that you are — IND — right. I was wrong’)
- (201) Admito que el libro sea bueno, pero es pesado
(‘I admit that the book is — SUB — good, but it is tedious’)

To these sentences the following interpretation applies. The embedded clauses of both (200) and (201) convey information on real states of affairs; so in the former case it is asserted that the interlocutor is right, and in the latter that the book is good. The difference between these performative statements bears upon the particular way in which the facts involved are put forward by the speaker. In (200), the propositional content of the embedded clause constitutes the communicative core of the utterance because the speaker intends to make it unambiguously clear to the hearer that he/she considers the latter to be right. This interpretation is corroborated by the fact that the statement *Yo me he equivocado* provides causal background information concerning the foregoing concession; it indicates the reason that the proposition *tienes razón* expresses a factual state of affairs. The inflection of *tienes* confirms the general rule that foregrounding or focalizing of truth value requires the use of the indicative mood. As observed above, sentence (201) is comparable to (200) in that the embedded proposition is marked with positive truth value. The subjunctive form *sea*, however, indicates that the propositional content is brought to the attention of the hearer from a quite different point of view. More strictly, the fact that the book is good is not focalized, but presented as presupposed information, which is equivalent to stat-

ing that the embedded proposition serves to provide background information concerning the adversative statement *pero es pesado*. At discourse level, the concession *admito que el libro sea bueno* plays a typically argumentative role, since it is the speaker's intention to anticipate a potential objection to be made by the hearer to his evaluating assertion *pero es pesado*. A different contextual interpretation is that, in a previous segment of the verbal exchange, the hearer has praised the quality of the book. In that case, the speaker aims to mention the hearer's evaluation only in passing in order to prevent it from being used as an argument in the remainder of the discussion. We could say, therefore, that it is the communicative goal of the speaker to downgrade the relevance of hearer's statement. Consider also Reyes' comment on the use of the subjunctive in example (201):

El subjuntivo introduce la otra voz y simultáneamente quita importancia al hecho de ser el libro bueno, poniéndolo en segundo plano en la argumentación (queda mencionado como verdad en mayor proporción que afirmado como verdad) (1990: 47).

(‘The subjunctive introduces the other voice and at the same time it plays down the importance of the fact that the book is good, situating it at a secondary level in the argumentation (it is mentioned rather than affirmed as a true fact).’)

Extending the analysis, we may say then that the subjunctive mood has a particular quotative value, which has never been described in traditional grammar.

We now move on to modal distribution in the subordinate clause of *advertir* (‘to warn’). The following examples will serve as the point of departure for the analysis:

- (202) Te advierto que esta noche hará frío
(‘I warn you that it will — IND — be cold tonight’)
- (203) Por última vez te advierto que no te acerques por aquí
(‘I warn you for the last time to keep — SUB — away from here’)

From the difference in meaning between (202) and (203) it is easy to infer that we are not dealing here with two performative sentences expressing contrast of focus, as in the case of (200) and (201), but with two different kinds of speech acts. The speaker of (202) makes an emphatic assertion, while the speaker of (203) issues an emphatic order. The contrast in illocutionary point, therefore, explains in a straightforward way why the former sentence shows indicative and the latter subjunctive complementation. Note that a similar distinction holds between *insistir* (‘to insist’) + Indicative and *insistir* + Subjunctive.

Next, the negative use of predicates reporting on acts of assertion will be addressed. To start with, compare the following pair of sentences:

- (204) a. No digo que tu marido es un embustero
 ('I do not say that your husband is — IND — a liar')
- b. No digo que tu marido sea un embustero
 ('I do not say that your husband is — SUB — a liar')

The modal difference between *es* in (204a) and *sea* in (204b) can be accounted for as follows. In the former case we are concerned with a self-reporting speaker who explicitly points out that he/she has not made the statement referred to in the embedded proposition. A relevant context, therefore, would be a discussion in which the interlocutor has just reproached him/her for making that statement. This means that *no digo* expresses a metalinguistic reference to a reported utterance, namely, *tu marido es un embustero*. As a consequence, the indicative inflection of the verb reflects the reality value of this utterance. We come to the conclusion then that (204a) represents a typical instance of illocution negation. From an interactional perspective, it may be added that the speaker of the utterance intends to avoid a conflict with the hearer by denying that he/she has made a face-threatening statement.

The speaker of (204b) aims to produce a quite different communicative effect. His/her intention is not to avoid a face-threatening act, but to perform one. More precisely, this speaker limits him/herself to indicating that the state of affairs expressed by the embedded proposition does not match the real world. The selection of *sea* is triggered by the general rule that clauses describing unreal states of affairs take the subjunctive mood. As to pragmatic interpretation, we find that the speaker of (204b) flouts Grice's first maxim of quantity, which runs as follows: "Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange)" (1975: 45). The maxim is manipulated because of the fact that the speaker does not formulate an explicit judgment on the character or the behavior of the husband of the addressee, but, instead, makes her draw the inference that he/she considers her husband, though not a liar, not a very reliable person either. In other words, what we are dealing with is a conversational implicature which, as far as semantic interpretation is concerned, may be described in terms of the relation between the members of a set of evaluative concepts occupying different positions on an implicational scale. Now, the offensive reading of (204b) is brought about by the speaker's implicating that a point of the scale relatively close to the negative pole is activated.

Further note that negative insertion in the subordinate clause does not produce the face-threatening implicature. Thus:

- (204) c. Digo que tu marido no es un embustero
(‘I say that your husband is — IND not a liar’)

is a performative utterance that does not bring about particular perlocutionary effects.

Finally, in a language such as English, where no modal paradigms are available to formally characterize the metalinguistic and the inferential interpretation of (204a) and (204b), it may be assumed that the distinction is expressed by means of prosodic devices.

The foregoing analysis justifies the conclusion that (204a) and (204b) represent instances of illocution negation and proposition negation, respectively. Instead of illocution and proposition negation, it is also appropriate to speak of external and internal negation. Compare the following exposition:

There are two kinds of negation (at least). They are commonly called “internal” and “external” negation. The internal negation of “I promise to pay you before the end of the tax year” is “I promise not to pay you before the end of the tax year”. The external negation of the same promise is “I do not promise to pay you before the end of the tax year”. Nearly all speech acts, including assertions, can be negated in these two ways. The internal negation of “The cat is on the mat” is, of course, “The cat is not on the mat”. Its external negation is normally expressed by the use of a negated explicit performative: “I don’t say that the cat is on the mat”... (Hare 1970: 12).

Lastly note that proposition negation can also be expressed by the predicate *negar* (‘to deny’). Thus, the following example can be considered conceptually, though not pragmatically, equivalent to (204c):

- (204) d. Niego que tu marido sea un embustero
(‘I deny that your husband is — SUB — a liar’)

The basic distinction between (204c) and (204d) is that the former sentence is likely to be uttered to emphasize or repeat a statement already made by the speaker in the previous discourse, whereas the intention of the speaker of (204d) is to focus on the offensive interpretation of the embedded proposition, which is claimed to be untrue. Note that the negation of (204d):

- (204) e. No niego que tu marido sea un embustero
(‘I do not deny that your husband is — SUB — a liar’)

may be interpreted as a hedged variant of the offensive assertion:

- (204) f. Digo que tu marido es un embustero
(‘I say that your husband is — IND — a liar’)

5.1.3.3.2 *Directives*

The class of directive speech acts may be subdivided in different ways. A fundamental classification is based on the distinction between interrogative and non-interrogative acts, the contrastive trait being that the former class serves the exclusive purpose of eliciting a verbal response from the hearer while non-interrogative acts are not constrained in this way; the action the hearer is supposed to perform may be verbal or non-verbal. As we will see below, this difference in interactional goal is syntactically reflected by mood and conjunction selection.

To begin with the analysis of interrogatives, consider the following examples of direct and indirect discourse:

- (205) a. ¿Has cerrado la puerta de entrada? — me preguntó
(‘Did you close the main door? — he asked me’)
- b. Me preguntó si había cerrado la puerta de entrada
(‘He asked me if I had — -IND — closed the main door’)
- (206) a. ¿Quién le dio esa información? — preguntó el juez
(‘Who gave you that information? — the judge asked’)
- b. El juez preguntó (que) quién le había dado esa información
(‘The judge asked who had — IND — given me that information’)

The first point to mention is that reproduction of interrogative speech is formally characterized by mood copying; that is, both direct and indirect discourse take over the indicative mood of the original question.

As is obvious from (205b) and (206b), conjunction selection in indirect discourse is dependent on the *yes-no* or *wh*-character of the reported question. In the former case, the so-called *si dubitativo* fills the conjunction slot, in the latter optional *que*-insertion takes place before the interrogative pronoun.

Reference to the speech act of answering is constrained in that the prototypical verb denoting that act, viz., *contestar*, cannot be used to report answers to *wh*-questions. Compare, for example:

- (207) Me *contestó / contó quién pasó el examen final
(‘He answered / told me who had — IND — passed the final examination’)

As suggested by the well-formed version of this example, *contar* may serve as an appropriate substitute for *contestar*. In the reproduction of answers to *yes-no* questions, however, *contestar* produces the same effect of appropriateness as *contar*, as shown by:

- (207) a. Me contestó / contó que María pasó el examen final
 ('He answered / told me that María had — IND — passed the final examination')

The use of *contó que* in (207a), in conclusion, differs from *contó quién* in (207) in that the latter presupposes the truth of the embedded proposition, whereas the former does not.⁶⁴

We now proceed to the analysis of non-interrogative directive speech. Consider, first, three examples of direct discourse:

- (208) Ayúdeme a subir el equipaje — me pidió
 ('Help me take the luggage upstairs — he asked me')
- (209) ¡Deténganse en el acto! — el guardia mandó a los transeúntes
 ('Stop immediately! — the policeman ordered the passers-by')
- (210) ¡Quédate en casa! — la supliqué
 ('Stay home! — I implored her')

These sentences show that the imperative is the standard mood for reporting direct discourse. The specific character of the directive act does not influence modal selection, as may be seen from the fact that the imperative is used, regardless of whether a request (208), an order (209), or an entreaty (210) is reproduced. The pragmatic difference between these categories, which is determined by specific degrees of directive force, can be represented by means of a three-point scale. That is, in regard to perlocutionary force, the entreating speaker exerts minimal pressure, the requesting speaker neutral pressure, and the ordering speaker maximal pressure. It follows that requests are the non-marked members of the class of directives, which is also reflected by their relatively high frequency of use. In this relation, remember our observation in Section 3.1.2 to the effect that requests are characteristic of three types of interaction patterns: (I) the speaker has power over the hearer, but does not want to make it explicit; (II) no power relation holds between the speaker and the hearer; (III) the hearer has power over the speaker.

Next we focus our attention on mood selection in indirect discourse. The following variants of (208)–(210) will be discussed

- (208) a. Me pidió que le ayudara a subir el equipaje
 ('He asked me to help — SUB — him take the luggage upstairs')
- (209) a. El guardia mandó a los transeúntes que se detuvieran en el acto
 ('The policeman ordered the passers-by to stop — SUB — immediately')

- (210) a. La supliqué que se quedara en casa
 ('I implored her to stay — SUB — at home')

As illustrated by this set of sentences, indirect reports of directive speech require the complement clause to be inflected for the subjunctive mood. This use of the subjunctive may be said to reflect the world-to-words direction of fit inherent in the class of directives. More precisely, the appearance of the subjunctive forms *ayudara*, *detuvieran*, and *quedara* must be explained as follows: clauses subordinated to directive matrix predicates express an unreal state of affairs due to the fact that, at coding time or reference time, the world in which that state of affairs is supposed to hold does not actually exist.

A special comment on the modal structure of the subordinate clause of (209) is in order, since order predicates do not only trigger subjunctive but also infinitive complementation. This may be seen from:

- (211) Me mandó atenderle
 ('He ordered me to serve him')
- (212) Le prohibían escuchar la radio
 ('They forbade him to listen to the radio')

The difference between (211) and (212), on the one hand, and (209a), on the other, is determined by the morphosyntactic structure of the indirect object. If a full noun phrase is selected, subjunctive complementation is obligatory; unstressed pronouns, on the contrary, require the use of the infinitive. A pragmatic explanation of the latter type of government might be that conjunction suppression serves as an iconic sign to reflect the power or authority the speaker has over the hearer. Put another way, the reduction of syntactic form could be interpreted in terms of a reduction of interpersonal space, since, in the case of orders and prohibitions, the intentional behavior of the hearer is supposed to be controlled by the speaker. Of course, iconicity does not account for the syntactic structure of sentences such as (209a). Nevertheless, it is a striking fact that infinitive complementation is limited to the use of predicates filling the order slot of the scale of directive force indicators. It does not occur if the entreaty or request points of the scale are activated.

The parameter of iconicity has also been discussed in the literature. Thus, referring to Givón (1980, 1985) Newmeyer (1992:762) observes:

... the more conceptual control a main verb exerts over a complement verb, the more likely the latter is to be incorporated with the former and the less likely a complementizer is to occur in the embedded clause. In both cases, the number of constituent boundaries between the two verbs correlates with their conceptual independence.

In studies on directive speech acts, much attention has been paid to the distinction between direct and indirect speech acts. However, in the literature on reported speech the focus of interest has invariably been the investigation of direct performances of the speech act. Therefore, in what follows I will extend the analysis to some typical instances of the reproduction of indirect directives. Examples (213)–(215) will be our starting point:

- (213) ¿Podrías traerme un vaso de agua? — me pidió/preguntó
(‘Could you bring me a glass of water? — he requested / asked me’)
- (214) Quiero que pongas la luz — me mandó / dijo
(‘I want you to put — SUB — on the light — he ordered / told me’)
- (215) Hace un frío tremendo aquí adentro — me dijo
(‘It is very cold inside — she said to me’)

Under the interpretation that is relevant to the present analysis, (213), (214) and (215) are instances of indirect directives, which means that each of these sentences is marked for multiple illocutionary force. To be precise, in (213) the explicit illocutionary act performed by the speaker is a question; in (214) and (215) the explicit act is an assertion. In addition to the explicit illocutionary act, the speakers of these sentences perform an implicit act, namely, a directive, which has to be inferred from the explicit one.

Now, the proper interpretation of indirectness depends on the hearer’s competence to deduce the implicit illocutionary act, which has no linguistic output, from the explicit act. One of the crucial factors involved in this inferential process concerns the motivated relation between both acts. Thus, in (213) the interrogative formulated by the literal illocutionary act is a question bearing upon the ability of the addressee to do the act requested. Together with such categories as willingness, non-obviousness, and reasonableness, ability belongs to the set of preparatory conditions inherent in the appropriate performance of directives. In (214), the realization of the explicit illocutionary act is a statement about the sincerity of the speaker. In (215), lastly, the speaker indicates the reason he/she has to make the request, the content of which is not formally expressed, but supposed to be inferrable from the context or situation of utterance. Thus, the act to be carried out could be closing the window, shutting the door, turning on the heating, etc.

Looking at these matters within the framework of reported speech, we observe a striking difference between direct and indirect performances of the speech act. In direct discourse, if reference is made to the ability precondition or the sincerity condition, the speech act verb may express both the literal and the

non-literal illocutionary act. This is shown by sentences (213) and (214), where an option is available between *pidió* and *preguntó*, and between *mandó* and *dijo*, respectively. Not unsurprisingly, in all cases modal selection is determined by the literal illocutionary act; thus, in (213) the indicative is triggered by the interrogative force and in (214) and (215) by the assertive force of the utterance.

A special comment is in order with respect to example (215). Unlike the reporting speakers of (213) and (214), the speaker of (215) has no alternative as far as the selection of the speech act verb is involved; this speaker can only use a verb denoting the literal assertive illocutionary act. How do we account for this phenomenon? The answer to the question has to be sought in the peculiar character of the indirectness concerned. That is, the reported speaker of (215) limits him/herself to indicating to the hearer a particular reason for doing the act without describing it at all. As a result, what is formally expressed is an assertive which, according to the context or situation of utterance, could also be taken as a literal statement without implicit directive force. It follows from all this that a basic difference holds between (215), on the one hand, and (213) and (214), on the other, since in the latter the explicit description of the act to be done by the hearer — *traer un vaso de agua*, *poner la luz* — counts as a conventional expression of directive force.

How about indirect discourse? Let us consider the following variants of (213)–(215):

- (213) a. Me preguntó / *pidió si podría traerle un vaso de agua
(‘He asked / requested me if I could — IND — bring him a glass of water’)
- (214) a. Me dijo / *mandó que quería que pusiese la luz
(‘He told / ordered me that he wanted — IND — me to put on the light’)
- (215) a. Me dijo / *pidió / *mandó que hacía un frío tremendo allí adentro
(‘She said to me / requested / ordered that it was — IND — very cold inside’)

These sentences make it clear that, in indirect discourse, indirect directives can only be reproduced by means of the speech act verb denoting the literal illocutionary act. As predicted by the use of the matrix predicates *preguntar* and *decir*, each of the sentences shows indicative complementation.

5.1.3.3.3 *Commissives*

In Section 3.2.2 we defined commissives as speech acts performed by the

speaker to commit him/herself, primarily for the benefit of the addressee, to do the act expressed by the proposition. Characteristic instances of predicates describing commissive acts are *prometer* ('to promise'), *garantizar* ('to guarantee'), and *jurar* ('to swear').

Direct reports of commissives require the use of the indicative mood, as illustrated, for example, by:

- (216) No volverá a ocurrir — me garantizó
(‘It will not happen again — he guaranteed me’)

In indirect discourse, the indicative alternates with the infinitive. Compare, e.g.:

- (217) Te prometo que te nombraré tesorero de la sociedad en la próxima junta
(‘I promise you that I shall — IND — appoint you treasurer of the society at the next meeting’)
- (218) Le prometí ir a buscarle hoy
(‘I promised her to pick him up today’)

The syntactic rule underlying the infinitive complementation of (218) has already been discussed in connection with the analysis of desiderative predicates: the selection of *ir* is triggered by coreference of the subjects of the matrix and the subordinate clause. Note however that desiderative and commissive predicates do not behave exactly in the same way; specifically, the former requires infinitive complementation to take place if the subjects are coreferent, whereas the latter optionally select the infinitive. Thus, (217) can be substituted for (217a), and (218) for (218a):

- (217) a. Te prometo nombrarte tesorero de la sociedad en la próxima junta
(‘I promise you that I will appoint you treasurer of the society at the next meeting’)
- (218) a. Le prometí que iría a buscarle hoy
(‘I promised her that I would pick him up today’)

We may conclude, then, that the following statement:

... la cosa prometida se expresa con un nombre o con un verbo en infinitivo” (Moliner 1998b: 786)
(‘... the content of a promise is expressed by a noun or by a verb in the infinitive’)

does not give a complete account of the syntactic facts to be described.

The next point to be focused on is that commissive speech acts, though specified by the world-to-words direction of fit, are not marked for subjunc-

tive complementation. The difference with directives, which are characterized by the same direction of fit, is determined by the particular roles of the speaker and the hearer in the interactional process. In directive interaction, the speaker is dependent upon the cooperation of the hearer as regards the performance of the future act, so that, in principle, no prediction can be made as to whether or not the wish of the speaker will be granted. In commissives, on the contrary, it is the speaker him/herself who assumes the responsibility for doing the act. The use of the indicative, basically realized by the future tense of the verb, anticipates, as it were, the reality of the future world the speaker commits him/herself to create. In this relation, compare the following statement about the use of the future in English:

In addition to the purely future sense of *shall*, there is also a more obviously modal use, the ‘promissive’: here the speaker puts himself forward as guarantor, as it were, of the truth or occurrence of the event he refers to (e.g. *You shall have your money by the end of the week* (Lyons 1969: 310).⁶⁵

Let us conclude with an example where the conditional takes over the role of the future because the commissive speech act reported on took place in the past:

- (219) Si se curaba, prometió a Dios que llevaría hábito durante dos años
(‘If he got better, he promised God that he would take holy orders for two years’)

5.1.3.3.4 Expressives

As pointed out in Section 3.2.2, by means of an expressive speech act the speaker expresses a psychological state brought about by an event causally involving the hearer. Expressives differ from assertives, directives, and commissives in that they are often realized by expressions lacking propositional content. Relevant cases in point are *gracias* (‘thank you’), *enhorabuena* (‘welcome’), and *perdón* (‘sorry’). Of course, these expressions cannot be reproduced by indirect discourse. On the other hand, there are predicates which admit clausal complementation, in which case: “... the propositional content ascribes some property (not necessarily an action) to either S or H” (Searle 1976: 13). Some Spanish examples are *agradecer* (‘to thank’), *perdonar* (‘forgive’), and *deplorar* (‘regret’). *Agradecer* is an expressive predicate that necessarily ascribes an action to the hearer. Let us look at the following set of examples:

- (220) Le agradezco que me haya ayudado a cruzar la calle
(‘I am thankful that you helped — SUB — me cross the street’)
- (221) Le agradezco haberme ayudado a cruzar la calle

(‘I am thankful that you helped me cross the street’)

(222) Le agradeceré que me ayude a cruzar la calle

(‘I will be thankful if you help — SUB — me cross the street’)

The appearance of the subjunctive in (220) represents a phenomenon we are familiar with: the content of the embedded proposition is presupposed to be true. The event described is backgrounded, which means that the core of the information is provided by the performative use of the expressive main predicate. The infinitive occurring in (221) should be viewed as a free variant of the subjunctive of (220). This situation resembles the one examined in the section on commissives, where we compared *Te prometo que te nombraré tesorero en la próxima junta* and *Te prometo nombrarte tesorero en la próxima junta*. In this case, too, free variation is at issue. Nevertheless, two fundamental differences hold between the commissive and the expressive sentences. Semantically, the complement clause of the former describes a future, or, more precisely, an anticipated state of affairs, whereas the complement clause of the latter describes a past event marked for factual presupposition. This can be formally shown by adding a nominalization marker to the infinitive complement of (221):

(221) a. Le agradezco el haberme ayudado a cruzar la calle

Needless to say, article insertion is not allowed in commissive complements. Thus, for instance, the following sentence is an ungrammatical variant of (218):

(218) a. *Le prometí el ir a buscarle hoy

Furthermore, the use of *prometer* requires the subjects of the matrix and the subordinate clause to be coreferent; the use of *agradecer*, by contrast, excludes coreference of the subjects.

Focusing on the pragmatics of *agradecer*, we find that the subjunctive mood of sentence (222) has a quite different source from that of (220). The use of *agradeceré* represents a typically negative politeness strategy adopted by the speaker to soften the directive force of the utterance. The use of the subjunctive in the subordinate clause, therefore, reflects the description of an anticipated state of affairs. Note that the requesting speaker may enhance the degree of politeness by making use of the conditional, which would yield the following output:

(222) a. Le agradecería que me ayudara a cruzar la calle

(‘I would be thankful if you helped — SUB — me cross the street’)

Let us finally look at an instance of an imperative expressive:

- (223) Perdona que te interrumpa
(‘Sorry for interrupting — SUB — you’)

The appearance of the subjunctive is commented on by Lunn, from whom the example is taken, in the following way:

[223] is what is said after a speaker has already interrupted a hearer. In this polite formula, an interruption observed by both speaker and hearer is classified as old information and marked with the low-priority subjunctive (1989a: 694).

5.1.3.3.5 *Specific forms of reproducing information*

This section contains a discussion of:

- (I) the reporting use of *decir*
- (II) the function of so-called *in a manner of speaking* predicates
- (III) the expression of non-verbal communication
- (IV) the perlocutionary status of the predicates *convencer* and *persuadir*

(I) Most grammars of Spanish devote special attention to the reporting use of *decir*. Thus, a particular focus of interest could be the modal contrast between pairs of sentences such as:

- (224) Dijo que no lo sabía
(‘He said that he did — IND — not know it’)
- (225) Dijo que le entregaran el paquete
(‘He said that they must — SUB — hand the package over to him’)

The question usually posed is whether in these cases we are concerned with one predicate selecting both the indicative and the subjunctive mood or with two distinct predicates each governing its own mood. Extending the analysis from a speech act point of view, we arrive at the conclusion that *decir* fulfills an overall function for reproducing speech, since it may report not only on assertives and directives, but also on commissives and expressives. For purposes of illustration, remember the use of *decir* in the direct and indirect reproduction of the assertives (195)–(197) and (195a)–(197a). Likewise, instead of (209) we could get: *¡Deténganse en el acto! — el guardia dijo a los transeúntes* and instead of (209a): *El guardia dijo a los transeúntes que se detuvieran en el acto*. Obviously, in the latter sentence the directive interpretation of *dijo* causes the subjunctive mood to appear in the subordinate clause. Although in direct reports of commissives *decir* may replace *prometer*, *garan-*

tizar and *jurar*, its use is constrained in the representation of indirect discourse. Thus, for instance, as an alternative to (217) we can get: *Te digo que te nombraré tesorero de la sociedad en la próxima junta*, but the infinitive complementation of (218) blocks: **Le dije ir a buscarle hoy*. To conclude with the class of expressives, reproduction by means of *decir* requires the expressive predicate to be copied. The alternative to (221), e.g., would be *Le digo que le agradezco haberme ayudado a cruzar la calle*; the variant without *le agradezco* would be impossible: **Le digo haberme ayudado a cruzar la calle*. The apparent reason for this is that the class of expressive predicates consists of a variety of items that are lexically unrelated. This may be seen, for instance, from the set of examples given in the previous section, viz., *agradecer*, *perdonar*, and *deplorar*. Since *decir* in itself does not specify illocutionary force, copying of the expressive predicate serves the purpose of avoiding ambiguity.

Lastly note that the *passe partout* function of *decir* should be regarded as a reflection of the importance attributed to the reality value of reported speech in communicative interaction. A specific manifestation of this can be found in the use of *decir* in narrative speech, where speakers often employ *digo* in direct discourse for emphasizing the reliability of their story. In this regard, also note the popular use of the historic present as an evidentiality marker in everyday conversation.

(II) In addition to *decir*, there is a class of so-called *in a manner of speaking* predicates, which also perform the function of reporting speech in a force-neutral way. More strictly, these predicates do not express the illocutionary point of the reproduced speech act, but convey information on its phonetic output. Some prototypical instances are *gritar* ('to shout'), *murmurar* ('mutter'), and *susurrar* ('whisper'). Marsá (1982) provides the following definitions:

gritar: "levantar mucho la voz emitiendo sonidos" (629); *murmurar*: "hablar de forma casi imperceptible, manifestando queja o enfado" (855); *susurrar*: "musitar, hablar con voz muy baja" (195).

(*gritar*: "to raise one's voice loudly when uttering sounds"; *murmurar*: "to speak in an almost imperceptible way when expressing a complaint or anger"; *susurrar*: "to murmur, to speak in a very low voice"')

In a manner of speaking predicates can be used to reproduce speech acts at the level of both direct and indirect discourse. The following examples represent the modal patterns of indirect discourse:

- (226) Gritó que no lo sabía
(‘She shouted that she did — IND — not know it’)

- (227) Gritó que le entregaran el paquete
(‘She shouted that they must hand -SUB — the package over to her’)
- (228) Gritó que le nombraría tesorero de la sociedad en la próxima junta
(‘She shouted that she would — IND — appoint him treasurer of the society at the next meeting’)
- (229) Gritó que me agradecía haberle ayudado a cruzar la calle
(‘She shouted that she thanked — IND — me for having helped her cross the street’)

These sentences show that *gritar*, as a representative member of the class of *in a manner of speaking* predicates, may be involved in the reproduction of assertives, directives, commissives, and expressives. It shares this property with *decir*, which explains that both predicates elicit the same types of modal complementation in the subordinate clause.

(III) It is a wellknown fact that we do not only communicate by means of speech, but also make use of different kinds of kinetic signs to convey information. The class of predicates describing these non-verbal forms of communication includes, among other ones, the following members: *indicar* (‘to indicate’), *señalar* (‘to show’), *hacer señas* (‘make signs’). Our starting-point for the analysis is the following example:

- (230) Y haciendo con la mano una seña hacia donde estaban los líderes,
indicó a éstos que se acercaran
(‘And making a sign with his hand toward where the leaders were, he indicated to them that they should come — SUB — closer’)

As follows from the occurrence of *se acercaran* in the complement clause, the manual gesture referred to in this sentence is a directive gesture. Now, it is interesting to notice that non-verbal signs run parallel with verbal ones in that they not only express directive functions; they are also used to reproduce assertive, commissive, and expressive acts. Their reporting potential is illustrated by the following set of examples:

- (231) Y haciendo con la mano una seña, indicó que se acercaba el enemigo
(‘And making a sign with his hand, he indicated that the enemy was — IND — coming closer’)
- (232) Y haciendo con la mano una seña, indicó que atacaría al enemigo
(‘And making a sign with his hand, he indicated that he would — IND — attack the enemy’)

- (233) Y haciendo con la mano una seña, indicó que les daba la bienvenida
(‘And making a sign with his hand, he indicated that he welcomed —
IND — them’)

Drawing a comparison with the syntactic behavior of *decir* and *gritar*, we observe that the complement clause of *indicar* is also marked with the indicative mood when a report is made on an assertive, commissive, or expressive act. Note that in (232), according to our expectations, the reproduction of the commissive act triggers the use of the conditional.

(IV) It is an empirical fact that, when one looks at the relative frequency of communicative acts in general, and speech acts in particular, it is assertive and directive acts which play a major role in both verbal and non-verbal interaction. Indirect evidence for this is provided by the Spanish lexicon, and probably by that of most other languages, by virtue of the fact that it includes two predicates, *convencer* (‘to convince’) and *persuadir* (‘to persuade’), which denote the strong successfulness of the performance of assertives and directives. There are no predicates indicating the perlocutionary effects of commissives and expressives. The assertive interpretation of *convencer* and *persuadir* correlates with indicative complementation, the directive one with subjunctive or infinitive complementation, as shown by the following examples:

- (234) Nos ha convencido de que es mejor aplazar el viaje
(‘He convinced us that it is — IND — better to postpone the trip’)
- (235) Me ha persuadido de que es mejor esperar
(‘He persuaded me that it is — IND — better to wait’)
- (235) La he convencido de que se corte el pelo
(‘I convinced her to have — SUB — her hair cut’)
- (237) Pretende persuadirle a dejar de beber
(‘She is trying to persuade him to stop drinking’)

This chapter will be concluded with a diagram serving as a recapitulation of the classes of action predicates examined in Section 5.1.3.

Diagram 6

	Causative acts <i>causar, lograr, impedir</i>	Thinking <i>pensar, considerar, inferir</i>
Action predicates	Mental acts	Predicting <i>adivinar, prever, pronosticar</i>
		World-creating <i>fingir, imaginar, figurar</i>
	Speech acts	Assertives <i>admitir, advertir, negar</i>
		Directives <i>pedir, mandar, prohibir</i>
		Commissives <i>prometer, garantizar, jurar</i>
		Expressives <i>agradecer, perdonar, deplorar</i>

5.1.4 *The modal structure of noun clauses: A survey*

In Chapter 5.1 a proposal has been made for a semantic classification of clause-embedding predicates that claims to be *optimal* and *maximal*. *Optimal* means that the classification reflects in both a consistent and a coherent way that part of the world that is described by the predicates in question. Basically, these provide information on the three central modules of the input-output system underlying intentional human behavior, viz., the acquisition of knowledge, the storing and assessing of acquired knowledge, and the categories determining the output of intentional behavior, that is, specific categories of human action. The psycholinguistic model underlying the classification corresponds to insights already existing in various branches of science, as shown by the quotations from the work of Annis (1977), Kim (1977), Barwise and Perry (1981), and Fodor (1983); however, it has never been applied to the analysis of the modal system of the Spanish verb.

If we say that the classification is *maximal*, we claim that it includes all clause-embedding predicates of the language. Of course, each class has been investigated in terms of a relatively small number of instances; nevertheless,

we have not found evidence for the existence of predicates that could not be integrated into the classes and subclasses distinguished.⁶⁶

Summing up, then, the principal difference with previous research into the modal system of Spanish noun clauses lies in the fact that this has not been carried out within the framework of an exhaustive taxonomy of clause-embedding predicates.

5.2 Adverbial clauses

In 5 it was pointed out that a fundamental difference between noun clauses and adverbial clauses concerns the semantic status of the conjunctions introducing these clauses. Noun clause conjunctions are void of meaning; conjunctions introducing adverbial clauses, by contrast, specify the semantic relation between the main and the subordinate clause. This distinction derives from the grammatical function of both types of clauses. More strictly, noun clauses fill one of the argument slots of the matrix predicate, as a result of which this predicate may constrain the meaning of these clauses. Thus, for instance, the directive predicate *mandar* imposes the condition on the embedded proposition that it expresses a controllable state of affairs; the assertive predicate *informar*, on the other hand, does not impose any semantic condition on the embedded proposition; accordingly, what may be expressed by this proposition is an action, a process, a state, or a position. It follows that the class of noun clause conjunctions, which does not include more than two members, *que* and *si*, only performs the syntactic function of marking the boundary line between the matrix and the embedded clause. As a consequence, these conjunctions do not play any part in the semantic interpretation of the sentence.

For adverbial clauses the opposite situation holds. As they do not serve as fillers of an argument slot, they do not bear an intrinsic relation with the main predicate. It is for this reason that the information provided by these clauses is independent of the type of predicate occurring in the main clause. Note that, orthographically, the peripheral status of the adverbial clause is usually marked by comma punctuation.

Let us now illustrate the contrast between noun and adverbial clauses by means of a concrete example:

- (238) Cuando le encontré en Málaga, me dijo que pasaba las vacaciones allí
 ('When I met him in Málaga, he told me that he was — IND — spending his holidays there')

The adverbial clause introduced by *cuando* expresses temporal meaning, which is not necessarily elicited by the use of the main predicate *dijo*. This specification is optional, as shown by the fact that deletion of the subordinate clause does not affect grammaticality, which is equivalent to stating that *Me dijo que pasaba las vacaciones allí* is a wellformed sentence of Spanish. The noun clause introduced by *que*, on the other hand, fulfills a quite different function, which consists in specifying the meaning of *dijo*. The strong cohesion of the matrix and the complement clause can be formally demonstrated by the impossibility of deleting the latter, since such a deletion would produce an ungrammatical output: **Cuando le encontré en Málaga, me dijo*.

Summarizing the analysis, we can say that noun clauses specify the meaning of the matrix predicate, whereas adverbial clauses specify the meaning of the main clause.

In the next sections we will examine the different ways in which the meaning of the adverbial clause interacts with the distribution of the indicative and subjunctive mood. In accordance with the classification set up in 5 we will focus attention on the following categories: *time, manner, purpose, cause, consequence, concession, and condition*.

5.2.1 Temporal clauses

Conjunctions introducing temporal clauses can be split up into three classes according to whether they denote simultaneity, succession, or temporal specification. The following set of examples may serve to clarify this tripartite distinction:

- (239) *Mientras haya gente con hambre y sin trabajo, los ricos encontrarán un capataz para arrear a los pobres*
 ('As long as there are — SUB — people suffering hunger and being unemployed, the rich will find a foreman to hurry up the poor')
- (240) *Después que almorzó Joaquín, Antonio se levantó*
 ('After Joaquín had — IND — lunch, Antonio got up')
- (241) *Antes de que almorzara Joaquín, Antonio se levantó*
 ('Before Joaquín had — SUB — had lunch, Antonio got up')
- (242) *Cuando entró el fontanero, se me escapó el gato*
 ('When the plumber entered — IND -, the cat ran away')

The following comments are in order. (239) contains a description of strictly overlapping states of affairs. The simultaneity relation between the main and

the subordinate clause is explicitly indicated by the conjunction *mientras*. In (240) and (241) *después que* and *antes de que* establish the chronological order between the events described in the main and the subordinate clause. The use of *después que* creates a retrospective relation between the reported events by virtue of the fact that the main clause expresses the primary and the subordinate clause the secondary point of reference of the sentence. Within the same frame of reference, *antes de que* expresses a prospective relation between the two events. In (242), in conclusion, the clause introduced by *cuando* serves to specify the temporal setting of the main clause.

In what follows, the categories of simultaneity, succession, and temporal specification will be focused on in regard to the distribution of the indicative and subjunctive mood in the subordinate clause.

To start with the category of *simultaneity*, let us take up again example (239). From a truthfunctional perspective, the use of the subjunctive in the *mientras* clause reflects a typical instance of an *irrealis* state of affairs, as the speaker of the sentence is not in a position to determine the duration of the period referred to. Accordingly, the subordinate proposition is marked for non-specific temporal reference. As to pragmatic interpretation, therefore, we are dealing with a clause characterized by a relatively low degree of information value. The next point to be noticed is that *mientras* clauses are also compatible with the indicative mood. In this case, the relation of simultaneity typically applies to events taking place in the present or in the past, which means that reference is made to experienced or factual states of affairs. Consequently, the use of the indicative reflects the *realis* character of the overlapping events, as shown, for example, by:

- (243) Todos esperan impacientes, mientras ella lee tranquilamente el periódico
(‘Everyone is waiting impatiently, while she is — IND — quietly reading the newspaper’)

Evidently, positive truth value is also involved when simultaneous events are perceived as occurring more than once, so that both clauses are marked with iterative aspect. This situation is illustrated by:

- (244) Tiene la costumbre de cantar mientras se afeita
(‘He is in the habit of singing while he is — IND — shaving’)

Mientras not only expresses simultaneity of events; its use also implies that the speaker looks at the states of affairs described from a contrastive point of view. Since, in principle, the number of overlapping states of affairs is infinite, it

must be assumed that the particular selection made by the speaker serves the purpose of highlighting the non-expected or contrastive nature of the information provided. In this way, the use of *mientras* contributes to drawing attention to the relevance of that which is communicated. Further note that contrastivity is explicitly focused on when instead of *mientras*, *mientras que* or *en tanto que* is used. Consider, e.g.:

- (245) Yo me alojo en una pensión, mientras que él se hospeda en el Castellana Hilton
 ('I am staying at a guesthouse, whereas he is — IND — staying at Castellana Hilton')

From a syntactic point of view, one could argue that in sentences such as (245) no sharp boundaries can be drawn between subordination and coordination, as shown by the fact that *mientras que*—the same would apply to *en tanto que*—can be substituted for *pero* without the sentence becoming ungrammatical. A necessary condition for the substitution is the use of the indicative mood in the subordinate clause, as the adversative meaning requires the contrastive presentation of factual statements. Thus, substitution of *en tanto que* for *pero* is excluded in the following example, where the subjunctive clause expresses reference to an indeterminate period in the future:

- (246) Yo te esperaré en el aparcamiento, en tanto que tú estés en el mercado
 ('I shall wait for you in the parking lot, while you are — SUB — at the market')

We will now move on to sentences expressing *succession* of events. The prototypical conjunctions to be studied here are *antes de que* ('before') and *después (de) que* ('after'). Taking the temporal setting of the main clause as the primary point of reference, we find that *antes de que* expresses a prospective relation between the main and the subordinate clause, whereas *después (de) que* expresses a retrospective relation between these clauses. This contrast was already illustrated by (240) and (241). Now, as regards selection of mood, it is a wellknown rule of Spanish grammar that *antes de que* obligatorily triggers the use of the subjunctive. In this connection, Pérez Saldanya (1999: 3313) points out:

... la oración subordinada se construye en subjuntivo independientemente de la referencia temporal de la oración principal.
 ('... in the subordinate clause the subjunctive is used regardless of the temporal setting of the main clause')

The following examples are provided to support this statement:

- (247) a. Nos fuimos antes de que llegaran
(‘We left before they — SUB — arrived’)
b. Nos vamos antes de que lleguen
(‘We’re going to leave before they — SUB — arrive’)
c. Nos iremos antes de que lleguen
(‘We shall leave before the — SUB — arrive’)

It is obvious from these sentences that it is the criterion of prospectivity which causes the subjunctive to appear in the subordinate clause. More precisely, the event described in this clause is viewed as non-experienced or non-factual from the vantage point of the main clause, so that the *irrealis* interpretation imposes itself independently of whether the main predicate is inflected for past, present, or future tense.⁶⁷ As a consequence, we are concerned with the same anticipatory perspective as expressed in desiderative, causative, and directive sentences. Let us finally look at Pérez Saldanya’s analysis (1999: 3313) of (247a-c):

... en todos los casos el subjuntivo está exigido por el hecho de que la subordinada se refiere a un evento posterior al de la principal, a un evento no actualizado y, por lo tanto, virtual en el momento designado por esta oración.
(‘... in all these cases the subjunctive is required by virtue of the fact that the subordinated clause refers to an event subsequent to the one of the main clause, to an event that did not take place, so that it is virtual at the moment specified by this clause’)

Después (de) que indicates retrospectivity; that is, from the vantage point of the main clause the speaker looks back at the event described by the subordinate clause. On account of the factuality of this state of affairs, which necessarily reaches its completion point before the event of the main clause takes place, one would expect the indicative mood to be selected, and this is what happens in (240) *Después que almorzó Joaquín, Antonio se levantó*. In actual fact, however, the situation is much more complicated than what is suggested by the modal structure of this sentence. To see this more clearly let us focus our attention on the following set of examples:

- (248) Después que haya hecho visar mi pasaporte estaré a la disposición de usted
(‘After I have — SUB — had my passport visaed I shall be at your disposal’)
(249) Cinco ancianos suizos fueron ayer los primeros ex miembros de las Brigadas Internacionales que expresaron su deseo de convertirse en ciu-

dadanos españoles después de que el Consejo de Ministros de la semana pasada aprobara la correspondiente normativa legal
 ('Yesterday five elderly Swiss gentlemen were the first ex-members of the International Brigades who expressed their wish to become Spanish citizens after the Cabinet passed — SUB — last week the corresponding legal regulations')

- (250) La Habana decidió derribar las avionetas después de que hubiesen lanzado octavillas
 ('Havana decided to shoot down the light aircraft after they had — SUB — dropped pamphlets')

The use of the subjunctive in (248) must be accounted for as follows. Although, from a chronological point of view, the main and the subordinate clause are retrospectively ordered, the state of affairs expressed by the *después que* clause has not come into existence at the moment of speech; accordingly, it has to be taken as a virtual state of affairs marked by the low-priority subjunctive. The subjunctive forms of (249) and (250), however, have an entirely different origin. Here, the succession of events is in accordance with factual reality, so that the indicative is the mood one would expect to appear in the *después (de) que* clause; in other words, the use of the subjunctive forms *aprobara* and *hubiesen lanzado* comes as a surprise. In the literature, much attention has been devoted to the question of how to explain this apparent anomaly. In general, there is a consensus about the fact that, as far as discourse genre is concerned, sentences such as (249) and (250) are typical of what is commonly called *estilo periodístico*. Newspaper texts are characterized indeed by a relatively frequent use of the subjunctive in *después (de) que* clauses, but, of course, this fact in itself does not offer a valid explanation of the phenomenon. In the course of time, three kinds of attempts have been undertaken to account for the use of the subjunctive in factual *después (de) que* clauses. Firstly, an analogy has been postulated with the antonymous conjunction *antes de que*, which, as we have seen above, obligatorily triggers the use of the subjunctive.⁶⁸ Secondly, in regard to the use of the *-ra* forms of the imperfect and pluperfect subjunctive, a historical explanation has been sought in the etymology of the paradigm, which, as is generally known, has developed from the indicative pluperfect of Latin. For some authors, then, the *-ra* ending of *aprobara* in (249) would not represent subjunctive, but indicative inflection. Consider, e.g., the following survey by Fernández Alvarez (1987: 131):

Este (el valor indicativo, H. H.) era el valor etimológico de esta forma, valor que se mantiene vivo hasta el siglo XVII. Durante el XIX, según Bello, fue utilizada por

todo tipo de escritores. Hoy se emplea cada vez menos en la literatura creativa, pero se ha refugiado su uso en redacciones de periódicos y emisoras de radio y televisión, donde se la considera más elegante, llegando a una verdadera inflación de formas en *-ra*. Aparece normalmente en oraciones temporales y adjetivas sustituyendo al pretérito pluscuamperfecto y al indefinido.

(‘This value was the etymological value of the form, i.e., the value attributed to it until the 17th century. During the 19th century, according to Bello, it was used by all kinds of writers. Today it is employed less and less in creative literature, but it remains in use in newspapers and radio and television stations, where it is considered more elegant, which leads to a real inflation or *ra*-forms. It normally appears in temporal and adjective clauses as a substitute for the pluperfect and the preterite’)

It follows from this exposition that the occurrence of the forms of the *-ra* paradigm is not restricted to clauses introduced by *después (de) que*. The phenomenon manifests itself in temporal clauses in general as well as in relative clauses. Compare, for instance, the two following examples:

- (251) La comunidad internacional se plegó a esa tesis desde que en 1973 lo hiciera Estados Unidos
(‘The international community submitted to that thesis since the United States did — SUB — so in 1973’)
- (252) La pareja, que se hiciera famosa por interpretar el papel de marido y mujer en *El pájaro espino*, es en la vida real un matrimonio feliz
(‘The couple risen — SUB — to fame for their interpretation of the role of husband and wife in *El pájaro espino*, is in real life a happily married couple’)

Needless to say, the etymological explanation for the use of the *-ra* forms does not apply to sentences such as (250), where the pluperfect form *hubiesen* represents the output of the *-se* paradigm, which, both in Latin and in Spanish, forms an authentic part of the subjunctive conjugation of the verb. Ridruejo (1999: 3315), in conclusion, points out that if the *-ra* forms are selected, the imperfect is much more common than the pluperfect, a tendency which is confirmed by sentences (249), (251), and (252).

Let us look next at the third explanation for the appearance of the subjunctive in factual *después (de) que* clauses. Here, we are dealing with the general pragmatic principle according to which the use of the subjunctive correlates with the expression of a low degree of relevance. This interpretation would apply indeed to a large extent to *después (de) que* clauses, which usually provide background information inferrable from the context or situation of utterance. Consider, e.g., the following statement:

The *-ra* form can be used to mark information which readers or hearers of the news are expected to know, i.e. information mentioned in a previous edition or a prior paragraph, or information which is assumed to be common knowledge. In journalistic prose, which is very rich in information, this use of the *-ra* form marks low-priority clauses to which readers can safely pay less attention than they can to high-priority, indicative marked clauses (Lunn and Cravens (1991: 150)

Referring to an example such as:

- (253) Al día siguiente de que Isabel Preysler... iniciase en un chalet de Marbella su veraneo, según informamos en la página 44 de este número...

(‘The day after Isabel Preysler... went — SUB — away on summer vacation to a house in Marbella, as we report on page 44 of this edition...’)

Lunn and Cravens reject the idea that the *-ra* paradigm has indicative value, their argument being that the *-se* forms occur in exactly the same pragmatic contexts. Both paradigms, therefore, consist of competing forms for the expression of background information.

The last question to be raised bears on the distribution of the indicative and the subjunctive mood in the *después (de) que* clause. Unlike what seems to be suggested by the foregoing statement, the indicative is also used to mark the retrospective relation between the main and the subordinate clause without it being clear that it fulfills the specific function of highlighting propositional content. This means that there are cases where no pragmatic distinction holds between the indicative and the subjunctive, which leads to the conclusion that free variation is at issue. A relevant example is provided by Pérez Saldanya (1999: 3314):

- (254) Nos fuimos después de que {intentaron / intentaran} agredirnos
(‘We left after they attempted — IND / SUB — to attack us’)

His comment runs as follows:

... el indicativo y el subjuntivo pueden alternar en la subordinada sin que se altere el valor de verdad ni se introduzcan diferencias importantes de significado.

(‘... the indicative and subjunctive may alternate in the subordinate clause without this leading to a change in truth value or the introduction of important differences of meaning’)

To conclude this section we will examine the category of *temporal specification*, which was illustrated by example (242) *Cuando entró el fontanero, se me escapó el gato*. Now, the temporal setting of the main clause can be specified in three different ways:

- (I) the subordinate clause locates the event of the main clause in a certain period or at a certain point in time;
- (II) the subordinate clause marks the beginning of the event of the main clause;
- (III) the subordinate clause marks the completion point of the event of the main clause.

These situations will be discussed in the order given.

(I) There is a variety of conjunctions introducing temporal clauses that mark the location of the main clause in time. The principal ones are *cuando* ('when'), *en cuanto* ('as soon as'), *tan pronto como* ('as soon as'), *cada vez que* ('whenever'), and *siempre que* ('whenever'). Among these conjunctions *cuando* plays a central role by virtue of its semantic flexibility; which explains its relatively high frequency of occurrence. Let us consider the following three examples:

- (255) Se llevó una terrible sorpresa cuando entró en su habitación
(‘He was terribly surprised when he entered — IND — his room’)
- (256) Cuando viene a visitarnos, siempre nos trae una botella de vino chileno
(‘When he visits — IND — us, he always brings us a bottle of Chilean wine’)
- (257) No encontrará a nadie cuando llegue
(‘He will not find anyone when he arrives — SUB —’)

The *cuando* clause of (255) refers to a particular moment in the past specifying the temporal setting of the event expressed by the main clause. The use of the *pretérito indefinido* marks an experienced state of affairs, as a result of which the indicative mood is obligatorily selected. The state of affairs expressed by the temporal clause of (256) also corresponds with factual reality. Note however that in this case positive truth value is not restricted to one particular situation: the sentence is marked with iterative aspect, so that the event referred to repeats itself an indefinite number of times. It is easy to see that this interpretation is supported by the occurrence of the adverb *siempre* in the main clause. In (257) the use of the subjunctive mood reflects the *irrealis* status of the temporal clause. Since the speaker of the sentence represents the event referred to as a virtual event, which is supposed to take place at a non-specific moment in the future, the *cuando* clause expresses a relatively low degree of information value. It should be borne in mind, however, that

cuando clauses oriented towards the future do not necessarily require the use of the subjunctive. Compare, for instance, the following newspaper fragment:

- (258) Pero también constituye un experimento para un futuro no muy lejano cuando el enemigo de ayer, el imperio soviético, en decadencia, se convertirá en la nueva Rusia que deberá formar parte de la Europa del futuro
(‘But it is also an experiment for the near future when the enemy of yesterday, the Soviet empire, fallen into decline, will — IND — become the new Russia that must form part of Europe in the future’)

Through the use of the future indicative the writer of this sentence communicates his conviction that the proposition expressed in the *cuando* clause will come true in the near future. A parallel can be drawn here with prediction predicates, where we found that the use of the future tense reflects the force of the claim that the state of affairs in question will come into existence.⁶⁹ Finally note that the temporal potential of *cuando* also includes the expression of simultaneity, so that it may operate as a synonym of *mientras*. The following example admits this interpretation:

- (259) Cuando ella paseaba al perro, su madre miraba la televisión
(‘While she was — IND — walking the dog, her mother was watching television’)

To recapitulate, the distribution of mood in *cuando* clauses shows the following pattern. The indicative is used in both factual and non-factual clauses. The former situation has been demonstrated by examples (255) and (256), which contain a description of experienced facts in the past and in the present. In either case, the sentence may be marked with iterative aspect. Iterative aspect is further compatible with simultaneity, as illustrated by (259). Non-factuality is expressed by the future indicative; it is inherent in statements with a strong predictive force. The subjunctive, lastly, appears in the temporal clause of sentences such as (257) as a reflection of the *irrealis* interpretation to be attributed to anticipated states of affairs.

Next, we will discuss in some detail the modal pattern of clauses introduced by *en cuanto* (‘as soon as’) and *tan pronto como* (‘as soon as’). These conjunctions differ from *cuando* in that they introduce subordinate clauses denoting a marked temporal relation with the main clause. The marker involved bears upon the immediate sequence of the events described by the main and the subordinate clause. Evidently, the notion of sequence evokes an affinity with the chronological order denoted by *después (de) que*. However,

the latter conjunction differs from *en cuanto* and *tan pronto como* in that it basically serves to specify the temporal setting of the main clause, without the feature of immediate sequence playing a crucial role in that specification.

To shed light on modal distribution, let us compare the following examples:

- (260) En cuanto volvió a casa, le dije que te llamara
(‘As soon as he came — IND — home, I told him to call you up’)
- (261) Tan pronto como llegue, haga el favor de pasarlo a mi despacho
(‘As soon as he arrives — SUB — , would you mind showing him to my office?’)

In the first sentence, *volvió a casa* reports on an experienced fact in the past, which is the trigger for the use of the indicative mood. In the second sentence, we are dealing with the prototypical use of the subjunctive involved in the expression of an anticipated state of affairs.

Just like *mientras* and *cuando*, *en cuanto* and *tan pronto como* may introduce iterative clauses. Compare, for instance:

- (262) En cuanto anocheecía, cerraba las ventanas
(‘As soon as night fell — IND — , he closed the windows’)

Iterative aspect, in conclusion, is emphasized in temporal clauses introduced by *cada vez que* and *siempre que*.⁷⁰ Since the description of recurring states of affairs may or may not be based on experienced events, both the indicative and the subjunctive mood appear in iterative clauses. This is illustrated by the following examples:

- (263) Siempre que voy a su casa, lo encuentro mirando la televisión
(‘Whenever I go — IND — to his home, I find him watching television’)
- (264) Cada vez que vengas a verme, quiero que me traigas un regalo
(‘Whenever you come — SUB — to see me, I want you to bring me a present’)

(II) Subordinate clauses marking the beginning of the event expressed by the main clause are generally introduced by the conjunction *desde que*. This type of clauses shows modal variation, as may be seen from the following set of examples:

- (265) Desde que vive en Albuquerque, no padece de los bronquios
(‘Since she has lived — IND — in Albuquerque, she has not suffered with her bronchi’)

- (266) Estoy muy triste desde que él se marchó
(‘I have been very sad since he left — IND —’)
- (267) La comunidad internacional se plegó a esa tesis desde que en 1973 lo hiciera Estados Unidos
(‘The international community has submitted to that thesis since the United States did — SUB — so in 1973’)

The first point to be mentioned is that all three *desde que* clauses describe real states of affairs. What differs is the modal representation of these facts. Thus, in (265) the present indicative refers to an imperfective situation holding at the moment of speech. The preterite indicative of (266) and the imperfect subjunctive of (267), by contrast, refer to perfective events that took place in the past. The central question to be posed, of course, is how to account for the modal distinction between these two sentences. We are already familiar with the pragmatic interpretation of the subjunctive defined in terms of low priority information; remember, e.g., the analysis of the *-ra* paradigm of *después (de) que* clauses. This orientation is also followed by Pérez Saldanya in his explanation of the use of *hiciera* in (267):

... en este caso, la subordinada se construye con subjuntivo y designa un evento factual que es altamente conocido y que sirve para enunciar la información de la oración principal (1999: 3316).
(‘... in this case, the subordinate clause takes the subjunctive and describes a factual event which is generally known and serves to express the information of the main clause’)

The backgrounding interpretation of the *desde que* clause does not seem implausible at all. But how to explain the indicative inflection of *se marchó* in (266)? Are we dealing here with foregrounding of the information conveyed by the subordinate clause? The answer seems to be in the affirmative. *Desde que él se marchó* does not only mark the beginning of the period referred to by *estoy muy triste*, but establishes a causal link with the content of the main clause. More specifically, it indicates the reason why the speaker is in the emotional state identified by *estoy muy triste*. It must be assumed, therefore, that highlighting of this information accounts for the use of the indicative.

I wish to conclude with a discourse fragment, where, at first sight, it does not seem an easy task to properly distinguish between a foregrounding and a backgrounding interpretation. It can be argued, however, that the indicative clause, which is embedded in a contrastive context, emphasizes the beginning of the event expressed by the main clause, whereas the subjunctive appears in an unmarked clause providing generally known information:

- (268) Desde que ganara las elecciones, la popularidad del canciller [Helmut Kohl, H. H.] ha sido en descenso, pero ha sido en los últimos meses cuando la caída ha cogido velocidad. Nunca, desde que subió al poder, las encuestas le habían situado a tanta distancia del líder de la oposición ('Since he won — SUB — the elections, the popularity of the chancellor has decreased, but it has been in the last months that his fall has gathered speed. Never, since he came — IND — to power, have the polls situated him at such a great distance from the leader of the opposition')

(III) Subordinate clauses marking the completion point of the event expressed by the main clause are introduced by *hasta que* ('until'). This conjunction is comparable with *antes de que* in so far as it establishes a prospective relation between the main and the subordinate clause; the state of affairs described in the latter chronologically follows the one described in the former. The modal behavior of the clauses introduced by these conjunctions, however, is not identical. In regard to *antes de que*, we have seen that prospectivity is the criterion that invariably selects the use of the subjunctive mood. The reason for this is that the state of affairs described by the temporal clause is viewed as a virtual state of affairs, regardless of whether its point of reference is located in the past, the present, or the future. In *hasta que* clauses, by contrast, a different perspective prevails, as it is not the reference point of the main clause but the moment of speech which serves as the vantage point for locating the subordinate proposition in time. Therefore, both the indicative and the subjunctive may appear as fillers of the modal slot of the clause. The following examples show the basic patterns of distribution:

- (269) Mis padres tienen la costumbre de leer hasta que se duermen ('My parents are in the habit of reading until they fall — IND — asleep')
- (270) Esperaré hasta que vuelva ('I shall wait until she returns — SUB —')
- (271) Había estado trabajando de camarera en un puesto de refrescos en medio de la carretera hasta que la echaron por tomarse las bebidas del puesto sin pagarlas de su bolsillo ('She had worked as a waitress in a kiosk along the main road until they threw — IND — her out because she had taken drinks from the kiosk without paying for them out of her own pocket')

The interpretation of the modal variation shown by these sentences does not pose special problems. (269) is marked for iterative aspect. Since the facts

described by the main and the subordinate clause are presented as experienced facts, the use of the indicative mood is required. The *hasta que* clause of (270) contains a description of a non-realized state of affairs, which is the trigger for the use of the subjunctive. The *hasta que* clause of (271), in conclusion, is marked for positive truth value by virtue of the fact that it expresses an evidenced event which took place in the past. Accordingly, the indicative mood is selected.

5.2.2 Manner clauses

Manner clauses specify the different ways in which the state of affairs expressed by the main clause manifests itself in the real world or in a virtual world not holding at the moment of speech. In truthfunctional terms, this implies that the subordinate clause must be attributed a *realis* or an *irrealis* interpretation, so that both the indicative and the subjunctive may appear as fillers of the modal slot of the clause. Commonly used manner conjunctions are *como* ('as'), *a medida que* ('as'), *según (que)* ('as'), *conforme* ('in accordance with'), *como si* ('as if'), and *cual si* ('as if'). Examples (272)–(277) will serve as our frame of reference for the analysis of the modal pattern of the subordinate clause:

(272) Me limitaré a contarlo como a mí me han explicado
(‘I shall tell it just as they explained — IND — it to me’)

(273) Les entregaban un programa a medida que iban entrando
(‘They were given a program as they entered — IND —’)

The manner clauses of both of these sentences describe real facts evidenced in the past, which accounts for the use of the indicative forms *han explicado* and *iban entrando*. As may be seen from the latter example, *a medida que* does not only indicate in which way the action of the main clause is performed; the conjunction also expresses a one-to-one correspondence between the different phases of the events denoted by the main and the subordinate clause.

(274) Según que haga frío o calor, me pondré un traje u otro
(‘Depending on whether it is — SUB — cold or warm, I shall put on one of these dresses’)

(275) Lo haré todo conforme me digas
(‘I shall do everything in accordance with what you tell — SUB — me’)

In these sentences, the subjunctive forms *haga* and *digas* mark in a protop-

typical way the anticipated states of affairs described by the corresponding manner clauses. From a pragmatic point of view, (274) and (275) are instances of the correlation between indeterminate truth function and low information value.

- (276) Era algo muy lejano, pero se le presentaba delante de los ojos como si hubiese ocurrido la tarde anterior
(‘It was something from the distant past, but he saw it as clearly as if it had — SUB — happened the afternoon before’)
- (277) Huyó cual si alguien le persiguiera
(‘She fled as if someone was pursuing — SUB — her’)

The conjunctions *como si* and *cual si* fulfill the particular function of introducing counterfactual clauses. Exceptionally, in certain emphatic contexts, the use of the indicative is possible (Ridruejo 1999: 3317), but, normally, these conjunctions require the use of the imperfect or pluperfect subjunctive since the state of affairs specified by the manner clause is incompatible with positive truth value. Herein lies the difference with anticipated states of affairs, which may come into existence, and often do come into existence. Now, comparing the present subjunctives of (274) and (275) and the imperfect and pluperfect subjunctive of (276) and (277), we reach the conclusion that the temporal difference involved correlates, respectively, with a relatively low and low degree of truthfunctional information. Note that the distinction can also be looked at from an iconic perspective by virtue of the fact that the imperfect and pluperfect tense suggest a mental space situated at a greater distance from the moment of speech than the one suggested by the present tense. Extending the comparison to examples (53) *¡Quién fuera su señoría para no tener que lavar!* (‘What I wouldn’t give to be your honor, so that I wouldn’t have to do the washing!’) and (55) *¡Ojalá le hubieses dicho la verdad!* (‘If only you had told him the truth!’), we find that the expression of counterfactuality triggers the use of the imperfect and the pluperfect subjunctive, independently of the syntactic configuration of the sentence. Other relevant cases in point are certain concessive and conditional sentences, which will be treated in Sections 5.2.5 and 5.2.6. For present purposes, compare *Aunque el prisionero hubiese gritado, no habríais oído sus gritos* (‘Even if the prisoner had — SUB — shouted, you would not have heard his cries’) and *Si el prisionero hubiese gritado, no habríais oído sus gritos* (‘If the prisoner had — SUB — shouted, you would not have heard his cries’).

5.2.3 Purpose clauses

Purpose clauses show an intrinsic relationship with cause, consequence, concession, and condition-indicating clauses, since all of these are involved in the expression of the different angles from which cause-effect processes in general and causal processes underlying intentional behavior in particular can be focused on. More precisely, purpose-indicating clauses refer to the output of intentional behavior highlighting actions that are performed to achieve specific goals. Cause and consequence-indicating clauses both describe cause-effect relations; cause-indicating clauses may further specify reasons for displaying particular forms of behavior. Concession-indicating clauses describe situations where an expected causal relation fails to obtain. Condition-indicating clauses, lastly, specify the general circumstances under which cause-effect processes take place or intended results of actions are attained. In this connection, consider the following survey of the causality network described:

El ámbito semántico de la causalidad abarca cinco relaciones diferentes (causales propiamente dichas, finales, condicionales, concesivas y consecutivas), que se organizan según la particular concepción que en cada una de ellas se establece entre la causa y el efecto, pues todas, aunque desde distintas perspectivas, inciden en uno u otro contenido. En la causa, esto es, en aquello que desencadena una acción, se fundamentan las oraciones causales, las condicionales y las concesivas. En el efecto se basan las finales y las consecutivas; por último, las causales y finales tienen en cuenta el proceso causa-efecto en su totalidad (Galán Rodríguez 1999: 3599).

(‘The semantic field of causality covers five different relationships (cause, purpose, condition, concession and consecutive relations), which are organized in accordance with the particular conception established in each of these cases between the cause and the effect, since, though from different perspectives, all these relations bear on one of the above concepts. Causal, conditional and concessive sentences are oriented to the cause, that is, that which triggers an action. Purpose denoting and consecutive sentences are oriented to the effect; finally, cause and purpose denoting sentences focus on the cause-effect process in its entirety’)

The present section contains an analysis of purpose-indicating clauses. The categories of cause, consequence, concession, and condition will be discussed in Sections 5.2.4, 5.2.5, and 5.2.6.

The modal structure of *purpose clauses* can be defined in negative terms by pointing to the fact that the occurrence of the indicative mood is excluded. A definition in positive terms requires a distinction to be made between the use of the subjunctive and the infinitive. The selection process is the same as the

one outlined in regard to desiderative sentences and sentences describing causative acts. Remember, for instance, the difference between (149) *Quiero acostarme temprano esta noche* ('I want to go to bed tonight early') and (150) *Quiero que te acuestes temprano esta noche* ('I want you to go to bed tonight early'), based on the identity versus the non-identity of the referents of the subjects of the main and the subordinate clause. Now, the principle of coreference also applies to purpose clauses, as shown for example, by:

- (278) Carmen se esconde para poder espiar a los vecinos
(‘Carmen is hiding in order to spy on the neighbors’)
- (279) Carmen se esconde para que no la vea nadie
(‘Carmen is hiding so that nobody will see- SUB — her’)

The subjunctive form *vea* in (279) has the same origin as *te acuestes* in (150): the state of affairs specified by the purpose clause is an anticipated state of affairs viewed from the vantage point of the main clause; for this reason, its truth value cannot be determined. In other words: “Purpose clauses, which refer to future actions relative to the main verb, always govern a subjunctive...; purpose clauses have indeterminate truth value...” (Kleiman 1974: 162).

As a variant of *para que* we also find *por que*, as illustrated by an example such as:

- (280) Una deseosa prisa por que se viniese abajo hasta la última piedra le acuciaba
(‘He was driven by an eager hurry to cause it to collapse — SUB — down to the last stone’)

Instead of *por que*, some writers prefer the spelling *porque* thus transforming the conjunction into a homograph of its causal counterpart *porque*. It follows that there is no consensus about the proper orthographic representation of the word:

No existe unanimidad en las obras lexicográficas ni en los textos normativos sobre la manera como se tiene que escribir esta conjunción cuando presenta valor final (Pérez Saldanya 1999: 3309).

(‘There is no agreement in lexicographical studies nor in normative texts concerning the way this conjunction has to be written when it expresses purpose’)

A second variant of *para que*, which consists in its reduction to *que*, is found in imperative sentences, where the purpose clause expresses the intended result of the directive action. Consider, e.g.:

- (281) Abre ahí, que se ventile esto
(‘Open the window over there, so that the room is — SUB — ventilated’)
- (282) Ve y denúncialo a la brigadilla, que lo investiguen
(‘Report this to the squad, so that they investigate — SUB — it’)

In addition to *para que*, *por que* (*porque*), and *que*, the class of purpose-indicating conjunctions consists of a set of complex prepositional expressions such as *a fin de que* (‘with the aim that’), *con la intención de que* (‘with the intention of’), *con el propósito de que* (‘with the purpose of’), *con el objeto de que* (‘in order that’), and *con la finalidad de que* (‘with the aim that’). These constructions share the property of including a noun phrase which explicitly refers to the concepts of purpose, goal, or intention. Needless to say, this class of conjunctions also governs the subjunctive mood. Purpose clauses specifying movement predicates represent a special case because they fill one of the argument slots of the matrix predicate. This is formally reflected by the use of the directional preposition *a*, which amalgamates with the conjunction *que*. The following example may serve as an illustration:

- (283) Hemos venido a que nos devolváis lo que nos pertenece
(‘We have come with the purpose of asking you to give — SUB — us back what belongs to us’)

Finally, attention should be drawn to the class of purpose clauses indicating that the performance of the action expressed by the main clause is necessary in order to avoid bringing about an undesirable state of affairs. The preventive meaning of these clauses requires the presence of a negative marker. Syntactically, they maintain a paratactic relation with the main clause, as illustrated by the following examples:

- (284) Escribe cuando llegues, no piensen que ya no les importas
(‘Write when you arrive, so that they do not think that they do — SUB — not mean a thing to you any more’)
- (285) Me voy, no sea que aparezca tu padre y nos descubra
(‘I am going to leave to prevent your father from discovering — SUB — us when he turns up’)

5.2.4 Cause and consequence clauses

Speakers wishing to describe a cause-effect relation can make a choice

between two different perspectives: a causal perspective and a consecutive perspective. If the latter is chosen, the causally related events are represented in the chronological order in which they take place. Viewed from the causal point of view, the events are represented in a non-chronological order, the description of the effect preceding that of the cause. Let us illustrate both situations by means of two pairs of examples:

- (286) *Saca buenas notas porque estudia mucho*
 ('She gets good marks because she studies — IND — hard')
- (287) *No puede venir porque se le ha dislocado el pie*
 ('She cannot come because her foot has — IND — been dislocated')

In these sentences the causally related events are represented in a non-chronological order. Reverting the perspective we get the chronological order inherent in the consecutive representation of the events:

- (288) *Estudia mucho, de modo que saca buenas notas*
 ('She studies hard so that she gets — IND — good marks')
- (289) *Se le ha dislocado el pie, de manera que no puede venir*
 ('Her foot has been dislocated so that she cannot — IND — come')

There are no problems with respect to modal distribution: the indicative dominates the pattern of both the causal and the consecutive clause of the sentence, as cause-effect relations are based on states of affairs that are taken to correspond with factual reality. Evidence for this is provided by Kleiman (1974: 162), who points out that a response to:

- (290) *Le haré un regalo ya que salió bien del examen*
 ('I shall give him a present because he passed — IND — the exam')

in terms of *¿Y salió bien del examen?* ('And did he pass the exam?') would be inappropriate, since one should not question information that is presupposed to be true.

Lastly note that the factuality of the cause-indicating clause can be demonstrated by deleting the conjunction, as a result of which the original clause surfaces as an autonomous assertion. In the case of (290) this would produce the following output:

- (290) a. *Salió bien del examen; le haré un regalo*
 ('He passed the exam; I shall give him a present')

Similarly, instead of (289), we could get:

- (289) a. Se le ha dislocado le pie; no puede venir
(‘Her foot has been dislocated; she cannot come’)

In the remainder of this section we will elaborate on the specific characteristics of the causal clause, on the one hand, and the consecutive one, on the other. We will start with the latter.

Consecutive clauses can be subdivided into *consecutivas coordinadas* and *consecutivas subordinadas* (Pérez Saldanya 1999: 3295). The *consecutivas coordinadas* are compatible with the use of a relatively wide variety of conjunctions. Thus, in addition to *de modo que* (‘so that’) and *de manera que* (‘so that’) — compare (288) and (289) — we find *por (lo) tanto* (‘therefore’), *pues* (‘so’), and *por consiguiente* (‘consequently’). Let us look at the following examples:

- (291) Todo está dicho ya; por tanto, es mejor que no sigas
(‘Everything has already been said; therefore it is better not to continue’)
- (292) Te lo dije y no me hiciste caso, pues no te quejes
(‘I told you but you did not listen to me, so do not complain’)
- (293) Mañana es día festivo, y por consiguiente los bancos están cerrados
(‘Tomorrow is a public holiday; consequently, banks are closed’)

These sentences show that *por tanto*, *pues*, and *por consiguiente* establish a paratactic link between the cause and the consequence clause. The following syntactic arguments support this observation. Firstly, the comma and semicolon punctuation is indicative of the pause intonation separating the cause and the consequence clause in spoken language. Secondly, according to the conjunction selected, *y*-insertion is possible, as shown, e.g., by (293). Due to its standard coordinative function, this conjunction marks in an unambiguous way the independent syntactic status of each of the clauses. Thirdly, and most important for the present analysis, the first clause of the sentence does not exert any control over the modal structure of the second one. Note, for instance, that the negative imperative *no te quejes* in (292) could never be the output of any mood-governing trigger.

The *consecutivas subordinadas* do not merely consist of a cause and a consequence-indicating clause. The interpretation of these clauses also involves other elements of meaning, as illustrated, for instance, by :

- (294) Colocaré el reverbero de manera que su luz se derrame sobre el libro de usted

(‘I shall place the lamp so that its light will — SUB — shine on your book’)

- (295) Lo pongo aquí de modo que no lo vea nadie
(‘I’m putting it here so that no one will — SUB — see it’)

In these sentences, *de manera que* and *de modo que* are semantically equivalent to *de tal manera que* (‘in such a way that’) and *de tal modo que* (‘in such a way that’). Specifically, the meaning of these conjunctions represents an amalgamation of the categories of consequence, purpose and manner. Note however that there is no doubt concerning the fact that it is the category of purpose which triggers the use of the subjunctive in the subordinate clause; *su luz se derrame sobre el libro de usted* and *no lo vea nadie* refer to desired, i.e., anticipated states of affairs. We could also say that the basic meaning of (294) and (295) would not be affected if the conjunctions *de manera que* and *de modo que* were substituted for *para que*.

When the cause indicating clause is negated, the consequence clause is marked by indicative or subjunctive mood, according to whether the syntactic relation between the two clauses is based on coordination or subordination. Consider the discussion of the following examples (Pérez Saldanya 1999: 3296–3297):

- (296) No le contesté, de manera que se {sintió / *sintiese} ofendido
(‘I did not answer him, so that he felt — IND / *SUB — offended’)
- (297) No le contesté de manera que se {*sintió/sintiese} ofendido
(‘I did not answer him in such a way that he felt — *IND / SUB — offended’)

(296) contains a coordination of two assertions. The negation of the cause-indicating clause, therefore, does not exert control over the consequence clause, and, as a result, the indicative mood is selected in the latter. In (297), by contrast, the negation of the main clause determines the subjunctive output of the subordinate one, since what is communicated by this sentence is that the consequence *se sintiese ofendido* fails to manifest itself.

If an imperative main clause precedes, the purpose interpretation of *de tal manera que* and *de tal modo que* is strongly foregrounded. Compare, for instance:

- (298) ¡Rodeen el edificio de tal manera que no pueda escapar nadie!
(‘Surround the building so that no one can — SUB — escape!’)

Lastly note that *para que*, the conjunction pre-eminently employed for

expressing the category of purpose, may also indicate a consecutive relation between the main and the subordinate clause. In this case, the main clause does not specify an intentional action to achieve a particular goal, but rather expresses a necessary condition for the event of the subordinate clause to take place. This special use of *para que* is illustrated by:

- (299) Hablaba suficientemente bien el español para que le entendiésemos
(‘He spoke Spanish sufficiently well for us to understand — SUB — him’)

We now move on to the analysis of consecutive relations involving a comparative assessment. Consider the following examples:

- (300) Estaba tan oscuro que era imposible leer
(‘It was so dark that it was — IND — impossible to read’)
- (301) Me dijo tanto sobre la belleza de aquella actriz que fui verla
(‘She told me so much about the beauty of that actress that I went - IND — to see her’)

It is easy to see that in these sentences the conjunction operates as a discontinuous constituent due to the fact that the comparative markers *tan* and *tanto* necessarily precede the object of comparison. The use of the indicative mood is predictable because of the factuality of the states of affairs expressed by the consequence clauses. Modification of this modal pattern may be brought about by two different factors, as illustrated by the following examples:

- (302) No estaba tan oscuro que fuera imposible leer
(‘It was not dark enough for it to be — SUB — impossible to read’)
- (303) Ofrézcale tanto dinero que podamos estar seguros de su colaboración
(‘Offer him enough money so that we can — SUB — be sure of his collaboration’)

In both sentences, the *que*-clause expresses an unreal state of affairs. The *irrealis*-interpretations involved, however, have a different source: in (302) we are dealing with counterfactuality, while the imperative main clause of (303) generates an intentional space filled up with an anticipated state of affairs.

Special attention should be devoted to the modal behavior of clauses introduced by the conjunction *de ahí que*, the meaning of which has been defined in the following way:

Expresión consecutiva que sirve para enunciar una consecuencia de algo que se ha dicho antes. Entre el antecedente y la consecuencia se hace una pausa, representada en la escritura por punto y coma (Moliner 1998a: 98).

(‘A consecutive expression which serves to indicate a consequence of something that has been said before. Between the antecedent and the consequence clause a pause is inserted, which is orthographically represented by a semi-collon’)

For illustration purposes, let us focus on the two following examples:

- (304) Gana poco; de ahí que a veces tenga que pedir prestado
 (‘He does not earn much; that is why there are times when he has —
 SUB — to borrow money’)
- (305) El clima es seco; de ahí que no haya prados naturales
 (‘The climate is dry; that is why there are — SUB — no natural
 meadows’)

The appearance of the subjunctive mood in the *de ahí que*-clauses can be explained as follows. Both clauses make reference to an actual fact, namely, the poor pecuniary situation of the person referred to by the subject in (304) and the absence of natural meadows in (305). Now, this information is presupposed to be known by the hearer. It may be inferrable, for instance, from the discourse context, so that one could think of a polyphonous interpretation of the *de ahí que*-clauses in so far as they echo a question asked by the interlocutor. In the examples under review, compare, e.g., *¿Por qué tiene que pedir dinero?* (‘Why does he have to borrow money?’) and *¿Por qué no hay prados naturales?* (‘Why are there no natural meadows?’), respectively. Note that, whatever the source of the information conveyed by the consequence clause, it has to be considered background information, not intended to be primarily brought to the attention of the hearer. As a corollary, it is the cause-indicating clause which represents the communicative core of the sentence. The conclusion to be drawn from all this is that *de ahí que*-clauses typically transmit low-priority information.

Finally note that the indicative mood sporadically occurs in the *de ahí que*-clause. Therefore, Gil and Banús’ claim (1988: 230) that the use of the subjunctive is obligatory, is too strong. Consider, for example:

- (306) Es decir, la analogía se refiere siempre a un atributo abstracto o a algún efecto psicológico compartido por dos objetos totalmente dispares. De ahí que el descubrimiento de analogías entre fenómenos distintos supone un esfuerzo intelectual importante...
 (‘That is to say, the analogy always bears on an abstract attribute or a psychological effect shared by two entirely different objects. That is why the discovery of analogies between different phenomena involves —
 IND — an important intellectual effort’)

In this fragment of a study on metaphor, the *de ahí que*-clause expresses the conclusion drawn from the argument put forward in the preceding context. Consequently, the use of the indicative mood reflects the priority or impact of the information contained by the consequence clause. It is not irrelevant to this interpretation that, unlike what we have seen thus far, the conjunction is not preceded by a semi-colon but by a full stop.

The analysis of *cause-indicating clauses* should draw on the different causal connections that may hold between the main and the subordinate clause. By way of introduction, let us look at the following exposition, which starts with a mini-dialogue:

A: — Ese chico está loco.

B: — ¿Por qué?

La pregunta *¿Por qué?* encierra aquí una ambigüedad inherente. Por un lado, el que la formula puede estar pidiendo información sobre la causa de la locura del chico, en cuyo caso una respuesta relevante sería: *Porque ha sufrido una grave lesión cerebral*. Por otro lado, la misma pregunta puede servir también para elicitar al interlocutor una justificación de su acto verbal. En ese caso, lo que desea saber el que hace la pregunta es en qué argumentos se fundamenta la aserción. Esta interpretación de la pregunta sería compatible con una respuesta como: *Porque se comporta de una manera idiota*" (Haverkate 1986: 688)

(‘A: — That boy is mad. B: — Why? Here the question *why* contains an inherent ambiguity. On the one hand, the person posing the question may be asking information about the cause of the boy’s madness, in which case a relevant answer would be: ‘Because he suffered serious brain damage’. On the other hand, the same question may also serve to ask the interlocutor for a justification of his/her speech act. In that case, the person asking the question wishes to know the arguments on which the assertion is based. This interpretation of the question would be compatible with an answer such as : ‘Because he behaves in an idiotic way’)

The ambiguity of the *por qué*-question bears on the difference between two types of causal relations: internal relations and external relations. The former type applies to cause-effect processes taking place in the domain of the physical world. As we have seen before, these connections can also be represented by consequence-indicating clauses. External causal relations are based on the expression of reasons or justifications. Returning for a moment to the above quotation, we can clarify the internal-external distinction by paraphrasing the *por qué*-question in the two following ways: *¿Por qué está loco ese chico?* (‘Why is that boy mad?’) and *¿Por qué afirmas que ese chico está loco?* (‘Why do you state that that boy is mad?’). The particular function of the former question is to elicit information on the cause of what is asserted by speaker A, while that of the latter is to elicit information on the reason speaker A has to make the

assertion. A second category of reasons can be distinguished with respect to motivations of intentional behavior. A relevant case in point would be:

- (307) No pude venir porque tenía mucho trabajo
 ('I could not come because I had — IND — a lot of work to do')

In summary, the above analyses lead to a threefold classification of causal relations based on the distinction between (I) cause-effect relations, (II) reasons for intentional behavior, (III) justifications for performing speech acts. As regards the distinction between (I) and (II), I wish to quote Galán Rodríguez' discussion of (a) *Las flores se han marchitado porque no tenían agua suficiente* ('The flowers withered because they had not enough water') and (b) *Te he comprado un regalo porque era tu cumpleaños* ('I bought a present for you because it was your birthday'):

Si la relación es de causa-efecto, (a), los sujetos no tienen restricciones semánticas; pero si es de motivación-resultado, (b), y dado que la motivación implica un acto de voluntad, los sujetos deben ser obligatoriamente entidades animadas que participan activamente (desean, tienen intención de) en la relación causal y en sus consecuencias (1999: 3602)

('If a cause and effect relationship is at issue, (a), the subjects are not semantically constrained; but if a motivation and result relationship is at issue, (b), and given the fact that a motivation implies an intentional act, the subjects must be animate entities that play an active role (wish, have the intention) in the causal relationship and its consequences')

Just like Galán Rodríguez, Degand (2000: 693–694) qualifies reason-indicating constructions in terms of 'volitionality', which suggests a more indirect relation between cause and effect. Cause-indicating constructions, on the other hand, express a direct link between causing situation and caused situation without the intervention of any volitionally-acting being.

Let us look next at class (III): justifications for performing speech acts. It is a distinguishing trait of this class that the conjunction of the clause specifying the justification may take different forms, i.e., besides the standard conjunction *porque*, the variants *que* and *es que* are commonly used in everyday conversation. Compare, e.g.:

- (308) A ver si te caes del sillón ése, que ese sillón no está muy católico
 ('Be careful, do not fall from that chair, because that chair is — IND — below par')
- (309) Juan no ha venido todavía, es que no le hemos visto
 ('Juan has not come yet, because we have — IND — not seen him')

As to the interpretation of the latter sentence, it is obvious that the *es que*-clause does not express the cause of *Juan*'s not having arrived yet; that cause could be an accident, an unforeseen delay, a misunderstanding, etc. What the *es que*-clause does indicate is the justification for the assertion *Juan no ha venido todavía*.⁷¹ It is also possible for the speaker to emphasize the justification by explicitly referring to the speech act performed:

- (309) a. Juan no ha venido todavía, te lo digo porque no le hemos visto
(‘Juan has not come yet, I tell you that because we have — IND — not seen him’)

Note that if an internal causal relation were at issue, the speech act paraphrase would produce an ungrammatical sentence:

- (310) *Ese chico está loco, te lo digo porque ha sufrido una grave lesión cerebral
(‘That boy is mad, I tell you that because he suffered — IND — a serious brain damage’)

Syntactically, sentences containing speech act justifications are subject to fixed word order, since the justification clause always follows the clause expressing the speech act, as may be seen, for instance, from the ungrammaticality of:

- (309) b. *Es que no le hemos visto, Juan no ha venido todavía
(‘Because we have — IND — not seen him, Juan has not come yet’)

As stated above, the clause *es que no le hemos visto* serves the purpose of providing evidentiary or inferential justification for the assertion made. We may now add to this that focusing attention on the relevance of this information causes the indicative to present itself as the natural filler of the modal slot. What is often overlooked is that it is not only assertions which are frequently motivated; speakers may also feel inclined to justify other types of speech acts. Remember, e.g., (308) *A ver si te caes del sillón ése, que ese sillón no está muy católico*, where the speaker indicates the reason why the warning is issued.

In what follows below, examples will be provided of the remaining major classes of speech acts. (311) and (312) represent directives, (313) a commissive, and (314) an expressive:

- (311) Date prisa, que perdemos el tren
(‘Hurry up because we are — IND — going to miss the train’)
- (312) No te apures, que tenemos tiempo suficiente
(‘Do not hurry because we have — IND — enough time’)

- (313) Ya no fumaré en tu presencia, porque sé que te molesta mucho
(‘I shall not smoke any more in your presence because I know
— IND — it bothers you a lot’)
- (314) Te felicito, porque nadie antes de ti pudo lograr un acuerdo sobre esta
cuestión
(‘I congratulate you because no one else before you managed
— IND — to reach an agreement about this question’)

With respect to sentence (309), it was pointed out that the high information value of the reason clause is the central factor involved in the use of the indicative mood. Extending the analysis we may also say that the *es que*-clause expresses the premiss underlying the conclusion drawn in the main clause. Now, as in argumentation both the premiss and the conclusion are of equal relevance to the proper performance of the speech act, it is easy to account for the obligatory use of the indicative in the causal clause. This pattern does not only apply to assertives, but, as suggested by (311)–(314), to directive, commissive, and expressive speech acts as well. Further note that, as is to be expected, the negative structure of the main clauses of (312) and (313) does not exert any influence over the modal output of the clause indicating the justification of the speech act; the indicative is selected in either case.

The modal distribution outlined above typifies both cause-effect indicating clauses and clauses specifying reasons for intentional behavior. The indicative is the predominant filler of the modal slot of the causal clause, whose primary function is to enhance the relevance of the statement made in the main clause. There are, however, two general exceptions to the rule prescribing indicative selection: firstly, negative main clauses may trigger the use of the subjunctive mood in the causal clause; secondly, the subjunctive also occurs in clauses transmitting de-emphasized or backgrounded information. These two factors will be treated in the order given.

Negation

To begin with, I wish to focus attention on the following examples:

- (315) No es porque lo haya hecho yo, pero creo que está muy bien
(‘It is not because I did — SUB — it, but I believe that it is very
good’)
- (316) Pedro no ha hecho eso porque te desprecie
(‘Pedro did not do that because he looks — SUB — down on you’)

The source of the subjunctive forms in *porque lo haya hecho yo* and *porque te*

desprecie is evident: in both cases it is negated that the causal relation described manifests itself in reality. The *porque*-clauses indicate a reason that cannot be adduced to explain the intentional behavior referred to, which is equivalent to saying that, in terms of pragmatic analysis, the *irrealis*-interpretation corresponds to a low degree of information value. Further note that the indicative variant of (316) produces the opposite effect:

- (316) a. Pedro no ha hecho eso, porque te desprecia
(‘Pedro did not that, because he looks — IND — down on you’)

The comma-punctuation of this sentence indicates that reference is made to two causally related assertions which may be said to maintain a paratactic relation by virtue of the fact that the conjunction can be deleted without the sequence of clauses losing its coherence. The *porque*-clause provides evidence for the statement made in the main clause, and this is what accounts for the use of the indicative. The next point to mention is that (316) and (316a) are not only differentiated in regard to the information value of the causal clause; these sentences also have opposite meaning, since in (316) it is asserted that *Pedro* does the act referred to, whereas in (316a) it is negated that he does. Furthermore, the speaker of (316a) asserts that *Pedro* despises his/her interlocutor; however, this information is not provided by (316). In more general terms: “En estos contextos negativos, el hablante no se compromete con la verdad o la falsedad del contenido de la subordinada sino simplemente con la idea de que este contenido queda excluido como causa efectiva” (Pérez Saldanya 1999: 3289).

Next, attention should be drawn to the potential concessive interpretation of subjunctive causal clauses. This phenomenon is addressed by Galán Rodríguez (1999: 3613) in her discussion of:

- (317) No pareces más alta porque lleves tacones
(‘You do not look taller because you wear — SUB — high heels’)

La construcción con subjuntivo presenta dos valores posibles que se distinguen por el alcance de la negación:

– Causal-concesivo (causales inefectivos): se niega que una causa provoque un determinado efecto: *No pareces más alta, aunque lleves tacones.*

– Causal-adversativo: se niega que la causa presentada provoque el efecto; pueden existir otras causas: *Pareces más alta, pero no porque llevas tacones.*

(‘The construction with the subjunctive expresses two possible values, which differ with respect to the scope of the negation: — Causal-concesivo (no cause-effect relationship): the speaker denies that a certain cause brings about a certain effect: ‘You do not look taller, although you wear — SUB — high heels.’ — Causal-adversative:

the speaker denies that the cause described brings about the effect; there may be other causes: ‘You look taller, but not because you wear — SUB — high heels’)

Concerning the concessive interpretation of the causal clause, I would like to point to the fact that, although the paraphrase *aunque lleves tacones* is basically correct, the primary factor involved in subjunctive selection is the wish of the speaker to background the information of the causal clause. It is this factor which will be our object of attention in the next part of this section.

Backgrounded information

We have already discussed the use of the so-called ‘low-priority subjunctive’ on various occasions. It is the subjunctive reflecting the speaker’s intention to indicate to the hearer that the information offered is not the focus of interest of what is communicated. Put another way, it is the subjunctive marking backgrounded or de-emphasized information, which, in causal clauses, basically originates in polyphonous discourse. For a clarification of this phenomenon, consider:

Veamos ahora el subjuntivo citativo en otro tipo de textos. Elijo primero una cláusula causal, pues, según indican las reglas gramaticales, las cuales — al menos las afirmativas — llevan indicativo en la mayoría de los casos. Considérese el diálogo:

– Es que hace mucho frío.

– Porque haga mucho frío no nos vamos a quedar en casa.

Evidentemente, la cláusula ‘porque haga mucho frío’ es polifónica: se oye la afirmación anterior en la voz del que la retoma para refutarla. La otra voz, que en este diálogo es audible, puede estar sólo presupuesta (el hablante puede referirse, por ejemplo a sus propios pensamientos sobre el frío, mientras mira a la calle por la ventana) (Reyes 1990: 48)

(‘Let us look now at the quotative subjunctive in another type of texts. I first select a causal clause, since causal clauses, as indicated by the rules of grammar, normally take the indicative in affirmative sentences. Consider the dialogue: — The thing is that it is very cold. — Because it is — SUB — very cold, we are not going to stay home. Evidently, the clause ‘it is very cold’ is polyphonous: one hears the previous statement through the voice of the speaker who repeats it in order to refute it. The other voice, which is audible in this dialogue, may be presupposed only (the speaker can refer, for example, to his own thoughts on the cold, while he is looking at the street through the window)’)

Bearing in mind the above exposition we now proceed to examine a more complicated case:

- (318) Los albañiles, ya porque estuvieran cansados o porque no les pagaran lo suficiente, apenas si trabajaban

(‘The bricklayers may have — SUB — been tired or may — SUB — not have been paid enough, the thing is that they hardly worked’)

As to the interpretation of this sentence, two sources can be proposed for the use of the subjunctive in the causal clauses: a truthfunctional source and a discourse-oriented source. In the former case, we are attributing a *potentialis* interpretation to the clauses, in the latter a polyphonous one. As both types of interpretation are mutually exclusive, it is the context or situation of utterance from which the proper intention of the speaker should be inferred.

It must further be pointed out that besides *porque*, the conjunction *ya que* is typically employed to introduce causal clauses expressing polyphonous information:

La expresión *ya que*, por ejemplo, es una conjunción causal como *porque*, pero su función argumentativa es peculiar: presenta la causa como un hecho conocido, ya mencionado antes en el discurso, es decir, no sólo apunta al mundo, sino también al discurso (Hassler 1996: 81–82).

(‘The expression *ya que*, for instance, is a causal conjunction just like *porque*, but its argumentative function is peculiar: it describes the cause as a known fact, mentioned earlier in the discourse, that is, it does not only point to the world, but also to the discourse’)

For illustration purposes, consider the following example:

- (319) Ya que no puedas venir, llámanos al menos por teléfono
(‘Since you cannot — SUB — come, call us at least’)

A few words, to conclude, on the conjunction *como*, which is also compatible with the indicative and the subjunctive mood. Modal variation in *como*-clauses has attracted the attention of many traditional grammarians, who have offered a variety of explanations for the selection process involved (Ridruejo 1999: 3292–3294). Within the context of the present study, two fundamental factors are assumed to be responsible for triggering the subjunctive mood: first, low information value of the causal clause due to the fact that the relevance of its content is downgraded; second, the *irrealis*-status of the causal clause due to the fact that an anticipated state of affairs is expressed. Downgrading of relevance can be illustrated by:

- (320) Como nadie propusiera ninguna enmienda, se efectuó directamente la votación
(‘Since no one proposed — SUB — an amendment, the motion was directly put to the vote’)

In this sentence the thematic information represented by the *como*-clause is de-emphasized for being presupposed or known to the hearer. Consequently, it is the main clause which contains the communicative core of the sentence. If instead of the subjunctive the indicative is selected by the speaker, the *como*-clause focuses on new information or information viewed to be relevant for the interpretation of the main clause. In the proper context, therefore, we can also get the modal alternative to (320):

- (320) a. Como nadie propuso ninguna enmienda, se efectuó directamente a la votación
 ('Since no one proposed — IND — an amendment, the motion was directly put to the vote')

The *irrealis* interpretation of the subjunctive is considered to involve conditional meaning. Compare:

- (321) Como hace frío, se abriga
 ('Since it is — IND — cold, he wraps up warm')

and

- (321) a. Como haga frío, se abriga
 ('If it is — SUB — cold, he wraps up warm')

Manteca Alonso (1981: 82), from whom these examples are taken, draws the conclusion that:

- [(321)] equivale a una causal: *Se abriga porque hace frío*; [(321a)] equivale a una condicional: *Si hace frío, se abriga*.
 ('[(321)] has the value of a causal clause: 'He wraps up warm because it is cold';
 [(321a)] has the value of a conditional clause: 'If it is cold, he wraps up warm'')

Likewise, Ridruejo (1999: 3294) attributes a conditional interpretation to the *como* clause of:

- (322) Como no nos ayude, le diré que se vaya
 ('If he does — SUB — not help us, I shall tell him to go way')

5.2.5 Concessive clauses

Concessive clauses are introduced by a diversity of conjunctions and connectors. In this section attention will be focused on the following items: *aunque* ('although'), *si bien* ('although'), *(aun) a sabiendas de que* ('even knowing that'), *por más que* ('no matter how'), *por mucho que* ('no matter how much'),

por muy que ('no matter how'), and (*aun*) *a riesgo de que* ('even at the risk that'). The most frequently used and, accordingly, most extensively studied member of this set is *aunque*. From a truthfunctional point of view, this conjunction shows a maximum distributional potential, since it is employed to introduce *realis*, *potentialis*, and *irrealis* clauses. As a consequence, it is compatible with both the indicative and the subjunctive mood. Most of the other concessive conjunctions are restricted with respect to mood selection. Thus, *si bien* and (*aun*) *a sabiendas de que* require the use of the indicative mood. Compare:

- (323) Madariaga, en ocasiones, no estuvo lejos del relativismo, si bien su humanidad le preservó de convertirlo en indiferencia
(‘Occasionally, Madariaga was not far from relativism, although his humanity prevented — IND — him from falling into indifference’)

As may be inferred from this example, the pragmatic function of *si bien*-clauses is to express propositions marked for high information value. These propositions perform an autonomous communicative function, so that they cannot be used for de-emphasizing purposes. This claim is supported by the fact that in sentences such as (323) *si bien* can be substituted for the adversative conjunction *pero*, which implies that the concessive information is viewed from a foregrounded or rhematic point of view. Lastly note that *si bien* shows free variation with *si bien es cierto que*, the meaning of which clearly stresses the veracity and, accordingly, the importance of the concessive information.

We now move on to concessive conjunctions primarily involved in the selection of the subjunctive mood. This class includes items expressing a scalar type of concessive meaning, as shown, for instance, by:

- (324) Por más que juegue, no se cansa
(‘No matter how much he plays — SUB — , he does not get tired’)
- (325) Por mucha ropa que se ponga, siempre tiene frío
(‘No matter how many clothes she puts — SUB — on, she is always cold’)

In (324), the frequency or intensity indicated by *por más que juegue* can be conceived of as a scalar magnitude. The use of the subjunctive is triggered by the speaker’s being unable to specify the maximum point of the scale. We can say therefore that subjunctive selection reflects a low degree of truthfunctional information. The same interpretation applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to the concessive clause of (325). This sentence expresses that it is the quantity of clothes

referred to which cannot be exactly verified. Depending on the content of the preceding piece of discourse, the concessive clauses of (324) and (325) may also be attributed a polyphonous interpretation manifesting the speaker's intention to downgrade the impact of the original statement by the interlocutor or an other discourse participant.

From the foregoing analyses it should not be inferred that the use of the indicative mood is excluded. Thus, we find the following variants of (324) and (325):

- (324) a. Por más que juega, no se cansa
(‘No matter how much he plays — IND —, he does not get tired’)
- (325) a. Por mucha ropa que se pone, siempre tiene frío
(‘No matter how many clothes she puts — IND — on, she is always cold’)

In these sentences, the description of real facts experienced by the speaker is the factor triggering the use of the indicative. Both statements suggest that, in the course of time, all points of the concessive scales involved have been activated.

Semantically akin to *por más que* and *por mucho que* is *por muy que*. The following examples from Fernández Alvarez (1987: 71) illustrate the use of this conjunction:

- (326) Por muy listo que seas, tienes que trabajar bastante más
(‘No matter how intelligent you are — SUB —, you have to work harder’)
- (327) Por muy lejos que viva, le encontraremos
(‘No matter how far away he lives- SUB —, we shall find him’)

Although Fernández Alvarez does not provide relevant contexts for these sentences, the *por muy...que* clauses are most likely to be interpreted as clauses expressing polyphonous information or information presupposed to be known by the hearer, which, of course, offers a sufficient explanation for the use of the subjunctive mood. Taking it for granted that the basic function of this type of clauses is to downgrade concessive information, we are not surprised to be informed that:

En esta estructura, la tendencia general es a usar el subjuntivo prácticamente de manera exclusiva (Fente et al. 1977: 37).

(‘In this structure, the general tendency is to use the subjunctive almost exclusively’)

Gil and Banús (1988:234) are stricter on this point by claiming that the use of the subjunctive is obligatory in *por muy... que* clauses. In the same category they include the complex conjunction (*aun*) *a riesgo de que*. The example they provide is:

- (328) (Aun) a riesgo de que no les guste, tengo que decirles la verdad
(‘Even at the risk that they will — SUB — not like it, I have to tell them the truth’)

Evidently, the factor triggering the appearance of the subjunctive mood in this kind of concessive clauses is the *potentialis* interpretation of the state of affairs expressed.

I now proceed to the analysis of the conjunction *aunque*, which denotes a diversity of connections between the main and the subordinate clause. As observed earlier, it is compatible with both the indicative and the subjunctive mood. My first focus of attention is the use of the indicative. Consider the following examples:

- (329) Aunque hacía mal tiempo, fuimos a la playa
(‘Although it was — IND — bad weather, we went to the beach’)
- (330) El vecino de enfrente no está en casa, aunque todas las luces están encendidas
(‘The neighbor over the way is not home, although all the lights are — IND — on’)
- (331) Vive en Andalucía, aunque ignoro en qué ciudad
(‘He lives in Andalucía, although I do — IND — not know in which town’)

Although the concessive clauses of these sentences all involve a *realis* interpretation, they do not establish the same sort of link with the main clause. The two former, (329) and (330), are more similar to each other than to (331); both of these sentences describe situations where an expected causal relation fails to obtain. In more formal terms, (329) and (330) conform to the pattern: ‘although (p), (q)’, where (p) and (q) are propositions presupposed to be linked by the conditional: ‘if (p), then normally not (q)’. The difference between the two sentences bears on the fact that (330) includes an inferential aspect of meaning that is lacking in (329). More precisely, under normal circumstances, when all the lights in a house are put on, such a situation is interpreted as an indexical sign for the presence of at least one person in that house. Now, the concessive clause of (330) fulfills the function of cancelling

that inference. We perceive a parallel therefore between (330) and (47) *El vecino de enfrente estará en casa; todas las luces están encendidas*, as the latter sentence is characterized by the same inferential pattern, the obvious difference with (330) being that the inference is not cancelled, but foregrounded. The concessive and the main clause of (329), by contrast, are not inferentially linked in this way, by virtue of the fact that bad weather is not an indexical sign for not going to the beach.

Sentence (331), lastly, is of a quite different order. The concessive clause *aunque ignoro en qué ciudad* does not express that an expected causal relation is cancelled, but serves to modify the content of *Vive en Andalucía*. One could also say that in restricting the communicative force of the preceding assertion the speaker of the sentence manifests his/her intention to comply with the first maxim of quantity: “Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange)” (Grice 1975: 45).

It is important to bear in mind, in conclusion, that, as opposed to subjunctive concessive clauses, which will be dealt with below, the *realis* interpretation of indicative clauses correlates with high information value, which means that the speaker brings the content of these clauses to the attention of the hearer as being relevant, new, or unexpected. In this relation, compare also: “The indicative is used after *aunque* only when the speaker wishes to concede information which is not flawed by either lack of interest or lack of veracity” (Lunn 1991: 152). Syntactic evidence for this interpretation is provided by the fact that the sentences under discussion can be replaced by adversative ones, in which the conjunction *pero* links two clauses conveying equally relevant information. Consider the following paraphrases of (329)–(331):

- (329) a. *Hacía mal tiempo, pero fuimos a la playa*
(‘It was bad weather, but we went to the beach’)
- (330) a. *Todas las luces están encendidas, pero el vecino de enfrente no está en casa*
(‘All the lights are on, but the neighbor over the way is not home’)
- (331) a. *Vive en Andalucía, pero ignoro en qué ciudad*
(‘He lives in Andalucía, but I do not know in which town’)

It is worthwhile observing that the correlation between concessive and adversative clauses was already noticed by Bello (1928: 324):

Pero lo que más merece notarse es la transformación de *aunque* en conjunción adversativa que enlaza oraciones y toda especie de elementos análogos denotando cierta oposición entre ellos.

(‘But what deserves our full attention is the transformation of *aunque* into an adversative conjunction that links clauses and all kind of analogous elements denoting a certain opposition between them’)

The appearance of the subjunctive mood in *aunque* clauses calls for an analysis in terms of each of the dimensions of the *realis*, *potentialis*, and *irrealis* scale. In the literature, most attention has been paid to the *realis* interpretation of the subjunctive. Let us look at the following examples:

- (332) Aunque seas inteligente, nunca tendrás éxito
(‘You may — SUB — be intelligent, but you will never have success’)
- (333) Ni los alimentos son un problema, aunque haya hambre en el mundo...
se mueren en el mundo unos 40 millones de personas al año y no
porque no haya alimentos
(‘Nor is food a problem, although there is — SUB — hunger in the
world ... about 40 million people die per year but not because there is
no food’)
- (334) A: – ¡Hombre!, Jenaro, he decidido ya comprarme el compacto.
¿Cuándo vamos a elegirlo?
J: – Es que ahora no puedo, no tengo tiempo
A: – ¡Siempre igual!
J: – Estoy ocupadísimo
A: – ¡Bueno!, aunque estés ocupadísimo, un día voy por tu casa y lo
compramos
(‘A: – Listen, Jenaro, I decided to buy the compact. When are we going
to choose one? J: – I cannot go now, I do not have time. A: – It is always
the same story. J: – I am very busy. A: – O.K., although you are — SUB
— very busy, one of these days I shall pick you up and then we are
going to buy it’)

The concessive clauses of these sentences clearly mark the intention of the speaker to attribute low relevance to the information provided. Sentences such as (332)–(334) are not seldom uttered in the context of a discussion, debate, or polemic, where they serve as a strategic move by the speaker to suggest that the content of the concessive clause is of secondary importance. What is put forward therefore is that the concessive proposition cannot be used as a valid argument in the verbal exchange. This is the reason that the discourse function of the subjunctive concessive clause often consists in rejecting a previous statement by the interlocutor. A clear case in point is the polyphonous repetition of *aunque estés ocupadísimo* in sentence (334). In this

connection, remember also the echo response in the dialogue *Es que hace mucho frío* ('The thing is that it is very cold') — *Porque haga mucho frío, no nos vamos a quedar en casa* ('Because it is — SUB — very cold, we are not going to stay home'), which was discussed in Section 5.2.4 as an instance of the rejection of a standpoint.

As a summary of the present analysis, it is useful to quote the following evaluation of sentence (333):

Cuando en un debate, aparecen oraciones concesivas en subjuntivo, estas concesiones tienen el valor pragmático de rebatir las opiniones de los demás, que el locutor retoma, pero distanciándose de ellas, precisamente porque no es él su enunciador, y porque además, espera poder desautorizar los argumentos, con otros argumentos, ahora suyos, con los que sí se identifica y que serán presentados en indicativo (Fernández Menéndez 1991/1992: 97)

('When, in a debate, concessive sentences with the subjunctive are used, these concessions have the pragmatic function of refuting the opinions of the other participants; the speaker repeats them, but distances himself from them, precisely because he is not the one who has expressed them, and, moreover, because it is his intention to disaffirm the arguments with other ones, his own arguments, with which he identifies himself and which will be presented in the indicative')

The *potentialis* interpretation of *aunque*-clauses can be illustrated by the following examples:

- (335) Aunque hayan jugado bien, no han ganado
(‘Although they may — SUB — have played well, they did not win’)
- (336) Aunque hayan comprado el coche, no se lo he visto
(‘Although they may — SUB — have bought the car, I have not seen it’)

Under the interpretation relevant to the present analysis, the concessive clauses of (335) and (336) describe states of affairs whose evidentiality cannot be ascertained by the speaker. More strictly, the propositions expressed may be true, but the speaker is not in a position to verify whether the events referred to took place in actual fact. Again, the use of the subjunctive mood reflects the relatively low degree of information value inherent in *potentialis* statements. To both sentences a polyphonic interpretation of the concessive clauses may also apply, in which case, of course, the trigger involved in subjunctive selection is the wish of the speaker to downgrade the information furnished by the other source.

Furthermore, *aunque* is found to introduce *irrealis* clauses describing contrary-to-fact states of affairs, as shown by the following examples:

- (337) Aunque el prisionero hubiera gritado, no habríais oído sus gritos
(‘Even if the prisoner had — SUB — shouted, you would not have heard his cries’)
- (338) Me habría gustado ir aunque hubiera tenido que pagar el viaje
(‘I would have liked to go, even if I had — SUB — had to pay for the trip’)

Formally, these sentences are marked for a particular kind of agreement of tense and mood, i.e., the pluperfect subjunctive of the subordinate clause correlates with the conditional perfect of the main clause. As we will see in the section on conditional clauses, this pattern is typical of the expression of counterfactual states of affairs. Note that agreement of the imperfect subjunctive and the conditional also correlates with counterfactuality. Compare, for instance:

- (338) a. Me gustaría ir aunque tuviera que pagar el viaje
(‘I would like to go, even if I had — SUB — to pay for the trip’)

Evidently, these patterns of agreement reflect the transmission of counterfactual or minimal truthfunctional information. A clear difference, therefore, manifests itself with the use of the present subjunctive, which, as shown by the discussion of (332)–(334), typically performs the function of backgrounding information concerning real states of affairs. In summary, the use of the imperfect and the pluperfect subjunctive indicates non-factuality, while the use of the present subjunctive indicates de-emphasized factuality. As illustrated by (335) and (336), the present perfect subjunctive is typically involved in the description of a *potentialis* state of affairs.

Finally, it is to be noticed that the *irrealis* interpretation of *aunque* clauses may also bear on anticipated states of affairs, as may be seen, for example, from:

- (339) Aunque haga mal tiempo, saldré a las diez en punto
(‘Even if it is — SUB — bad weather, I shall leave at exactly ten o’clock’)
- (340) No acabará usted el traje para la hora prometida aunque trabaje toda la noche
(‘You will not finish the dress at the time you promised, even if you work — SUB — the whole night’)

Obviously, in these sentences, anticipation is not only expressed by the present subjunctive of the concessive clause but also by the future indicative of the main clause.

5.2.6 *Conditional clauses*

Although conditional clauses are important in all languages, and although their ‘logic’ has been thoroughly, if inconclusively, investigated by philosophers, our knowledge and understanding of them in the languages of the world is very poor (Palmer 1986: 188)

Restricting Palmer’s statement to our knowledge of Spanish we can say that the major classes of conditional clauses in this language can be demarcated in a fairly consistent way. Although there is a set of marginal cases, which are more difficult to categorize, these do not pose special problems to the central topic of this book, since they do not complicate the description of the modal system of the language.

Conditional sentences are fundamentally distinct from other types of adverbial sentences in that the main and the subordinate clause are strictly interdependent, as a result of which they do not admit paraphrases in terms of coordinative constructions such as the ones discussed in the sections on causal and concessive clauses. To provide a concrete example: *Si tu padre viene, me marcho yo* (‘If your father comes — IND —, I shall leave’) is not equivalent, under any interpretation, to *Tu padre viene; me marcho yo* (‘Your father is coming; I shall leave’). As suggested by this example, the truth value of conditional sentences can be ascertained only when the cause-effect relation expressed by the propositions of the main and the subordinate clause manifests itself in actual fact.

A truthfunctional analysis of conditional sentences yields a threefold classification based on the *realis*, *potentialis* or *irrealis* interpretation of the causal link between the *protasis* — the subordinate clause — and the *apodosis* — the main clause.

The *realis* interpretation applies to what logicians call *material implication*. Compare the following characterization of this concept:

The truth value of the protasis determines the truth value of the apodosis, i.e. whenever the antecedent clause is true, the consequent clause is also true. In other words, the truth of the protasis is a sufficient condition for the truth of the apodosis (Köpcke and Panther 1989: 693)

Sentences expressing material implication have the illocutionary force of generic statements, that is, statements on general laws, rules, or principles, which are supposed to apply at any moment when the truth conditions are met. Compare, for instance:

(341) Si llueve, las calles se mojan

(‘If it rains — IND —, the streets get wet’)

- (342) Si el volumen del gas aumenta, la presión disminuye
 (‘If the volume of gas increases — IND —, the pressure decreases’)

Expressions of material implication bear an intrinsic relation to causal statements. Thus, comparing (341) with:

- (343) Las calles se mojan porque llueve
 (‘The streets are getting wet because it is raining’)

we see that whenever an instance of the material implication manifests itself, it can be expressed by means of a causal sentence. Both the *si*-clause and the *porque*-clause require the use of the indicative by virtue of their expressing generic and specific factuality, respectively. As regards the logical relation between protasis and apodosis, it must be pointed out that their affirmative representation, the so-called *modus ponens*, usually indicated by the formula $p \rightarrow q$, correlates with their negative representation, the so-called *modus tollens*, in the following way: $\neg q \rightarrow \neg p$. Consequently, the negative version of (341) runs as follows:

- (341) a. Si las calles no se mojan, no llueve
 (‘If the streets are — IND — not getting wet, it is not raining’)

The basic order of *modus ponens* differs from that of *modus tollens* in that it iconically reflects the extralinguistic order of the cause-effect relation.

Though semantically distinct from *realis* conditionals, *potentialis* ones also trigger the use of the indicative mood. In older phases of the language, however, the difference in meaning was made formally explicit by the use of the future subjunctive in the antecedent clause. Consider, e.g., the following old-Castilian text, quoted from Bello (1928: 170): *Si el cielo diere fuerza para tanto, cantaré aquí, y escribiré entre flores de Tirsis y Damón el dulce canto* (‘If God gives — SUB — me strength to do so, I shall sing here, and I shall write the sweet chant amid the flowers of Tirsis and Damón’). Some petrified remnants of the future subjunctive still exist in contemporary Spanish: *sea lo que fuere* (‘whatever the case may be’), *al que leyere* (‘to whom it may concern’), *adonde fueres, haz lo que vieres* (‘when in Rome, do as the Romans do’).

The primary function of the *potentialis* conditional is to express a hypothetical link between the antecedent and the consequent clause. More precisely, if the state of affairs described in the former takes place in reality, the factuality of the state of affairs described by the latter is implied. Let us look at the following examples:

- (344) Si tardas, me marcharé sin ti
(‘If you are — IND — late, I shall leave without you’)
- (345) Si pregunta eso, le dices que no lo sabes
(‘If she asks — IND — that, tell her that you do not know’)

From these *potentialis* conditionals it is easy to infer the fundamental difference with *realis* ones, the causal link established by the former being based not on an experienced but on a virtual state of affairs.

With respect to modal output, it is a striking fact that *potentialis* conditionals do not select the subjunctive, but the indicative mood. Specifically, the incompatibility of the conjunction *si* and the present subjunctive in sentences such as (344) and (345) represents a peculiar phenomenon. Bustos (1986:23) provides the explanation that this combination would lead to redundancy of information: the use of the present subjunctive typifies propositions with indeterminate truth value, while the same distinctive feature is inherent in the meaning of *si*. Solano-Araya (1987:359) discusses the question as follows:

Si ‘if’ cannot normally be followed by a verb in the subjunctive, unless it is the imperfect subjunctive. It expresses a condition, or possibility, and natural language does not seem to allow redundancy by allowing the possibility to be expressed again in the verb, as in *Si yo *vendré / *venga / vengo mañana...*

Note that the problem can also be viewed from a pragmatic perspective if the principle of relevance is taken into account (Lunn 1989a). To see this more clearly, remember that the truth value of the protasis determines the truth value of the apodosis, which means that the content of both clauses is equally relevant. Put differently, the appearance of the indicative mood can be explained in terms of the high information value of the *si*-clause.

Our next point concerns the fact that the indicative is also the mood occurring in reported speech, i.e., a statement referring to a hypothetical condition that was valid in the past cannot contain a subjunctive form of the verb. This may be seen from the following examples:

- (346) Las autoridades aseguraron a los trabajadores que no sufrirían represalias si abandonaban de inmediato el recinto
(‘The authorities assured the workers that they would not suffer reprisals if they left — IND — the premises immediately’)
- (347) Le dije que se lo compraría si me hacía una rebaja
(‘I said to him that I would buy it from him if he gave — IND — me a discount’)

duced by the clause-initial connectors *es que* and *es (será) porque*. From a formal point of view, it is to be noticed that, in contrast to the latter, the former is both syntactically and morphologically constrained, i.e., the apodosis cannot be introduced by *no es que* nor by any paradigm of the verb other than the present indicative (Kleiman 1974: 125). These restrictions, of course, do not affect the modal pattern of the antecedent clause.

(II) The emphatic presentation of a standpoint is characteristic of the following type of hypothetical conditionals:

- (353) Si ella es artista, yo soy Súperman
(‘If she is — IND — an artist, I am Superman’)
- (354) Si dos y dos son cuatro, mi cliente es inocente
(‘If two and two make — IND — four, my client is innocent’)

Pragmatically, these sentences are instances of the manipulation of Gricean maxims. By making use of a hyperbole, the speaker of (353) flouts the first maxim of quality: “Do not say that which you believe to be false” (Grice 1975: 46). The speaker of (354) flouts the maxim of relevance because no conceptual link can be established between the content of the protasis and that of the apodosis. It should be added to this that in order to produce the rhetorical effect desired the protasis must contain a stereotyped expression; conceptual paraphrases are not allowed. Thus, for instance:

- (354) a. *Si quince y veinticinco son cuarenta, mi cliente es inocente
(‘If fifteen and twenty-five make — IND — forty, my client is innocent’)

cannot be considered an acceptable sentence of Spanish. Although both (353) and (354) express the reinforcement of an assertive speech act, they differ with respect to illocutionary point: the former sentence serves to reject a standpoint, the latter to defend one. Both protases, in conclusion, should be attributed a polyphonic interpretation; that is, in (353) *ella es artista* echoes the voice of another speaker than the one who is responsible for the statement, while in (354) *si dos y dos son cuatro* belongs to the inventory of popular sayings accessible to any speaker of the language.

A special type of assertive strengthening is produced by the utterance of certain elliptical conditionals. What happens in these cases is that the content of the implicit apodosis is presupposed by the preceding context or by the situation of utterance. The following examples are provided by Montolío (1999: 3682):

- (355) – Mañana por la tarde iré a ver la exposición.
 – Pero si tienes visita en el dentista
 (‘– Tomorrow I shall go and see the exhibition. – But you have —
 IND — an appointment with the dentist!’)
- (356) – Pásame el pastel, por favor
 – Pero si estás a régimen
 (‘– Can you pass the cake, please? – But you are — IND — on a diet!’)

This specific class of conditionals is characterized by three distinctive properties (Montolío 1999:3682). Firstly, they have the status of side sequences offering a metacommunicative comment on the speech act performed by the interlocutor. As a consequence, the discursive order of the dialogue is interrupted. Secondly, they have the force of an emphatic reply to what is being communicated by the interlocutor. Finally note that, though the obligatory use of the indicative mood is triggered by the protasis function of the *si* clause, it also correlates with the high information value inherent in the performance of an overtly face-threatening speech act.

(III) Conditionals focusing on the precondition of a particular speech act are distinct from other types of conditionals on account of the fact that they do not focus on the cause-effect relation between the antecedent and the consequent clause. Let us look at the following examples:

- (357) Si tienes sed, hay cerveza en la nevera
 (‘If you are — IND — thirsty, there is beer in the fridge’)
- (358) Si hace frío, tengo un abrigo
 (‘If it is — IND — cold, I have a coat’)
- (359) Si estás aburrido, en el Olimpia echan una de vaqueros
 (‘If you are — IND — bored, there is cowboy film on at the Olympia’)

These sentences are peculiar in the sense that they do not express a conditional link between the protasis and apodosis. Whatever the truth value of the former, the latter describes a real fact, which is equivalent to stating that the truth value of the protasis does not determine that of the apodosis. In other words: “If *p* is true, then the speech act expressed by *q* is relevant” (Köpcke and Panther 1989:699). In regard to pragmatic interpretation, we find that the speech acts expressed by the apodosis typically serve to transmit positive politeness; thus, the speakers of (357) and (358) make an offer; the speaker of (359) gives advice. Needless to say, if the preparatory condition is not met, the appropriateness of the speech act is cancelled.

Up till now we have been exclusively concerned with the standard conditional conjunction *si*. In addition to *si*, there is a small set of complex conjunctions that appear in hypothetical conditionals. Their use can be illustrated by the following examples:

- (360) (En) caso (de) que la veas, dile que la espero a la entrada del teatro
(‘In case you see — SUB — her, tell her that I shall wait for her to the entrance of the theatre’)
- (361) Con tal (de) que escribas a menudo, estará contenta
(‘She will be happy provided you write — SUB — her often’)
- (362) Le dio un día libre bajo/con la condición de que terminara ese trabajo la próxima semana
(‘He conceded her a day off on condition that she would — SUB — finish the job next week’)
- (363) El te recibirá, siempre que se lo pidas
(‘He will receive you provided you ask — SUB — his permission’)

These sentences show that, as opposed to *si*-clauses, clauses introduced by the above conjunctions are incompatible with the selection of the indicative mood. *(En) caso (de) que* introduces antecedent clauses emphasizing the *potentialis* character of the proposition expressed, which is a sufficient explanation for the appearance of the subjunctive. *Con tal (de) que*, *bajo/con la condición de que*, and *siempre que* trigger the use of the subjunctive because the antecedent clause expresses directive force specifying actions that are to be performed by the hearer in order to bring about the state of affairs described by the consequent clause. Accordingly, anticipating the intentional behavior of the hearer is the criterion responsible for the use of the subjunctive.

As to the use of *siempre que*, we have to distinguish between a temporal and a conditional meaning. Remember that the former has been dealt with in Section 5.2.1; compare, in particular, example (263). The polysemy involved exerts influence on the selection of mood in the subordinate clause, as put forward by the following statement:

Por otra parte, el contraste entre el indicativo y el subjuntivo se puede observar fácilmente en una oración como *Siempre que se (encarga / encargue) él de hacer el inventario, no me importa ayudarle*. Con indicativo, la subordinada posee un valor exclusivamente temporal y con subjuntivo, condicional (Pérez Saldanya 1999: 3312).

(‘On the other hand, the contrast between the indicative and the subjunctive can be easily observed in a sentence such as ‘Whenever he takes — IND — care of making the inventory, I do not mind helping him’/ ‘Provided that he takes — SUB

— care of the inventory, I do not mind helping him'. With the indicative, the subordinate clause has an exclusively temporal, and with the subjunctive, an exclusively conditional value')

I finally proceed to the analysis of two conjunctions, *a menos que* ('unless') and *a no ser que* ('unless'), which, in contrast to *con tal (de) que*, *bajo/con la condición de que* and *siempre que*, express a negative condition. Consider, e.g.:

- (364) No iré a menos que me acompañes
(‘I shall not go unless you accompany — SUB — me’)
- (365) A menos que haya leído mal las listas, todos mis amigos han aprobado
(‘Unless I have — SUB — read the lists wrongly, all my friends have passed the exam’)
- (366) Vendré esta tarde a no ser que ocurra algo imprevisto
(‘I shall come this afternoon, unless something unforeseen happens — SUB —’)

The subjunctive forms of these conditionals stem from different sources. In (364), *a menos que me acompañes* implies the same kind of directive force as postulated for the antecedent clauses of (361)–(363). In (365), *a menos que haya leído mal las listas* contains background information, which seems to be conveyed merely in passing. Evidence for this interpretation may be derived from the fact that the conditional clause fills the thematic slot of the sentence, precluding the rhematic information transmitted by *todos mis amigos han aprobado*. The conditional clause of (366), in conclusion, literally focuses on a hypothetical situation, which finds its formal expression in the *potentialis* subjunctive.

The last part of this section will be devoted to the investigation of *irrealis* conditionals. These conditionals may be compared with the category of optatives, discussed in Section 3.3.1. Remember, for instance, the analysis of *¡Ojalá lloviese mañana!* (‘I wish it would rain tomorrow!’) and *¡Ojalá le hubieses dicho la verdad!* (‘If you only had told him the truth!’). The difference between these two wishes was described in terms of the contrastive features ‘realizable’ and ‘non-realizable’, respectively. Now, a similar distinction applies to the following *irrealis* conditionals:

- (367) Si Juan viniera, haríamos un picnic
(‘If Juan would — SUB — come, we would go on a picnic’)
- (368) Si papá viviera, yo estaría estudiando medicina, mamá
(‘If Daddy were — SUB — still alive, I would be studying medicine, Mom’)

As the non-factual event expressed by the protasis of (367) might take place in principle, it is not inconsistent to compare this sentence with:

- (369) Si Juan viene, haremos un picnic
(‘If Juan comes — IND — , we shall go on a picnic’)

It is clear that the protases of these sentences run parallel in that they describe states of affairs that do not correspond with factual reality. They differ with respect to the degree of likelihood of occurrence, i.e., the speaker of (369) implies the possibility, the speaker of (367) the improbability of John’s coming.

The next comparison to be made is that between (367) and (368). Although in both protases the imperfect subjunctive is used, *si Juan viniera* and *si papá viviera* represent different types of non-factuality. As we have seen above, the former proposition may come true in principle, whereas the latter is false and remains false under any circumstances. Note that if instead of the imperfect subjunctive the pluperfect is used, ambiguity may arise as to the *potentialis* or *irrealis* interpretation of the conditional clause. Thus, in his discussion of example:

- (370) Si Juan Pedro hubiera aprobado, no tendría que volver a examinarse
(‘If Juan Pedro had — SUB — passed the exam, he would not have to take it again’)

Bustos (1986:235) argues:

Hay dos interpretaciones de esta oración, la primera de las cuales presupone o implica que Juan Pedro no ha aprobado y que por tanto tiene que volver a examinarse, y otra interpretación en que el hablante no sabe si la posibilidad considerada se ha realizado, es decir, se puede interpretar como *Juan Pedro no ha aprobado y por tanto tiene que volver a examinarse* o como *Yo no sé si Juan Pedro ha aprobado, pero si en realidad no lo hecho, entonces tiene que volver a examinarse* (‘There are two interpretations of this sentence; the first one presupposes or implies that Juan Pedro did not pass the exam, so that he has to take it again; the other one is that the speaker does not know if the possibility considered has become reality, that is to say, the sentence can be interpreted as ‘Juan Pedro has not passed the exam, and, therefore, he has to take it again’, or as ‘I do not know if Juan Pedro has passed the exam, but if he really has not, he has to take it again’)

Bustos draws the evident conclusion that, under normal circumstances, the hearer will solve the ambiguity problem by making use of his/her knowledge of the context or situation of utterance. Note, incidentally, that the *potentialis* interpretation strongly suggests a polyphonic source of the conditional.

To conclude this section, I would like to focus attention on three isolated phenomena: a morphological, a syntactic, and a semantic one.

Morphological research has brought to light that in most languages of the world the modal paradigms used in the protasis parallel those of the apodosis (Haiman 1983b: 279). Spanish is no exception to this general rule, as far as *realis* and *potentialis si* clauses are concerned. No parallel structures, however, are found in the protasis and the apodosis of *irrealis* conditionals, the former being marked for the subjunctive, the latter for the conditional.

Concentrating next on syntactic structure, we have seen in nearly all examples treated in this section that, as far as word order is involved, the antecedent clause precedes the consequent clause. This is no coincidence, since Spanish shares this characteristic with the vast majority of the languages. There are even languages where the consequent clause may not precede the antecedent one. Consider, e.g.: “. . . one of the near universals of word order in human languages is that the given protasis precedes the apodosis, and deviations of this order are either marked or prohibited” (Haiman 1983b: 278). What is not made explicit by this statement, however, is that the antecedent-consequent order is of an iconic nature by virtue of the fact that in extralinguistic reality conditions precede their fulfillment.

Finally, it is useful to make a comparison between the conjunctions *si* and *cuando*. Semantically, they are so closely related that speakers of Spanish do not always distinguish between them in a consistent way. This situation is by no means exceptional, since, as pointed out by Thompson and Longacre (1985), there are many languages which lack a formal distinction between the conjunctions in question. In Spanish, the lexical distinction between *si* and *cuando* can be described as follows: the meaning content of the former corresponds to the presuppositional content of the latter, and vice versa. Elaborating on this point, we can say that *si* has a conditional meaning; the expression of a condition, however, presupposes a moment or a set of moments at which the state of affairs referred to comes about or may come about. *Cuando*, on the other hand, has a temporal meaning; specification of a certain moment or set of moments, however, presupposes that the state of affairs referred to comes about or may come about because a necessary condition is satisfied. In summary, the meaning of *si* is conditional, its presupposition is temporal; the meaning of *cuando* is temporal, its presupposition is conditional. Due to this particular relationship we do not seldom find situations where the use of the conjunctions seems to be subject to free variation. Let me provide one concrete example:

- (371) Para Lehmann, por último, la lingüística histórica se beneficiará enormemente cuando se examinen desde el punto de vista sociolingüístico comunidades del pasado de las cuales tenemos amplia información...
- (‘For Lehmann, finally, historical linguistics will enormously benefit when communities of the past on which we have extensive information are — SUB — examined from the sociolinguistic point of view...’)

Taking into account the conditional link between the main and the subordinate clause one would expect *si* to be the filler of the conjunction slot. Nevertheless, by using *cuando* the writer prefers to focus attention on the moment at which the cause-effect relation is supposed to come into existence.

Free variation of *si* and *cuando* manifests itself particularly in those situations where the events described take place an indefinite number of times, so that the corresponding propositions are marked for iterative aspect. A relevant example is:

- (372) Si (cuando) hacía calor, íbamos al campo
(‘If (when) it was hot, we went to the countryside’)

It is to be noticed, lastly, that variation of *si* and *cuando* is subject to at least one constraint: the protasis of *irrealis* conditionals requires the use of *si*; this type of clauses cannot be introduced by *cuando*.

5.2.7 The modal structure of adverbial clauses: A survey

In the preceding sections, the classification of adverbial clauses has been exemplified by a selection of conjunctions that prototypically represent the six classes distinguished. Although, for obvious reasons, no attempt has been made to exhaustively specify the members of these classes, the criteria established enable us to predict the modal structure of clauses introduced by conjunctions not explicitly treated. A clear case in point is *sin que* (‘without’), which cannot be integrated into any of the six classes. It is easy to see, however, that *sin que* clauses require the use of the subjunctive as they serve to describe *irrealis* states of affairs, i.e., states of affairs that are contrary to fact.

In the following survey, the modal distribution of each of the classes of adverbial clauses will be presented in terms of the truthfunctional categories of *realis*, *potentialis*, and *irrealis*. A subcategorization of the *realis* category will be provided in case backgrounding of information is referred to. In the same way, ‘anticipation’ will be specified as a particular manifestation of the *irrealis*

category. Lastly, each correlation will be illustrated by means of a relevant example discussed in the text.

Diagram 7

Temporal clauses

indicative → *realis* (242)

subjunctive → *irrealis* (anticipation) (261)

Manner clauses

indicative → *realis* (273)

subjunctive → *irrealis* (277)

→ *irrealis* (anticipation) (275)

Purpose clauses

subjunctive → *irrealis* (anticipation) (279)

Cause and consequence clauses

indicative → *realis* (286)

subjunctive → *realis* (backgrounding) (319)

→ *irrealis* (316)

→ *irrealis* (anticipation) (294)

Concessive clauses

indicative → *realis* (329)

subjunctive → *realis* (backgrounding) (334)

→ *potentialis* (336)

→ *irrealis* (337)

→ *irrealis* (anticipation) (339)

Conditional clauses

indicative → *realis* (341)

→ *potentialis* (357)

→ *irrealis* (anticipation) (348)

subjunctive → *potentialis* (365)

→ *irrealis* (368)

→ *irrealis* (anticipation) (363)

5.3 Adjective clauses

In 5 it was pointed out that adjective clauses fulfill a basically different function from that of nominal and adverbial ones. The reason for this is that the two latter operate at sentence level, whereas the former operates at the hierarchically lower level of the noun phrase. The structural distinction involved is also reflected by the function of the subordinating connectors. Syntactically, nominal and adverbial conjunctions do not perform another function than that of establishing a link between the main and the subordinate clause; rela-

tive conjunctions, on the other hand, mainly belong to the class of pronouns and adverbs, which means that, in addition to their connecting function, they also play a part in the syntactic configuration of the subordinate clause by filling an argument or a satellite slot in the corresponding proposition.

The fundamental point of departure for the study of adjective clauses is the traditional distinction between restrictive and non-restrictive clauses. In Spanish, we do not only find the terms *oración restrictiva* vs. *no restrictiva*, but also *oración especificativa* vs. *explicativa*, respectively. In 5 the difference between the two types of adjective clauses was illustrated by the contrast between *los alumnos que vivían lejos llegaron tarde a la escuela* ('the pupils who lived far away arrived at school late') and *los alumnos, que vivían lejos, llegaron tarde a la escuela* ('the pupils, who lived far away, arrived at school late'). In the former sentence, the set of pupils is split into two subsets, i.e., pupils who live far and pupils who do not live far from school. The statement made only conveys information about the first subset, indicating that its members came to school late.⁷² In the latter sentence, by contrast, reference is made to the set of all pupils, who, living far away, happened to come at school late. Orthographically, reference to a non-restrictive set is usually indicated by comma-punctuation.

From the foregoing introduction it is clear that restrictive clauses perform a purely referential function dividing the set of objects referred to by the antecedent into two subsets, i.e., a subset satisfying the qualification expressed by the adjective clause and a subset not satisfying that qualification. Non-restrictive clauses, in contrast, do not fulfill a referential function on account of the fact that their antecedent is already fully specified. A characteristic case in point is the proper noun, which serves the exclusive purpose of identifying objects in the real world: persons, institutions, countries, etc. Accordingly, adjective clauses characterizing proper nouns are non-restrictive by nature. Comparable to proper nouns are personal, demonstrative, and possessive pronouns, which can be described as referential categories expressing "el grado máximo de determinación" (Giménez Resano 1987:215). Thus, for instance, the restrictive reading of *esta criada* in the following sentence would be ungrammatical:

- (373) *En la agencia me aconsejaron esta criada que sabe guisar
(‘At the agency they advised me this servant who can cook’)

Obviously, the problem does not arise with the non-restrictive reading:

- (373) a. En la agencia me aconsejaron esta criada, que sabe guisar
(‘At the agency they recommended me this servant, who can cook’)

Now, if non-restrictive adjective clauses do not play a referential part in the semantic configuration of the sentence, what kind of purpose do they serve? The answer is that they offer the speaker the opportunity of conveying a particular qualification of the antecedent. Put another way, non-restrictive clauses are appositive clauses fulfilling the function of an autonomous assertion. Syntactic evidence for this interpretation may be seen from the fact that a non-restrictive clause is paraphrasable as an integrated part of a coordinated sentence. Compare, e.g., the transformation of *Los alumnos, que vivían lejos, llegaron tarde a la escuela* into *Los alumnos vivían lejos y llegaron tarde a la escuela* ('The pupils lived far away and arrived at school late').⁷³ Usually, the person responsible for the content of the non-restrictive clause is the speaker of the sentence. In reported speech, however, ambiguity may arise as to the identity of the source of the information. Thus, discussing the example:

- (374) Juan dice que su novia, que es un poco aventurera, quiere ir a pelear a El Salvador
 ('Juan says that his girlfriend, who is — IND — a bit adventurous, wants to go and fight in El Salvador')

Solano-Araya (1987: 86) properly points out that without knowledge of the relevant context or situation of utterance it is impossible to ascertain whether the statement *que es un poco aventurera* was made by the speaker or by *Juan*.

The modal analysis of the non-restrictive clause does not pose any special problems if we take into account its assertive illocutionary force. More precisely, it is the *realis* character of the non-restrictive proposition which brings about the use of the indicative mood. Nevertheless, two exceptional situations must be distinguished. First, the subjunctive mood appears when a ritual optative formula is used to show an emotional attitude towards the person identified by the antecedent. This is what happens, for example, in *Tu bisabuela, que en gloria esté, era una mujer muy valiente* ('Your great-grandmother, God rest her soul, was a very brave woman') and *Visitaremos a María, a quien Dios bendiga* ('We shall visit María, God bless her'). Note that in the former case the use of *que* represents an instance of structural ambiguity; it may be taken as a relative pronoun or as a conjunction introducing an optative complement clause. In either case, of course, the *irrealis* interpretation of the subordinate proposition must be specified in terms of 'anticipation'. A quite different use of the subjunctive is involved in the following sentence:

- (375) Don Juan Carlos... refrendó con su presencia el desagravio de la ciudad al doctor Robert, que fuera presidente de la Diputación barcelonesa

(‘Don Juan Carlos... manifested with his presence the apology of the city to Dr. Robert, who was — IND — president of the delegation from Barcelona’)

Lunn (1989 b: 254) explains the occurrence of *fuera* as an instance of background information which assiduous readers of the text have been expected to know already. Reference to this kind of discourse knowledge is embedded in sentences that report new information in the main clause.

Let us proceed next to the analysis of restrictive adjective clauses, which represent a rather complex category, both from a syntactic and a semantic point of view. As to the former, attention will be devoted to the distribution of the indicative and the subjunctive mood; as to the latter, the *realis*, *potentialis*, and *irrealis* parameter, primarily developed to determine the truth value of the complement proposition, will be applied to analyze the referential properties of the entity the restrictive clause is about.

The following examples, taken from Bull (1965:182), offer an illustration of the way the above criteria interact with modal variation in the restrictive clause:

- Realis*: “The speaker knows what was done: *Le agradezco lo que ha hecho por mi hermana*”
 (‘I thank you for what you have — IND — done for my sister’)
- Potentialis*: “The speaker has no experience: *Le agradezco lo que haya hecho por mi hermana*”
 (‘I thank you for what you may — SUB — have done for my sister’)
- Irrealis*: “The speaker anticipates: *Le agradezco lo que haga por mi hermana*”
 (‘I thank you for what you may — SUB — do for my sister’)

Taking for granted that *realis* reference bears on entities that are both existent and identified or identifiable, we find that *potentialis* and *irrealis* reference show a much more intricate pattern. More strictly, the four following situations need to be distinguished:

- (I) the existence or non-existence of the entity referred to is focused on
- (II) the entity referred to may exist in a virtual world
- (III) the entity referred to cannot be identified
- (IV) it is not obvious whether the entity referred to fits the description given

In regard to these situations, the *realis* parameter applies to (I), the *irrealis* parameter to (I) and (II), and the *potentialis*-parameter to (III) and (IV).

In what follows below, empirical evidence for the classification propounded will be furnished. For explanatory purposes, I will make a selection

of contrastive examples in which each of the *irrealis* and *potentialis* configurations is opposed to its *realis* counterpart. In this way a proper insight can be gained into the modal distribution in restrictive adjective clauses.

(I) *The existence or non-existence of the entity referred to is focused on*

The distinction between existent and non-existent referents of the antecedent is formally dependent upon the presence or absence of a negative marker in the main clause. This may be seen from the following pair of sentences:

- (376) a. Aquí hay cosas que merecen nuestra atención
(‘Here are things which deserve — IND — our attention’)
b. Aquí no hay cosas que merezcan nuestra atención
(‘Here are no things which deserve — SUB — our attention’)
- (377) a. Tiene muchos alumnos que saben hablar alemán
(‘He has many pupils who can — IND — speak German’)
b. No tiene muchos alumnos que sepan hablar alemán
(‘He does not have many pupils who can — SUB — speak German’)

The (a) sentences present a uniform *realis* pattern affirming the existence of the entity referred to by the antecedent. In order for the indicative mood to be selected in the restrictive clause, therefore, it is not necessary that the noun phrase filling the antecedent slot is marked for specificity. Put concretely, the referents of *cosas que merecen nuestra atención* and *muchos alumnos que saben hablar alemán* are not identified, but are identifiable. Although the subjunctive mood appears in both of the relative clauses of the (b) sentences, its use cannot be explained in a homogeneous way. In (376b), the existence of a referent of the antecedent is denied, which brings about an *irrealis* interpretation associated with low information value. The interpretation of (377b) is more complicated. It could be argued that the negation does not exert control over the nominal core of the antecedent, but over the quantifier *muchos*, which leads to the interpretation that that which is basically denied is the number of the pupils involved. Accordingly, one could say that the use of the subjunctive presupposes the existence of the referents of the antecedent.

This interpretation applies without doubt to the following examples, which, though not marked for negative structure, are comparable to (377b):

- (378) Tiene pocos alumnos que sepan hablar alemán
(‘He has few pupils who can — SUB — speak German’)
- (379) Sólo conozco a cuatro alumnos que lo hayan aprobado todo
(‘I only know four pupils who have — SUB — passed the whole exam’)

Pérez Saldanya (1999:3276) comments on these sentences in the following way:

La oración [(378)], por ejemplo, presupone la existencia de alumnos que saben hablar alemán pero asevera que, contrariamente a lo que se podría esperar, el número de dichos alumnos es escaso. De manera paralela, la oración [(379)] presupone que hay cuatro alumnos que lo han aprobado todo pero asevera que, contrariamente a lo que sería esperable, nadie, excepto estos cuatro alumnos lo ha hecho.

(‘Sentence [(378)], for instance, presupposes the existence of pupils who can speak German but asserts that, contrary to what one could expect, the number of these pupils is limited. In a parallel way, sentence [(379)] presupposes that there are four pupils who have passed the whole exam but asserts that, contrary to what could be expected, no one, except these four pupils, has done so’)

Saldanya’s conclusion, finally, runs as follows:

Dicho con otras palabras: con subjuntivo, el cuantificador es el elemento informativo más importante y el resto del SN, incluida la relativa, queda relegado a un segundo plano informativo (1999:3276).

(‘In other words: with the subjunctive, the quantifier is the most important informative element and the rest of the NP, the relative clause included, is pushed into the background’)

From these analyses it may be deduced that the use of the subjunctive appearing in sentences such as (378) and (379) leads to an implicit concessive interpretation of the sentence.

Note that a similar situation holds when a negative main clause contains a predicate with inherently negative meaning. Compare, e.g.:

- (380) a. No faltan, sin embargo, lingüistas que adoptan una posición contraria
 (‘There are, however, linguists who adopt — IND — the opposite position’)
- b. No faltan lingüistas que adopten una posición contraria
 (‘There are linguists who adopt — SUB — the opposite position’)

In (380a), the indicative form *adoptan* is selected because the restrictive clause serves to focus on the existence of the class of linguists referred to. The use of the subjunctive in (380b), by contrast, presupposes the existence of this class; what is asserted by the speaker is that they cannot be ignored.

Needless to say, in affirmative main clauses the use of *faltar* triggers the subjunctive mood in the restrictive clause if its antecedent is marked for non-specificity. Consider, for example:

- (381) Faltaba un profesor que nos enseñara sociología
(‘There was no professor who taught — SUB — us sociology’)

(II) *The entity referred to may exist in a virtual world*

In this section we will address a class of predicates which exerts direct control over the modal output of the restrictive clause. Representative members of this class are: *buscar* (‘to look for’), *intentar* (‘to attempt’), *necesitar* (‘to need’), and *querer* (‘to want’). It is characteristic of these predicates that, in certain syntactic configurations, their use may give rise to referential ambiguity. Thus, for instance:

- (382) Leonor quiere ir a estudiar en una universidad americana
(‘Leonor wants to study at an American university’)

can be interpreted, depending on the context or situation of utterance, in two different ways, i.e., the indefinite article may be attributed a specific or a non-specific reading. In the former case, *Leonor* has already chosen an American university; in the latter, she is still looking for one. In the literature on the subject, it is customary to qualify the predicates under discussion as *virtual predicates* (Kleiber 1981:283) or predicates that create *opaque contexts*. The reason for this is that, with respect to the non-specific reading of sentences such as (382), no conclusion can be drawn with respect to the existence or non-existence of the entity referred to.

In restrictive adjective clauses, however, the ambiguity disappears because the selection of the indicative or subjunctive mood indicates whether or not a specific entity is involved. Let us consider the following pairs of examples:

- (383) a. Busco un libro en el que se analiza el modo en las oraciones de relativa
(‘I am looking for a book in which mood in relative clauses is — IND — analyzed’)
b. Busco un libro en el que se analice el modo en las oraciones de relativa
(‘I am looking for a book in which mood in relative clauses is — SUB — analyzed’)
- (384) a. María intenta casarse con un millonario que tiene yate
(‘María intends to marry a millionaire who has — IND — a yacht’)
b. María intenta casarse con un millonario que tenga yate
(‘María intends to marry a millionaire who has — SUB — a yacht’)

The use of the indicative mood in the restrictive clauses of (383a) and (384a)

reflects the *realis* interpretation of the referent of the antecedent, which is both existent and identifiable. In the (b) sentences, by contrast, the use of the subjunctive must be associated with an *irrealis* interpretation of the entity referred to by the antecedent. More strictly, in these sentences *un libro* and *un millonario* express a virtual type of reference, since their referents cannot be identified at reference time, that is, in the cases under review, the moment of speech. Being more explicit on this point, we can say that the class of virtual predicates may select complement clauses whose propositions are not true at *t*, i.e., at reference time, but may become true at *t + i*, i.e., in a possible or virtual world. Remember that, when discussing desiderative and optative predicates, to which the same approach applies, we characterized the prospective point of view involved in terms of ‘anticipation’.

The above analysis implies that non-virtual predicates cannot create possible worlds or opaque contexts. Consequently, these predicates require the use of the indicative mood in the restrictive clause, as may be seen from:

- (385) a. María se casa con un millonario que tiene yate
 (‘María marries a millionaire who has — IND — a yacht’)
 b. *María se casa con un millonario que tenga yate
 (‘María marries a millionaire who has — SUB — a yacht’)

(III) *The entity referred to cannot be identified*

It can be stated as a general rule that the antecedent of the restrictive clause is marked for non-specificity if the entity referred to is not identifiable. With respect to modal distribution, various situations have to be distinguished. First of all, the speaker may express uncertainty about the existence of the referent of the antecedent. This is illustrated by a question such as :

- (386) ¿Hay algún sitio donde podamos comer?
 (‘Is there some place where we can — SUB — eat?’)

In this sentence, of course, the use of the subjunctive must be associated with the *potentialis* character of the restrictive clause. On the part of the speaker, there is no presupposition concerning an affirmative or negative answer to the question. However, we also find communication situations where the speaker presupposes that an affirmative answer will be given. In these cases, a negative marker is inserted to indicate that the speaker’s expectation is not neutral but biased. Furthermore, the affirmative answer is anticipated by the use of the indicative mood in the restrictive clause. Consider the following variant of (386):

- (387) ¿No hay ningún sitio donde podemos comer?
(‘Is there no place where we can — IND — eat?’)

The *potentialis* interpretation may also stem from the use of lexical items expressing possibility, uncertainty, or doubt. A characteristic case in point is the modal verb *pod*er. Pérez Saldanya (1999: 3261) provides the following example:

- (388) Puede que haya conocido a una persona que estudie en la Universidad de Nuevo México
(‘It may be that she has — SUB — met a person who studies at the University of New Mexico’)

In sentences such as (388), the non-specific nature of the antecedent as well as the appearance of the subjunctive mood in the relative clause can be seen as manifestations of what Pérez Saldanya calls *valor epistémico de eventualidad* (‘epistemic value of eventuality’).

Non-specificity of the antecedent also plays a crucial part in certain relative clauses bearing a conditional relation to the main clause. Some relevant examples are:

- (389) El concursante que consiga contestar esta pregunta obtendrá un premio millonario
(‘The contestant who manages — SUB — to answer this question will get a prize of one million’)
- (390) Un lingüista que haya analizado una lengua exótica sabe lo complicado que es
(‘A linguist who has — SUB — analyzed an exotic language knows how complicated it is’)
- (391) Cualquier coche que tenga catalizador goza de ventajas fiscales⁷⁴
(‘Any car that has — SUB — a catalytic converter enjoys fiscal advantages’)

As pointed out by Pérez Saldanya, empirical evidence for the conditional link between the main and the adjective clause is produced by syntactic structure, since the relative clause performing the role of protasis fills the thematic slot of the sentence, preceding the main clause, which, filling the rhematic slot, performs the role of apodosis. This order of the clauses is irreversible. It can be argued, therefore, that, as far as the use of the subjunctive mood is concerned, we are not only dealing with non-specificity of the antecedent, but also with a type of relative clause that imposes a certain condition on the

antecedent to be satisfied for the proposition of the main clause to come true.

Next, I wish to draw attention to non-specific antecedents that bear on entities with low information value. The relevance of these entities is downgraded because their identity does not play a crucial part in the verbal exchange. In the following example, the referent of the antecedent is existent but cannot be identified by the speaker:

- (392) Quiero que venga el que haya escrito eso
(‘I want the person who has — SUB — written that to come here’)

Ligatto (1996: 15) points out that in this sentence the subjunctive mood must be used:

... cuando [el hablante, H. H.] no conoce la identidad del autor y no quiere comprometerse afirmando su existencia o presencia entre los que lo rodean.
(‘... when [the speaker] does not know the identity of the writer and does not want to commit himself/herself to stating his existence or presence among those who are surrounding him/her’)

Consider also the two following examples, where low relevance basically stems from lack of interest or indifference:

- (393) No me importa la fuente de información que hayas utilizado
(‘I do not care what source of information you have — SUB — used’)
- (394) Me da igual lo que puedas haber descubierto
(‘It is all the same to me what you may — SUB — have discovered’)

(IV) *It is not obvious whether the entity referred to fits the description given*
Given a set of entities making up a certain field of comparison, it may be difficult for the speaker to decide which entity is the optimum representative of the field. The speaker may be in doubt, for instance, as to attributing a superlative value to the entity selected or to ascertaining whether or not the entity is the first one of a set or series. The problem of identification involved can be said to be caused by what Farkas (1985: 149) calls “the vastness of the field of comparison.” Looking at these matters from a truthfunctional point of view, we see that the restrictive clause may have both a *potentialis* or a *realis* character. Let us examine first some examples of the *potentialis* category:

- (395) Se trata del espectáculo más interesante que haya visto
(‘I am talking about the most interesting show I have — SUB — seen’)
- (396) Es la única ciudad que me haya cautivado con su belleza
(‘It is the only city which has — SUB — captivated me with its beauty’)

- (397) Era el primer libro que se hubiera publicado sobre el tema
(‘It was the first book that had — SUB — been published on the subject’)

In each of these sentences, the field of comparison referred to must be regarded as a global field consisting of a set of unspecified entities. As a consequence, it may be the case that the speaker has overlooked a relevant entity. It can be argued, therefore, that the use of the subjunctive reflects the speaker’s not being completely certain that the entity selected fits best the specific characteristics of the set.

Now, unlike what seems to be implied by the above analysis, the use of the subjunctive is by no means exclusive. Thus, examples (395)–(397) have the following indicative counterparts:

- (395) a. Se trata del espectáculo más interesante que he visto
(‘I am talking about the most interesting show I have — IND — seen’)
- (396) a. Es la única ciudad que me ha cautivado con su belleza
(‘It is the only city which has — IND — captivated me with its beauty’)
- (397) a. Era el primer libro que se había publicado sobre el tema
(‘It was the first book that had — IND — been published on the subject’)

These indicative sentences point to the speaker’s regarding the field of comparison as a field composed of clearly distinct elements. Put another way: “Speaker implies that all possibilities have been covered” (Castronovo 1984: 557).

The above interpretation suggests that the modal distinction between sentences (395)–(397), on the one hand, and sentences (395a)–(397a), on the other, should be described in terms of contrastive distribution. Statistical research, however, has demonstrated that in not less than 96.7% of the clauses investigated the use of the indicative mood is preferred (Maschelein 1990: 62). Furthermore, comparative studies also indicate a sporadic use of the subjunctive in contemporary Spanish:

... la frecuencia del subjuntivo es mucho mayor en francés y en italiano (con unos porcentajes del 44% y el 63%, respectivamente) que en español y catalán (con un porcentaje del 9% para el catalán y todavía inferior para el castellano) (Pérez Saldanya 1999: 3278).

(‘... the frequency of the subjunctive is much higher in French and Italian (with

percentages of 44 and 63, respectively) than in Spanish and Catalan (with a percentage of 9 for Catalan and even less for Spanish')

Evidently, these quantitative differences are difficult to explain, which is probably the reason that some authors have put forth that the use of the subjunctive mood in Spanish is not authentic, but rather represents an imitation of the use of the French *subjunctif*.

The following quotation contains a survey of the major descriptions and explanations offered in this section:

... el subjuntivo es el modo de la no aserción y se caracteriza por el hecho de no afirmar la existencia del referente, bien porque no tiene una referencia específica (o el hablante duda de ella), bien porque, a pesar de ser específica, no constituye el objetivo básico de la comunicación. El indicativo, por el contrario, es el modo de la aserción y se caracteriza por afirmar la existencia del referente o por otorgar un carácter asertivo al contenido de la oración relativa en contextos en los que el antecedente tiene una mención genérica y la relativa designa hechos habituales (Pérez Saldanya 1999: 3258).

(... the subjunctive is the mood of non-assertion; it is characterized by the fact that it does not state the existence of the referent, either because it does not have a specific reference (or the speaker may not be sure about it), or because, though it is specific, it does not constitute the basic aim of the communication. The indicative, on the contrary, is the mood of assertion; it is characterized by the fact that it states the existence of the referent or brings about an assertive interpretation of the content of the relative clause in contexts where the antecedent has a generic status and the clause describes habitual facts')

In the diagram which follows below the distribution of the indicative and subjunctive mood in adjective clauses is represented in terms of the *realis*, *potentialis*, or *irrealis* interpretation of the subordinate proposition. Since non-restrictive clauses invariably select the indicative mood, as they focus on real states of affairs, attention will be solely devoted to restrictive clauses. For purposes of illustration, reference will be made to prototypical examples discussed in the present section.

Diagram 8

indicative	→	<i>realis</i>	(376a)
subjunctive	→	<i>realis</i> (backgrounding)	(380b)
		<i>potentialis</i>	(388)
		<i>irrealis</i>	(376b)
		<i>irrealis</i> (anticipation)	(383b)

5.4 *De que*-clauses

This last section focuses attention on a minor category of noun clauses, which, at first sight, bear a formal resemblance to adjective clauses. In actual fact, however, they have a quite different grammatical status. To start with, compare the following pair of examples:

- (398) La idea de la que me hablaste ayer me parece de difícil plasmación
(‘The idea you talked — IND — to me about yesterday seems to me difficult to implant’)
- (399) La idea de que el presidente dimita inmediatamente no es compartida por todos
(‘The idea that the president should — SUB — resign immediately is not shared by everyone’)

The contrast between the adjective and nominal function of the *de que*-clauses in, respectively, (398) and (399), can be demonstrated by means of the following distinctive features.

In (398), the relative pronoun performs a double syntactic role: it establishes an anaphoric link with the antecedent, while, at the same time, it fills the slot of one of the arguments of the predicate *hablaste*, i.e., it functions as a prepositional complement of that predicate. Furthermore, the relative pronoun has undergone an expansion whose output contains a pronominal copy of the antecedent. Semantically, no constraints apply to the lexical nature of the antecedent, so that, in addition to abstract nouns such as *idea*, any concrete noun may be selected. The absence of selection restrictions stems from the fact that the relative pronoun performs an exclusively referential function copying, as we have seen in the previous section, the identifying properties of the antecedent.

In (399), the conjunctive element does not have referential meaning, but operates as a complementizer, which means that it introduces a complement clause specifying the meaning of the preceding noun. Consequently, the following syntactic conditions obtain: the conjunction *que* does not play an argument role in the embedded clause nor can it be expanded into a complex phrase containing a pronominal copy of the preceding noun. From a semantic point of view, it is to be noticed that the complement-taking noun is subject to the constraint that it expresses abstract meaning.

It is a particular property of Spanish that the noun and the complement clause are linked to each other by the preposition *de*. In the majority of languages, even in those typologically related to Spanish, such as Catalan,

French or Italian, this kind of preposition insertion does not take place (Brucart 1999: 401).

It can be argued (Rigau 1999: 352) that mood selection in *de que*-clauses is not necessarily determined by the meaning of the complement-taking noun but by the meaning of the main proposition. Thus, instead of, e.g.:

- (400) *Circula la noticia de que el presidente va a dimitir*
 ('The news is circulating that the president is — IND — going to resign')

and

- (401) *Defiende la idea de que no salga la procesión*
 ('He defends the idea that the procession should — SUB — not take place')

we can also get:

- (400) a. *Circula que el presidente va a dimitir*

and

- (401) a. *Defiende que no salga la procesión*

In other words, the presence or absence of the nouns *noticia* and *idea* does not influence the *realis* interpretation of the complement propositions of (400) and (400a) nor the *irrealis* interpretation of the complement propositions of (401) and (401a). Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the lexical meaning of the complement-taking noun may trigger the use of a specific mood:

The nouns *esperanza* ('hope'), *posibilidad* ('possibility'), *probabilidad* ('probability'), *creencia* ('belief') are clearly related to corresponding verbs and adjectives which mean more or less the same thing. These nouns take the same mood as their corresponding expressions... (Solano-Araya 1987: 197–198).

In the literature, most research has been conducted into mood selection in the complement clause of *el hecho de que* ('the fact that') or its reduced form *el que*. The obvious reason for this is that, on account of its lexical meaning, the use of *el hecho de que* suggests that a real state of affairs is brought to the attention of the receiver of the message, while, in actual fact, the frequent occurrence of the subjunctive mood suggests the description of a non-real state of affairs.

In regard to the modal output of *el hecho de que* clauses, Fente et al. (1977: 54) offer an explanation in terms of the register used by the speaker:

... existe una decidida tendencia en el habla cuidada a usar el subjuntivo.
 ('... there exists a marked tendency to use the subjunctive in careful speech')

One of the examples they provide is:

- (402) El hecho de que venga a vernos significa que nos tiene afecto
(‘The fact that he is — SUB — coming to see us means that he has affection for us’)

The same page contains an example with the indicative mood:

- (403) Y todo ha surgido del hecho de que Juan II el Gordo engulló en aquel lugar unos manjares hace 569 años
(‘And everything originated from the fact that 569 years ago Juan II el Gordo bolted — IND — down some delicacies in that place’)

Now, it is difficult to see why (402) would be a specimen of cultivated language while (403) would not. Actually, what we are concerned with is not a difference in register or style but the syntactic effect of the speaker’s choice between foregrounding and backgrounding of information. In sentence-initial position, the *el hecho de que*-clause typically provides thematic information, i.e. information presupposed by the speaker to be known by the hearer. Thus, in (402), the content of *el hecho de que venga a vernos* is de-emphasized, as a result of which the subjunctive mood appears in the complement clause. In this example, it is the predicate *significa que nos tiene afecto*, i.e., the filler of the rhematic slot of the sentence, which expresses the core of the information. In (403), the opposite situation holds. The referent of the thematic subject *todo* is presupposed to be known by the hearer through his/her knowledge of the context or situation of utterance. The contrastive or new information concerning this subject is transmitted by the complement clause of *del hecho de que*. The selection of the indicative form *engulló*, therefore, reflects foregrounding of that information. Note, incidentally, that the identificatory force inherent in the use of the demonstrative pronoun *aquel* is in perfect harmony with the interpretation propounded.

The following exposition may serve as a summary of our discussion of the syntax and pragmatics of the *el hecho de que*-clause:

In pre-matrix position, an *el hecho (de) que* clause normally refers to information already known (i.e., shared) and takes the Subjunctive as in: *Pero el hecho de que no la llamaran la afectó muchísimo* (‘But the fact that they did — SUB — not call her upset her terribly’). In contrast, in post-matrix position, this type of clause normally introduces new information into discourse and takes the Indicative as in: *Una cosa que la afectó muchísimo fue el hecho de que no la llamaron* (‘Something that upset her terribly was the fact that they did — IND — not call her’)” (Guitart 1984: 165).

Conclusion

Although our central object of research consisted of not more than three paradigms of the Spanish verb, the imperative, the indicative and the subjunctive mood, the analysis of these categories has resulted in the production of a new book, which can be added to the impressive number of publications devoted to the subject in the course of time. The wide variety of the studies in question, many of which are included in the list of references of this book, derives from the fact that research into the modal system of the Spanish verb can be conducted from different perspectives and within different frames of reference.

The fundamental purpose of the present book has been the critical discussion, revision and elaboration of previous approaches, with particular emphasis on the levels of syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. As to semantic analysis, a proposal has been offered for a new classification of clause-embedding predicates, the underlying idea being that a coherent and self-contained typology of these predicates is indispensable for describing and explaining in a consistent way the modal output of the complement clause. The framework chosen stems from the insight that clause-embedding predicates share the property of providing information on the set of mental processes that characterize intentional human behavior. More precisely, these predicates can be divided into three major classes, each of which represents one of the components or modules of the input-output mechanism involved. In chronological order, we are dealing first with the class of acquisition of knowledge predicates, which describe the processing of perceptual and conceptual information. The second class is composed of predicates describing the storing and assessing of the input information. Two major subclasses are to be distinguished here, viz., the classes containing cognition and evaluation predicates. The third class of clause-embedding predicates describes categories involved in the output of intentional behavior; the basic subclasses are those that denote causative acts, mental acts, and speech acts.

The foregoing classification is claimed to cover not only the entirety of clause-embedding predicates, but also to offer the possibility of making reliable predictions about the distribution of the indicative and subjunctive

mood in the complement clause. Specifically, by virtue of the lexical class to which it belongs, the use of the embedding predicate creates, in strict correlation with the affirmative or negative structure of the main clause, a truth-functional space or domain in which the complement proposition is attributed a *realis*, *potentialis* or *irrealis* interpretation. The analytical power of these parameters is not restricted to noun clauses, but extends to any type of sentence, both subordinate and non-subordinate. In regard to the *realis*, *potentialis* or *irrealis* status of the proposition, it was found that *realis* propositions trigger the use of the indicative, and *potentialis* and *irrealis* propositions the use of the subjunctive mood, the remarkable exception being propositions that express presupposed or backgrounded information. In these cases, the use of the subjunctive is required. It was claimed that the explanation for these phenomena has to be sought at the level of pragmatic analysis. More precisely, one can formulate the general rule that the subjunctive mood marks propositions expressing low or relatively low truthfunctional information. Low information value is characteristic of *irrealis* propositions; relatively low information value typifies *potentialis* propositions. As to propositions expressing presupposed, backgrounded or downgraded information, the principle of relevance can be claimed to be operative. Thus, for instance, at discourse level, the use of the subjunctive is often indicative of the fact that the speaker wishes to deny that the proposition expressed conveys information to be seriously taken into account. In this way, the status of an argument put forth by the interlocutor can be downgraded.

In more general terms, it can be argued that the distribution of Spanish mood described in terms of the contrast between high and low information value reflects in a particular manner the structure of a language employed by speakers who are cooperative in the sense of Grice's first maxim of quantity: "Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange)" (1975:45).

Notes

1. The following observation, which dates back to 1981, may still be considered valid: "... at present, within the framework of 'classical' speech act theory, nobody seems to be able to offer a considerably better theoretical classification than the one to be found in Searle (1976)" (Parret, Sbisà, Verschueren 1981: 11).
2. Instead of 'directive', some authors also employ the term 'impositive'.
3. A similar process takes place in sentences with periphrastic constructions. In these constructions, however, we are not dealing with complementary but free variation. Consider, e.g. :
 - (a) Le estoy escribiendo una carta
 - (b) Estoy escribiéndole una carta
(‘I am writing him a letter’)
4. In Dik (1989) a more elaborated typology of the interrelations between predicates and states of affairs is proposed. For present purposes, however, the original framework better suits the descriptive needs.
5. Dik (1980) mentions the following English examples: *Action*: ‘John kissed Jane’. *Process*: ‘John fell in love with Jane’; *Position*: ‘John held Jane in his arms’; *State*: ‘John is in love with Jane’.
6. Note that, in regard to the interpretation of examples (6)–(18), it is the prototypical meaning of action, process, position, and state predicates which is focused on. In the present context, we are not concerned with specific interpretations of these predicates as determined by the context or situation of utterance. In the following example, for instance, the state verb *saber* appears in an imperative sentence, which suggests an interpretation not in terms of a mental state but in terms of a mental act: *Si es usted el que me ha denunciado sepa que mi barco está minado* (‘If you are the one who has denounced me, you should know that my ship has been mined’).
7. It is a striking fact that Spanish grammars hardly devote attention to the pragmatic analysis of the imperative. The Real Academia, for instance, limits itself to the following description:

El imperativo ... es un modo especial que responde exclusivamente a la función activa del lenguaje, y expresa exhortación, mandato o ruego dirigidos a otra persona, de la cual depende que la acción se realice o no (1981: 454). (‘The imperative ... is a special mood that exclusively corresponds to the active function of language; it expresses exhortation, order, or request addressed to another person, on whom it depends whether the action is performed or not’)

8. Consider the following remarks by Navarro Tomás on the phonetic realization of different types of directive speech acts:

Es mayor el contraste entre la recomendación y el ruego, y asimismo entre estos últimos que entre la invitación y la petición, pero es inútil buscar líneas fijas y precisas que delimiten el campo de acción de estas formas ... (1948: 185).

(‘The contrast is more marked between a recommendation and a demand, it is also more marked between these two than between an invitation and a request, but it is useless to look for fixed and precise demarcation lines that delimit the working area of these forms’)

Navarro Tomás supports his statement with a literary fragment from Bécquer, in which even the intonation of a typically polite utterance such as *¿Me quiere usted dar esa pintura que ha hecho?* (‘Will you give me that painting that you have made?’) gives rise to more than one directive interpretation:

Señorito — me dijo con un acento que él procuró suavizar todo lo posible — voy a pedirle a Ud. un favor — ¡Un favor! — exclamé yo, sin comprender cuáles podrían ser sus pretensiones; — diga Ud., que si está en mi mano es cosa hecha . — ¿Me quiere Ud. dar esa pintura que ha hecho? — Al oír sus últimas palabras no pude menos de quedarme un poco perplejo; extrañaba por una parte la petición, que no dejaba de ser bastante rara, y por otra el tono, que no podría decirse a punto fijo si era de amenaza o de súplica (1948: 185). (‘Sir — he said to me with an accent he tried to soften as much as possible — I am going to ask you a favor. — A favor! — I exclaimed without understanding what could be his desire; — go ahead, if it is in my power, it shall be done — Will you give that painting that you did? — When I heard his last words, I could not help feeling a little puzzled; on the one hand, I was surprised at the request, which was rather unusual and, on the other, at the tone, of which one could not say exactly if it corresponded to a menace or an entreaty’)

9. An extensive research study into Spanish and Spanish American paralinguistic signs has been conducted by Meo-Zilio and Mejía (1980, 1983).
10. For an analysis of a wide variety of directives within the framework of speech act theory, see Haverkate (1979: 93–98).
11. Obviously, speakers may tell a lie. This however doesn’t affect the present analysis, since lying speakers also have the intention to convince the hearer that the words uttered describe a real state of affairs. It is for this reason that Searle extends his definition of assertives to lies as well: “[assertives], where we tell our hearers (truly or untruly) how things are” (1983: 166).
12. Justifying assertions in general and assumptions in particular is a frequent phenomenon in verbal interaction, which requires an explanation from a socio-psychological point of view. In this connection, consider the following observation:

Let us look next at a secondary purpose speakers may attempt to achieve in performing speech acts. This purpose stems from their wish to make a favorable impression on their hearers. More specifically, speakers tend to express themselves in such a way that their hearers consider them reasonable and sociable, thinking and acting persons.

Therefore, in most types of interaction speakers develop strategies ... to create, preserve, or increase a positive image of themselves (Haverkate 1984: 42).

A similar point of view has been put forward concerning the speech act of arguing:

Thus, instead of presupposing that the goal of arguing is to convince *alter* of the truth of one's own statement (opinion), of reaching a consensus, we can now include a goal such as conveying a certain image of *ego* to *alter* (the rational intellectual who 'thinks it out logically') (Quasthoff 1978: 13).

13. Consider the following observation:

In all languages we find special sentence types classifiable as Declaratives, Interrogatives, and Imperatives, and in most languages we find a special sentence type for Exclamatives. Accordingly, we regard these illocutionary values as the *basic illocutions* distinguished in natural languages (Dik 1989: 256).

In the present study, we will be dealing with exclamative sentences in the section on optative speech acts (3.3.1).

14. With respect to another Romance language, Italian, Sbisà observes:

Finally, in languages such as Italian — in which the interrogative sentence type may not differ from the declarative but for intonational features — the distinction between an interrogative sentence and a declarative one may be a matter of degree, and in many intermediate cases the utterance of the sentence may appear as neither a question nor an assertive speech act, but as an expression of doubt or the advancing of a suggestion (1987: 2).

Lyons does not exclude the possibility that in some languages interrogatives are marked for dubitative mood:

There may well be languages, however, with a mood whose basic function is that of expressing doubt or qualifying the speaker's commitment to truth; ... there are parallels between questions and dubitative, or epistemically qualified, utterances such that it would not be unreasonable to expect that what is basically a dubitative mood might be regularly used both for posing questions and expressing doubt or uncertainty (1977: 748).

15. Note that we are referring here to informative questions, not to questions that do not primarily elicit an answer from the addressee, such as rhetorical questions and directive questions. Some examples of the latter category were discussed in 3.1.2: *¿Puedes darme la llave?* ('Can you give me the key?'), *¿Quieres darme la llave?* ('Will you give me the key?'), etc.

16. It should be noticed that when explaining the use of the indicative mood, Spanish grammars exclusively focus on declarative and not on interrogative sentences. Compare, for instance, the following quotation from the Real Academia:

Si decimos *La puerta está cerrada*, *Sabía que habían llegado*, *No asistiré mañana a la junta* afirmamos o negamos hechos pensando que se producen, se produjeron o se producirán en la realidad; empleamos al enunciarlos el modo indicativo (1981: 454). ('If we say 'The door is closed', 'I knew that they had arrived', 'I shall not be present at the meeting tomorrow', we confirm or deny facts thinking that they take place, took place or will take place in reality; in expressing them we use the indicative mood')

17. In classical speech act theory a fifth class of speech acts is distinguished, viz. the class of *declaratives*, which have a ceremonial performative status. In uttering a declarative the speaker makes an explicit reference to the speech act he/she is performing. In Spanish, the output of ceremonial performatives is marked by indicative mood, as may be seen, e.g. from *Abro la sesión* ('I open the session'), *Bautizo este barco con el nombre de María Cristina* ('I name this ship María Cristina'), and *Juro que no conozco al acusado* ('I swear that I do not know the accused').

18. The polyfunctional character of the indicative as a verbal category should not be considered an isolated phenomenon; the same is true of the paradigms of the tense system, where the present indicative, for instance, does not always refer to the period including coding time as in *Me siento malo* ('I feel ill'), but also to the future: *Me marcho pasado mañana* ('I shall leave the day after tomorrow'), or even to the past, as illustrated by the so-called 'historical present': *Ayer me llama y me dice que no quiere hacerlo* ('Yesterday he calls me and says to me that he does not want to do it'). Therefore, Lyons is right in stating: "Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that there is probably no tense, mood, or aspect ... in any language whose sole function is the one that is implied by the name that is conventionally given to it in the grammar of the language" (1977: 682).

19. Note that we do not take into consideration here the indicative interpretation of the *raparadigm*, which will be discussed in 5.2.1.

20. In older phases of the language the *futuro de subjuntivo* did exist, but:

... hoy ha desaparecido casi totalmente en el habla de la Península, sustituido por el presente de indicativo (*Si alguien duda ...*) o de subjuntivo (*Cuando alguien dude ...*). Se conserva, así como el futuro perfecto (*hubiere cantado*), en la lengua escrita, generalmente solo en algún modismo (*sea lo que fuere*) o en redacción de estilo solemne o burocrático (Seco 1993: 202–203).

(... today it has disappeared almost entirely in the speech of the Peninsula; it has been substituted for the present indicative ('If someone doubts ...') or the subjunctive ('When someone doubts ...'). It still survives, just like the future perfect ('he would have sung'), in the written language, generally only in some idioms ('whatever the case may be') or in solemn or bureaucratic style')

21. Examples such as *¡Dios la perdone!* ('May God forgive her!') and *¡Viva el presidente!* ('Long live the president') clearly show that, in contrast to the assertive subjunctive, the optative one may appear autonomously, without the syntactic control of specific adverbial constituents.

22. In interrogative sentences, *acaso* expresses an assumption uttered for manipulative reasons. The obligatory use of the indicative in this case suggests, first, that the speaker is able to motivate the assumption, and, second, that he/she already knows the answer to the question. In this type of interrogatives *acaso* is pragmatically equivalent to *es que*; in other words, examples such as *¿Acaso te he engañado?* ('Have I deceived you or something?') and *¿Es que te he engañado?* are free variants of one and the same rhetorical question.

23. For some statistical information on the modal distribution under review, consider:

Los resultados de las investigaciones que se llevan a cabo en el presente análisis per-

miten llegar a ciertas conclusiones. En primer lugar, hay una fuerte predominancia del empleo del indicativo con los adverbios “probablemente”, “posiblemente”, “acaso”, “quizá(s)”, y “tal vez”, los cuales considerados en su totalidad, arrojan un porcentaje de empleo de indicativo de 69% en contraste con 31% de empleo de subjuntivo, o sea que con estos adverbios el uso del indicativo sobrepasa más de dos veces el del subjuntivo (DeMello 1995: 358). (‘The results of the investigations carried out in the present analysis allow us to draw some conclusions. First, there is a strong predominance of the use of the indicative with the adverbs “probably”, “possibly”, “maybe”, “perhaps”, and “maybe”, which, considered in their entirety, take the indicative in 69 % of the cases in contrast to 31% corresponding to the use of the subjunctive’)

24. In this connection, compare:

It has been suggested ... that in languages in which a past tense is used as a hypothetical the past tense actually means ‘remote from present reality’ rather ‘preceding the moment of speech’. James points out a problem with this approach, which is that in normal contexts, the past tense, say in English or French, continues to mean ‘before the moment of speech’ and cannot be interpreted as merely ‘remote’ or ‘distal’... . What all of these authors have failed to stress is that it is not the past tense alone that is contributing to the hypothetical meaning, but rather the past in combination with a modal verb, a subjunctive mood, a hypothetical marker (such as *if*), or, in some cases, the imperfective aspect (Bybee 1995: 514).

To elaborate on this point, let us consider the following sets of examples:

- | | |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| (I) <i>Quiero hacer una pregunta</i> | (II) <i>Hago una pregunta</i> |
| <i>Quería hacer una pregunta</i> | <i>Hacía una pregunta</i> |
| <i>Querría hacer una pregunta</i> | <i>Haría una pregunta</i> |
| <i>Quisiera hacer una pregunta</i> | <i>hiciera una pregunta</i> |
| (‘I want to ask a question’) | (‘I ask a question’) |
| (‘I wanted to ask a question’) | (‘I asked a question’) |
| (‘I would like to ask a question’) | (‘I would ask a question’) |
| (‘I would like to ask a question’) | (subordinated clause) |

The difference between the modal and the non-modal set can be described as follows: the members of the former are conceptually equivalent, but pragmatically different, whereas the members of the latter are pragmatically equivalent, but conceptually different.

25. The concepts of positive and negative face play a fundamental part in Brown and Levinson’s politeness theory:

Central to our model is a highly abstract notion of ‘face’ which consists of two specific kinds of desire (‘face-wants’) attributed by interactants to one another: the desire to be unimpeded in one’s actions (negative face), and the desire (in some respects) to be approved of (positive face) (1987: 13).

26. Although one would expect that, not only in Spanish but in all languages of the world, the structure of the embedded clause would be determined by that of the main one, and not the other way around, one exceptional situation has been described by Laver and Trudgill (1979). These authors found that speakers of substandard English may inflect the

first-person singular of the present tense in the same way as the third-person singular, so that, for instance, *I sits* serves as a substitute for *I sit*. However, this variant never occurs when a complement clause follows the embedding clause, which leads to the conclusion that the former exerts a certain influence over the structure of the latter. Laver and Trudgill provide the following examples: "... we find *I likes it* and *I wants to do it*, but not *I knows that it's true*" (1979: 23).

27. Indirect reported speech follows the general pattern; it requires a direct object clause introduced by *que*: *Manolo exclamó que no lo haría nunca*.

28. Consider also the following observation:

Most textbooks approach the matter as though it were the subjunctive that must be learned. This approach gives students the impression that the subjunctive is something odd or unusual. This approach also assumes that the indicative will take care of itself, and need not be taught. Thus almost no attention is given to the matrix clauses that require indicative complements (Terrell and Hooper 1974: 493).

29. Compare also Fodor's (1983) conception of the mind as a computer:

... we see the mind as a variety of specialised systems, each with its own method of representation and computation. On the one hand there are the input systems, which process visual, auditory, linguistic and other perceptual information. On the other hand there are the central systems, which integrate information derived from the various input systems and from memory and perform inferential tasks (quoted from Mey and Talbot 1988: 764).

30. The two predicates denoting the remaining senses, *saber* and *oler*, do not express a particular propositional attitude; accordingly, they do not take complement clauses.

31. It is to be noticed that *ver* does not only denote perceptual but also cognitive meaning. The polysemous nature of this lexical item is not surprising if we take into account that the relation between perception and cognition is a causal one: the former process necessarily precedes the latter. From an example such as *Vemos que la lucha contra el racismo no ha terminado aún* ('We see that the fight against racism has not ended yet') it is obvious that the cognitive interpretation of *ver* does not bring about a modal change in the embedded clause; the use of the indicative remains obligatory since the state of affairs described is considered to correspond with factual reality.

32. With respect to the sensory meaning of *sentir*, compare also: "On one interpretation, that of 'hear, feel', this verb classes itself as ... a predicate of perception (or "coming to knowledge") and takes the expected indicative complements only" (Klein 1974: 119).

33. Note that truth value is generally regarded as the cornerstone of the concept of proposition. For purposes of illustration, compare the following definitions:

Aristóteles limitaba la proposición (en realidad el *juicio*, su *logos apofántico*) a todo aquello que reside en lo verdadero o lo falso — es decir, lo que puede someterse a criterio de verdad (Rosenblatt 1965: 24).

(‘Aristoteles restricted the proposition (actually the ‘judgment’, his ‘logos apophanticos’) to everything that has its origin in what is true or false, to what can be subjected to truth conditions’)

... we will maintain in what follows that a proposition is an abstract, theoretical construct, which is used to identify the meaning, or what is expressed by a sentence under specific contextual restrictions (speaker, time, place), and which is related to truth values (Van Dijk and Kintsch 1983: 111).

34. Consider also Guitart's comment on the following sentences:

- “(a) *No noté que mi artículo tenía errores*
 ‘I didn’t notice that my article had — IND — errors’
 (it did have errors and I failed to notice them)
 (b) *No noté que mi artículo tuviera errores*
 ‘I didn’t notice that my article had — SUBJ — errors’
 (I didn’t notice any errors — I doubt that it had any)” (1984: 161).

35. An exceptional counterexample would be *No veo que está lloviendo* (‘I do not see that it is raining’) uttered by a blind speaker. In this case, the factuality of the state of affairs described by the complement clause is not experienced by seeing but by hearing.

36. As regards the use of the subjunctive, Igalada Belchí remarks:

... lo que ocurre es que, al emplear el subjuntivo, el hablante manifiesta que no se compromete en cuanto a la verdad o la existencia de lo que comunica (1987–89: 661).
 (‘... what happens is that when the speaker uses the subjunctive, he makes it clear to the hearer that he does not commit himself to the truth or the existence of what he is communicating’)

37. Compare also: “The tendency toward truth can be ... described as a tendency to make effective contact with reality” (Ransdell 1977: 167).

38. This section is an extended version of Haverkate (1995).

39. The terms ‘focalizing’ and ‘defocalizing’ were introduced in Haverkate (1984) to denote foregrounding and backgrounding strategies in the expression of referential meaning.

40. In some languages, the source of epistemic knowledge is grammatically coded. Consider, for instance, the expression of evidentiality in Turkish:

In Turkish, for example, there are two evidential markers distinguishing between witnessed and non-witnessed events: *-du* is used to report past events that have been directly experienced by the speaker (*Ahmet gel-du* ‘Ahmed came’), whereas *-mes* is used to express inference or hearsay (*Ahmet gel-mes* ‘he/she/it came (apparently, reportedly)’) (Choi 1995: 168).

41. Manipulation of epistemic knowledge may be characteristic of certain types of discourse:

Watson calls attention to the deployment by interrogators of knowledge claims as persuasive devices for inducing suspects to confess. By framing their accounts with such phrases as “we know that X” (rather than using such verbs as “believe”, “think”, or “suppose”) — even when they are based on a hunch or conjecture — police officials create a preference for confirmation. These sorts of knowledge claims seem to require suspects to provide detailed information that addresses the specific contentions

embedded in allegations if they wish to contest the veracity of their interrogators' allegation; they can't, as it were, just say "no" (Briggs 1997: 534–535).

42. It is not an incidental fact of language that the conjunction *si*, which in the context under review introduces so-called *oraciones interrogativas indirectas* ('indirect interrogative sentences') (Gili y Gaya 1955: 269), shares its form with the hypothetical conjunction *si*, since both are involved in the expression of indeterminate truth value. This identity of form and similarity of meaning is also found in languages other than Spanish. The following statement focuses on the double role of English *if*: "... I argue that it is precisely the shared abstract meaning, i.e. the speaker's uncertainty, which is responsible for the close relationship between conditionals and questions" (Akatsuka 1985: 636).

Although in contemporary Spanish *no saber si* governs the indicative mood in the complement clause, in older phases of the language the subjunctive could be used too. The same holds true for Spanish American dialects:

In many Latin American dialects, when a conditional *si* clause is introduced by *no sé* 'I don't know', the following verb appears in the Subjunctive, e.g., *No sé si pueda (S)* 'I don't know if I can'. Continental speakers find this usage odd, but it is widespread in America (Lunn 1995: 434).

43. Imperative sentences, both affirmative and negative ones, are no exception to this rule, as illustrated, for example, by:

(a) *Olvida que lo he dicho yo*

('Forget that I said it')

(b) *No olvides que soy sacerdote*

('Do not forget that I am a priest')

44. Compare also Hengeveld's qualification "objectively modalized predication" (1987: 16).

45. This situation is not uncommon in scientific reports:

En cambio, cuando la información corresponde a una teoría que todavía no ha sido totalmente aceptada, esto se indica mediante cláusulas modales con verbos de opinión (*se supone que, se cree que*) o construcciones preposicionales encabezadas por *según* o *para*. De este modo el periodista no se responsabiliza por la información sino que transfiere esa responsabilidad a la creencia general o a una teoría determinada. De este modo, se restringe la aserción y se relativiza la información (Gallardo 1999: 56).

('On the other hand, when the information is concerned with a theory that has not been accepted yet, this is indicated by means of modal clauses with verbs of opinion ('it is assumed that', 'it is believed that') or prepositional constructions introduced by 'according to' or 'for'. In this way, the journalist does not take responsibility for the information, but transfers that responsibility to what is generally believed or to a particular theory. In this way, the assertion is restricted and the information is presented from a non-personal point of view')

46. Note that (114c) is well-formed if the question bears upon the content of the embedded proposition; in that case, the person asking the question wishes to know the opinion of the other concerning the way the president was murdered. However, if the embedded proposition does not denote an action or a process, the *cómo* question is inappropriate any-

way. Compare, e.g., * ¿Cómo crees que esta casa es antigua? ('How do you believe that this house is old?')

47. In this connection, consider:

Es un fenómeno muy conocido que cuando un verbo de opinión se construye con una oración subordinada sustantiva del tipo V + que + oración, el modo de esta última se encuentra normalmente en indicativo, aunque no se descarta que también pueda aparecer en subjuntivo (Guillén Sutil 1990: 219).

('It is a wellknown phenomenon that when a verb of opinion is constructed with a subordinate noun clause of the type V + that + clause, the latter normally takes the indicative, although the use of the subjunctive is not excluded')

However notice that in some varieties of Spanish and Italian the line of modal demarcation runs between epistemic and doxastic predicates:

Debe recordarse que los verbos de aserción débil más característicos, como *creery pensar*, se construyen con subjuntivo en italiano moderno y también en español antiguo y dialectal, sin que por ello dejen de pertenecer a esa clase semántica (Bosque 1990: 36).

('It should be pointed out that the most characteristic verbs of weak assertion, such as 'believe' and 'think', are constructed with the subjunctive in modern Italian and also in old and dialectal Spanish without losing their membership of that semantic class')

48. The meaning of *suponer* expressed in (117) and (117a) is characteristic of so-called *predicados creadores de mundos o universos* ('world or universe-creating predicates') (Ridruejo 1999: 3228). Other specimens belonging to this class of predicates are *imaginar* ('to imagine'), *aceptar* ('to accept'), and *poner por caso* ('to suppose').

49. Note that these interpretations offer a solution to the problem posed by Bosque, who wonders why *Suponiendo que María tenga razón* ('Supposing that María is — SUB — right') and *Supón que María tenga razón* ('Suppose that María is — SUB — right') are grammatical sentences of Spanish, whereas **Supongo que María tenga razón* ('I suppose that María is — SUB — right') is not. (Bosque 1990: 39).

50. Lleó analyzes the difference we are concerned with in the following way:

... when the speaker uses the complement clause of these [doxastic, H. H.] verbs in the Subjunctive, he is not making any claim about the truth or falsity of the proposition involved in the complement; on the other hand, when he uses the complement clause in the Indicative, he "somehow" means to commit himself to the truth of the complement (1979: 11).

51. Nevertheless, there is no general agreement on the grammaticality of indicative complementation:

Son muy pocos los casos en que aparece obligatoriamente un subjuntivo. Cuando se trata de una oración dependiente de un verbo de duda o temor aparece subjuntivo:

{*Dudo*}

que venga

{*Temo*}

(Igalada Belchí 1987–89: 660).

(‘There are very few cases where the use of the subjunctive is obligatory. The subjunctive appears in clauses which are dependent on a verb of doubt or fear: ‘I doubt / am afraid that he is coming’)

52. The following statement elaborates on the difference between ‘possibility’ and ‘probability’:

... la *posibilidad* se expresa en términos dicotómicos y complementarios: cuando se asegura que es posible que algo ocurra, al tiempo se está diciendo que es posible que *no* ocurra, sin que existan términos medios o posibilidad de graduación de la posibilidad. La *probabilidad*, en cambio, se expresa en términos graduales. Se puede expresar que algo se considera ‘muy probable’ o ‘poco probable’ (Jiménez Juliá 1989: 203).

(‘... ‘possibility’ is expressed in dicotomic and complementary terms: when one is assured that it is possible that something happens, one is saying at the same time that it is possible that it does *not* happen; there does not exist a middle course or a possibility to express degrees of possibility. ‘Probability’, on the other hand, is expressed in different degrees. One can say that something is considered ‘very probable’)

With respect to the use of *posible*, it should be added to this statement that one can say *muy posible*. **Poco posible*, however, does not sound acceptable.

53. Note that *posiblemente* and the objectively modalized expression *es posible que* are not semantically equivalent. There is, for example, a difference between (a) *Posiblemente viene hoy* (‘Possibly he is — IND — coming today’) and (b) *Es posible que venga hoy* (‘It is possible that he is — SUB — coming today’). Unlike (a), (b) focuses on the truth value of *venga hoy*. Accordingly, *es posible* is implicitly contrasted with unpersonal constructions expressing other degrees of cognitive meaning, such as *es cierto*, *es probable*, and *es imposible*. The difference at issue can be formally shown by changing the assertive structure of the sentence into an interrogative one. Thus, other things being equal, sentence (a) cannot be transformed in this way, but sentence (b) can:

- (a’) *¿*Posiblemente viene hoy?*
 (b’) ¿*Es posible que venga hoy?*

For a more detailed analysis, see Foley and Van Valin (1984: 219).

54. The following comment is representative of this line of reasoning:

... la emoción es un estado subjetivo que envuelve con su efectividad toda la expresión; tiene realidad interna, pero no fuera de nosotros. Esta subjetividad total en que se halla sumergida la oración subordinada, da al juicio expresado por ésta una apariencia de irrealidad objetiva, que facilita la propagación analógica del subjuntivo (Gili y Gaya 1955: 123).

(‘... emotion is a subjective state which effectively penetrates the whole expression; it has an internal reality, which does not exist outside ourselves. The total subjectivity in which the subordinate clause is immersed creates the impression that the judgment expressed by it describes an objective unreality, which facilitates the analoguous propagation of the subjunctive’)

Note that criteria such as *realidad interna* and *subjetividad total* might also apply to the meaning of doxastic predicates, as a result of which they lose their distinctive force.

55. Deontic sentences are subject to the constraint that the temporal relation between the main and the subordinate clause reflects the chronological order of the states of affairs involved. This rule explains, for example, the ungrammaticality of (146a) **Es necesario que lo hicieras cuanto antes* ('It is necessary that you did it as soon as possible'). For a more elaborate discussion of this type of *consecutio temporum*, see Suñer and Padilla-Rivera (1987).

56. This syntactic configuration is not a language-particular characteristic of Spanish, but holds for many other languages. Thus, e.g., *me gusta* can be translated into Dutch, English, French, German, and Latin in the following way: *het bevalt me*, *it pleases me*, *ça me plaît*, *es gefällt mir*, and *placet mihi*.

57. Compare also Castronovo's discussion of *Temo con sobrado motivo que ha llegado el momento* ('I have ample reason to be afraid that the time has come): "*Temo* does not express an emotional reaction here; rather the context forces it to mean 'believe' since the speaker expresses a great degree of certainty that the moment has arrived" (1984: 201).

58. For an analysis of the English hedge *I'm afraid*, which is more often employed than its Spanish counterpart *me temo*, see Haverkate (1987b: 350–352). For present purposes we may look at a dialogue fragment from the work by Vonnegut:

"I'm afraid I don't read as much as I ought to", said Maggi.

"We are all afraid of something", Trout replied, "I'm afraid of cancer and rats and Doberman Pinchers."

This fragment is commented on by Coulmas (1980: 146) in the following manner: "*I'm afraid* is a routine formula, and it is common knowledge that, in normal usage, it does not mean that the speaker is afraid of something, but that he is about to admit or disclose something unpleasant or somehow negative."

59. In accordance with our object of research, this rule has been formulated in order to account for the basic pattern of modal distribution in Peninsular Spanish. In other dialects, such as Mexican and Colombian Spanish, evaluation predicates do not necessarily trigger subjunctive complementation, as shown by the following set of examples: *Estoy muy satisfecho de que supo terminarlo él solo* (Mexican) ('I am very satisfied that he managed — IND — to finish it alone'), *Me da coraje que lo hizo sin mi permiso* (Mexican) ('It makes me mad that he did — IND — it without my permission'), *Me enfureció que me insultaron* (Colombian) ('It made me furious that they insulted — IND — me'), *Me alegre de que conseguiste el empleo* (Colombian) ('I am glad that you got — IND — the job') (Bosque 1990: 46). A similar situation applies to Medieval Spanish: "...[the indicative was used, H. H.] after verbs of emotion owing to the fact that the clause was not fully subordinate to the governing verb, i.e., *He was glad that it happened* = *He was glad because it happened*" (Bolinger 1953: 460).

60. An exception to this rule concerns the insertion of clitic pronouns undergoing subject-to-object raising. Compare, *La señora le hizo acercarse al fuego* ('The lady made him get closer to the fire') (Bouzet n.d.: 382). If, however, instead of a clitic pronoun a full noun phrase is inserted, subjunctive complementation takes place: *La señora hizo que el pobre hombre se acercara al fuego* ('The lady made the poor man get — SUB — closer to the fire').

61. For an analysis of other anthropocentric categories of Spanish, see Haverkate (1980).

62. Note however that:

Some languages which have both direct and indirect speech allow the use of indirect speech only if the reporter-speaker is unsure about the original speech ... In Paez culture, a person is not allowed to quote by taking the responsibility for the quote himself/herself — which is the implication of indirect quote. A quote must be entirely attributable to the original speaker, in form and content — which is the strategy of a direct quote (Li 1986: 40–41).

63. The sections on *assertives* and *directives* contain a revision of Haverkate (1996).

64. This point was originally made by Karttunen with respect to English, where the same situation holds: “The verb *tell* with a that-complement does not entail that what is told is true; with an indirect question it does” (1978: 172).

65. The ‘promissive’ interpretation of the future tense can also be explained from a diachronic point of view. As is wellknown, the modern Spanish paradigm originated from a fusion of the Latin infinitive and the verb *habere*. The following semantic evolution took place during the grammaticalization process involved: “The meaning of *habeo* in isolation was of course ‘I have, I possess’, but combined with an infinitive it appears at first to have indicated intention, then obligation and finally simple futurity” (Penny 1991: 173).

66. One could argue that so-called ‘existential predicates’ do not fit into the classification. Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that these predicates are exceptional in the sense that they do not express lexical meaning; they are exclusively used to indicate that a certain state of affairs holds or takes place. Characteristic instances are *ocurrir* (‘to occur’), *pasar* (‘to happen’) and *acontecer* (‘to take place’). Since these predicates focus on the existence of facts, they require the indicative mood to be used in the complement clause. Evidently, negative matrix clauses trigger the use of the subjunctive because of the *irrealis*-character of the embedded proposition.

67. This point has also been stressed by Kleiman (1974: 162):

Traditionally, the subjunctive verb in these *before* clauses has been explained in terms of the future reference of temporal clauses: *before* clauses do not have future reference with regard to the speech event, but they are future with respect to the action described in the main clause ...

68. In this connection, Pérez Saldanya (1999: 315) observes:

En el primer grupo hay que situar la mayoría de los gramáticos tradicionales y algunos de los estructuralistas, para quienes el uso del subjuntivo se debe a la analogía establecida entre *después de que* and *antes de que*. (‘In the first group we must include the majority of traditional grammarians and some of the structuralists for whom the use of the subjunctive is due to the analogy established between *después de que* and *antes de que*’)

69. Compare also Pérez Saldanya’s comment on the sentence *Se lo comunicamos cuando tú {quieres/quieras}* (‘We tell it to him when you {want — IND / SUB —}’), where the present subjunctive is opposed to the present indicative:

... el indicativo señala que el hablante se está refiriendo a un intervalo temporal concreto y específico, a un intervalo que ha sido delimitado previamente por el interlocu-

tor; el subjuntivo, por el contrario, señala la no especificidad de este intervalo (1999: 3314).

(‘... the indicative indicates that the speaker is referring to a concrete and specific temporal interval, an interval that has been previously determined by the interlocutor; the subjunctive, on the other hand, indicates the non-specific character of this interval’)

70. As we will see in the section on conditional clauses, *siempre que* also expresses hypothetical meaning.

71. The average language user may be assumed to be aware of the difference between cause and justification indicating statements. The following conversation, taken from Coste and Redondo (1965: 444), supports this point of view:

A: – Las ranas croan

B: – Sin duda lloverá

A: – Es posible que llueva, pero no creo que en la producción de la lluvia intervengan en lo más mínimo las ranas

(‘– The frogs are croaking – No doubt it is going to rain – It is possible that it is going to rain, but I do not believe that frogs take any part in the production of rain’)

72. Defining a subset of a set referred to in a restrictive relative clause consists in a two-stage operation: “[a restrictive clause] specifies a set of objects in two steps: a larger set is specified, called the domain of relativization, and then restricted to some subset of which a certain sentence, the restricting sentence, is true” (Keenan and Comrie 1977: 63).

73. In both sentences *vivían lejos* suggests a causal link with *llegaron tarde a la escuela*. Note that, speaking in more general terms, this is not an uncommon interpretation of non-restrictive adjective clauses.

74. *Cualquiera* (‘whatever’) belongs, together with *quienquiera* (‘whoever’), *comoquiera* (‘however’) and *cuando quiera* (‘whenever’), to a set of relative expressions which cover a generic domain of reference. They are formally characterized by the verbal suffix *-quiera*, which serves as a *potentialis* marker to indicate that the boundaries of the referential domain cannot be demarcated. As a consequence, the use of the subjunctive in the relative clause is obligatory.

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